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An election with little strategic significance, but undeniable symbolic importance… The presidential election held in Iran on Friday to choose a successor to Ebrahim Raisi, who died on May 19 in a helicopter crash while returning from Azerbaijan, has led to a runoff between the moderate reformist candidate, Massoud Pezeshkian, and the staunch ultraconservative candidate, Saeed Jalili. The outcome of this popular vote highlights several socio-political indicators that uncover the deep-seated discontent that has been noticeable within Iranian society for several years.
The abstention rate (60%) is the highest of any election held since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had called for massive participation, aiming to confirm the supposed “legitimacy” of the mullahs’ regime, which has been seriously challenged by a series of popular uprisings. The latest of these, triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini while in detention in September 2022, continues sporadically to this day, punctuated by convictions and capital executions. The low turnout recorded on Friday is a clear rebuke and a stinging blow to the authorities.
More significantly, the minimal impact of calls for widespread participation from moderate faction leaders is particularly telling. Former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, along with Hossein Mousavi (a candidate in June 2009) and Mehdi Karroubi, had urged their supporters to vote for Pezeshkian. One might have expected a mobilization from young people, university students, women (especially), intellectuals, and artists in support of the reformist candidate. However, this was not the case. These broad segments of civil society, who have spearheaded recent popular uprisings against the obscurantist foundations (and values) of the Islamic Republic, clearly no longer believe in the system as a whole and seem disillusioned with the potential for meaningful reform through the moderate faction.
This widespread rejection of the system comes as no surprise. The core issue lies in the fact that real decision-making authority over major strategic choices and the overall direction of the Islamic Republic rests with the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, not with the President, whose role is limited to managing domestic state affairs. The silent majority that boycotted the election likely hasn’t forgotten that Iran has had two moderate reformist presidents since 1979: Mohammad Khatami (two terms from 1997 to 2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013 to 2021). Yet, these four terms have hardly changed the orientations set by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards nor fundamentally improved the situation or living conditions of Iranian society. Those opposed to the regime may also recall the circumstances of the June 2009 presidential election. Reformist candidate Hossein Moussavi had claimed victory, alleging extensive electoral fraud that led to the announcement of hardline candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s win. This event triggered large-scale protest movements in Tehran and several major cities. However, the protests were violently quelled.
The regime’s theocratic, authoritarian, and ideological foundations seem unshakeable. However, in the current volatile context and amid multiple crises, is there now a strategic rationale for the regime to support the election of a reformist president advocating for détente with the West and a more socially tolerant policy? The debate is fueled by a significant indicator: Pezeshkian’s candidacy as a reformist was rejected in the 2021 presidential election. Why, then, has it been endorsed three years later? Does the regime, amidst current challenges, genuinely aim to initiate a rapprochement with the West and ease societal tensions in Iran? Or is it merely trying to reinforce its “legitimacy” by presenting the illusion of a genuine electoral contest between its favored candidate, Saeed Jalili, and the moderate contender, who has repeatedly criticized the hardline faction’s domestic and foreign policies? The upcoming weeks will tell…