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A necessary, indeed indispensable, but not sufficient condition … This is how one could characterize the retention of General Joseph Aoun in his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In the context of stabilizing southern Lebanon and strictly adhering to Resolution 1701, the decision was crucial, as the army needs to be led by a commander who is well-known by international authorities. One they see as trustworthy and credible and who has a track record to prove it, as the troops are expected to play a crucial role alongside UNIFIL when the time comes to revert to a state of calm.
The regular forces should thus be fully prepared to shoulder their responsibilities in the upcoming phase, the timing and course of which will predominantly be dictated by political dynamics. The pressing question at hand, subject to myriad speculations, revolves around the genuine risks of a full-scale confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. Will it be war or will it be peace? The answer is clearly not to be found in Lebanon, not even at the level of the pro-Iranian party.
It goes without saying, but some tend to overlook it: the decision to launch (or not) a full-fledged war is a distinctly political choice made at the highest levels of power by a very exclusive group of leaders. In our unique context regarding southern Lebanon, three entities hold the authority to make a decision in this regard: the United States, Israel and Iran. What would the strategic interests of each of these three powers be if they were to opt for a widespread conflict on Lebanese soil and what would the implications be?
From the outset, and based on initial indications, both the United States and Israel, along with France and the United Nations, have outlined a clear objective for Lebanon: the strict implementation of Resolution 1701, including the withdrawal of the Hezbollah militia to the north of the Litani River, within the framework of a comprehensive agreement under American auspices. The Israeli Minister of Defense announced a few days ago that his country is not seeking to engage in a new war (specifically, on the northern border with Lebanon) but aims to achieve a diplomatic agreement “that would ensure Hezbollah does not threaten Israelis in the North.” A position that doesn’t overtly project hostility, at least on the surface, but aligns with that of the international community, particularly the United States and France. However, it may not necessarily mirror the stance of the most radical wing of the Netanyahu government. This group might be inclined to confront Hezbollah in order to preempt the potential emergence of a “new Gaza” on Israel’s northern border.
The two extremes converge, as often said in political analysis circles. The unwavering stance of certain Israeli leaders would thus be bolstered if the Iranian camp chooses to persist in a protracted war along the southern border. One of the significant uncertainties in the power struggle unfolding in the region, and consequently in Lebanon, is the true intentions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
Do the Pasdaran wish, or rather do they really have the means, to advance their expansionist and destabilizing strategy in the region, even at the risk of causing a widespread conflict with unpredictable repercussions? Clearly, one would need to be privy to the closed and restricted circle of Iranian decision-makers to provide an answer to such a question. Nevertheless, in this context, certain indicators do stand out. This includes the repeated drone attacks by pro-Iranian militias against American positions in Iraq and Syria. However, the most serious indication that could illustrate the true intentions of the Pasdaran lies primarily in the escalation of Houthi attacks in Yemen against merchant ships and oil tankers in the Red Sea.
On Tuesday night (December 19), the Pentagon announced the creation of an extensive coalition of 10 countries to address the aggressive conduct of the Houthis and ensure the security of maritime traffic in the Red Sea. The Houthis swiftly countered, affirming their commitment to persist in their attacks in the designated area. Is this an impulsive reaction born out of frustration, or does it reflect a genuine intent from their sponsor, namely the Pasdaran, to push things to the limit in a showdown with the West, particularly the United States, even if a faction within the Iranian regime is not in favor of such action?
Two more far-reaching and pivotal questions come up about the future course of events: Is there truly a dual dynamic within the Iranian regime—one characterized by fervent radicalism, ideological steadfastness and unwavering resolve, embodied by the Pasdaran, and another purportedly moderate or pragmatic, occasionally articulated by select power centers in Tehran? More importantly, could there be a sort of tacit accommodation, involving the “acceptance of the other” between the Iranian regime and the West, including Israel, within the framework, of course, of certain red lines, notably nuclear ones?
This question is extremely relevant when revisiting the historical precedent of the Iran-Contra affair in the mid-1980s, when the United States and Israel covertly supplied arms to Iran amid its conflict with Iraq.
The situation in southern Lebanon is intricately tied to the answers to these two fundamental questions. A favorable response to the second one could revive hopes for a political resolution in southern Lebanon similar to the successful delineation of maritime borders. On the other hand, a positive response to the first question would increase the risks of escalation and widespread confrontation.
Nevertheless, these risks are moderated by a crucial factor: the delicate balance of power on both regional and international fronts, especially following the creation of the coalition of 10 countries entrusted with securing the Red Sea. This delicate balance of power is undoubtedly a challenge for those prone to adventurous practices driven by an ideological obscurantism of a bygone era. An issue to follow closely …
