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General François Hage was killed three months after leading the army to a resounding victory in its battle against Islamist terrorists in Nahr el-Bared in 2007.
In 2007, during the one hundred and five days of the military operation led by General François Hage against the terrorist organization Fateh el-Islam, in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared, the Lebanese army came out victorious. Despite the threat that Fateh el-Islam represented to the security of the country and the region, Nahr el-Bared was deemed a “red line” by Hezbollah.
The terrorist group (Fateh el-Islam) had slowly expanded in Tripoli under the leadership of the Islamist, Shaker el-Absi. The latter was imprisoned for three years by Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime for arms trafficking and was released in February 2005, around the time of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s assassination.
A few months after the forced withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country, Damascus expelled him to Lebanon. In the fall of 2006, Shaker el-Absi settled in Tripoli, where he founded the aforementioned Islamist group. Was this done under Syria’s influence? Some believe that such was the case.
Absi promptly seized control of the camp of Nahr el-Bared, where he allegedly planned to establish an emirate or an Islamic state. His group carried out numerous terrorist acts, targeting, among other things, military personnel. Twenty-seven soldiers were killed in ambushes and clashes with armed members of Fateh el-Islam. For the army, it became imperative to eliminate the threat that this group represented. The military operation was launched on May 20, 2007.
Despite efforts to prevent the army from carrying out its operation against Fateh el-Islam, the military institution, under the leadership of François Hage, successfully introduced Lebanon as the first country to crush the Islamic State (IS) group’s project in the region.
At that time, Lebanon was gripped by a series of bombings following the assassination of Rafic Hariri. These attacks targeted Lebanese opposition figures, including Gebran Tueni, on December 12, 2005.
Two years later, to the day, General François Hage, then 54 years old, was killed by a car bombing – the ninth similar incident since February 14, 2005. He had just left his house in Baabda early in the morning to go to his office at the Ministry of Defense in the suburbs of Beirut when a powerful explosive device placed along the Baabda road detonated. The blast claimed two more lives and left eight others injured.
The Hero of Nahr el-Bared’s Battle
As the head of the operations cell within the Lebanese army, General François Hage stood as one of Lebanon’s most respected commanders. Rising from the ranks of lieutenant to battalion commander and eventually overseeing both commando and intervention regiments, Hage was appointed by General Michel Sleiman — then the army commander (later the President of the Republic in 2008) — to lead the Battle of Nahr el-Bared. According to General Khalil Helou, the choice was outlined by the officer’s character, and he portrayed him as “a hands-on leader who didn’t settle for conducting his job from behind a desk.”
Interviewed by This is Beirut, General Helou and those who were well acquainted with François Hage describe the latter as an exceptional officer on all levels: personal, military and strategic. He was considered a likely candidate to succeed Michel Sleiman at the helm of the military institution. It should be mentioned that Sleiman had led the army from 1998 to 2008 before becoming President of the Republic.
Born in South Lebanon, François Hage “lived through the fifteen years of war in Lebanon (from 1975 to 1990), displaying unwavering resilience, and maintaining a constant bond of solidarity with and close to his soldiers,” as explained by those who were interviewed.
Throughout the Battle of Nahr el-Bared, “he often went to the frontline, even spending nights in the camp, and stood in for officers to allow them to get some rest,” highlights Helou. His military dedication was coupled with a commitment to protecting his soldiers against any political pressure. Since the beginning of the Battle of Nahr el-Bared, politicians from all sides pressured both Michel Sleiman and François Hage to expedite the time span of the conflict. To which the head of the operations cell asserted, “The battle will take whatever time it requires, but it will end with a winner and a loser.” By this, he meant that it would not end inconclusively due to negotiations, which proved futile from the very first weeks.
Hassan Nasrallah’s ‘Red Line’
Thus, from May 20 to July 2, 2007, following intense and heavy clashes that resulted in the loss of nearly 170 lives and almost 400 injuries, the Battle of Nahr el-Bared and the victory of the Lebanese army against Fateh el-Islam stood as a symbolic reply to the statements made by Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, on May 25, 2007, just days after the onset of the hostilities.
In a speech marking the commemoration of the liberation of South Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah stated, “The army is a red line. No one should undermine it. (…) But, at the same time, the camp (Nahr el-Bared) is also a red line. (…) Whoever decides to enter the camp must shoulder the responsibility. Any decision to enter the camp would entail sacrificing the army, the Palestinian people and Lebanon.”
At that time, Hezbollah had launched “a comprehensive process to assert control over Palestinians in Lebanon,” as described by General Helou. “For the pro-Iranian party, this strategy involved infiltrating Palestinian organizations, turning them against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to safeguard themselves from the potential threat they might pose.” This also allowed the Shiite party to maintain control over these groups, as is currently evident with Hamas. “This is particularly significant since the PLO had begun fostering friendly relations with the Lebanese army and state, committing to refrain from further involvement in Lebanese affairs,” he concludes.
