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The Lebanese presidential election has been postponed to a date to be determined by the Group of Five (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, France, and the United States) following the failure of previously set deadlines blamed on various officials and political parties. The delay can be attributed to Hezbollah’s insistence on linking the presidential issue with broader regional ones and using it as a strategic bargaining tool to support its regional objectives.
The Shiite duo’s (Amal-Hezbollah) steadfast support for their candidate, Marada Leader Sleiman Frangieh, is a direct response to the Group of Five’s inclination toward exploring the chances of a third candidate. This dealt a blow to the French initiative, the Qatari mediation efforts, and other foreign interventions, mainly the one initiated by the Vatican. As the presidential issue becomes entangled with regional concerns, a former minister believes that it is essential to await the outcome of key developments that will influence the course of the election. These developments include the relaunch of US-Iranian negotiations in Oman, following the release of five American hostages held in Iran in exchange for releasing frozen assets worth 6 billion dollars, which were deposited in Qatari banks.
Meanwhile, negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Riyadh for ending the Yemeni war have gained momentum, following discussions between Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan. Iran has urged the Huthi insurgents and Hezbollah to engage with Saudi Arabia in order to put an end to the war and address unresolved issues. Negotiations are taking place amidst challenging conditions, with a steadfast Saudi commitment to reach a settlement. The aim is to promote stability and peace in Yemen following an agreement on power restructuring.
On another note, while exploratory drilling is ongoing in Block 9 in southern Lebanon to assess fuel reserves, Lebanese officials are awaiting the return of US envoy, Amos Hochstein, who is expected to discuss the demarcation of the land border with Israel and the presidential election. It is believed that US President Joe Biden’s administration has expanded Hochstein’s mission to include the election issue.
In parallel, the issue of Syrian refugees is increasingly dominating the political arena, amidst political disagreements, which have resulted in slowing down the functioning of constitutional institutions, with far-reaching implications on the security situation.
Political observers are questioning the rationale behind the continued influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon. This phenomenon persists even though the Syrian conflict has officially ended, with secure areas under government control and other safe regions under the influence of opposition forces offering viable options for refugee repatriation. As per a security official, the migration of Syrians to Lebanon is primarily motivated by economic factors rather than political ones. A Syrian refugee supported this view, noting that despite economic challenges in Lebanon, the situation remains relatively better than in Syria, where the high cost of living is coupled with shortages of basic necessities.
While economic and livelihood factors are the primary factors behind the new wave of Syrian migration, security officials are wary of the militarization of Syrian refugee camps, where heavy weaponry, explosives, drones, and other military equipment have been found.
Sovereign circles sounded the alarm over the implication of this fact, given the seemingly utter indifference of the international community, even though the number of refugees is now nearing half of Lebanon’s total population. The army has been conducting raids on Syrian refugee camps, confiscating significant quantities of weapons, and deporting Syrians who entered Lebanon illegally through smuggling networks.
A prominent figure in the anti-Hezbollah sovereign camp believes that the Syrian refugees are potential time bombs that can be strategically used to serve external agendas aimed at undermining Hezbollah’s arsenal. Such a scenario could potentially inflame sectarian tensions between Shiite and Sunni communities, disrupting the Shiite duo’s unity and potentially driving their supportive base to revolt against their leadership. This scenario could possibly be the intended outcome.
Lebanese politicians have failed to elect a president, surrendering the matter to external actors who, nonetheless, require internal consensus to proceed. Hezbollah’s opponents fear that an agreement on the presidential election may not be a peaceful one, reminiscent of the 2008 uneasy accord that resulted in the election of General Michel Sleiman as president.
That period was marked by the events of May 7th, which saw Hezbollah and Amal militiamen invade West Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon. Is it possible that a new version of May 7 might be looming, but this time in a reverse direction, by using the Syrian refugee crisis against Hezbollah for security ends?
Foreign parties are concerned that violence in Lebanon could potentially ignite external conflicts and fuel sectarian tensions even more. In this context, informed sources do not exclude the possibility of enlisting Syrians to eradicate (Hezbollah’s) illegal weapons and enforce Resolutions 1559, 1701, and 2650. In short, just like “Syria under Hafez al-Assad,” expelled the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Lebanon in the 1980s -when it controlled the government-, the Syrian refugee crisis could be used today by external actors to help put an end to the role of illegitimate armed groups, with the support of the Group of Five and the United Nations. Furthermore, according to sources from the opposition, the manipulation of the Syrian refugees’ crisis can also come in handy to demarcate the maritime and land borders with Syria, and expand UNIFIL’s mission to control these borders and help the army prevent infiltration and arms smuggling.
The election of a president and the formation of a new government will fall short of expectations if they are not coupled with a clear border demarcation with Syria and the creation of a Lebanese-Syrian security cooperation. Should the Syrian regime agree to this plan, its leader may be “rewarded” by external actors in the form of an Arab and Western rapprochement. However, this engagement would be contingent upon resolving the Syrian crisis under specific conditions that the regime should commit to fulfilling. These include pursuing a political agreement with Israel through Abraham Accords, defining its political choices, and finally aligning with the Arab world while distancing itself from Iran.
