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The departure or expulsion of the four MPs from the “Free Patriotic Movement” (FPM) came amid complete silence from Hezbollah regarding what its partner in the “Mar Mikhael Understanding” is going through. This is despite the fact that the FPM leadership has not failed so far to keep up with Hezbollah’s affairs and its ongoing concerns related to the constantly erupting “support front” in southern Lebanon. Could there be a reason behind this dynamic in the relationship between the two sides?
To address this question, it is essential to examine the communication dynamics between Dahyeh (Hezbollah’s stronghold) and Mirna Chalouhi (the FPM headquarters) during this period. This analysis reveals the depth of the divide between the two sides. While Hezbollah operates under the principle that “no voice is louder than the voice of the battle,” continuously unfolding on the southern front, the FPM is mired in a severe internal crisis that has left it resembling a tree in autumn — shedding its leaves and on the brink of collapse.
On the media front, there has also been a new phase of reevaluating the significance of the partnership between Hezbollah and the FPM, 18 years after it was established through the “understanding” signed by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and FPM founder General Michel Aoun. This reevaluation has gained significant momentum recently under two main headlines: the judicial developments concerning the case of former Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh and the parliamentary developments regarding the diminished influence of the FPM following the departure of four of its MPs.
Under the first headline, the heated rhetoric highlighted the fragile nature of the relationship between Dahyeh and Mirna Chalouhi. When the FPM seized on the arrest of Riad Salameh, portraying it as a major victory, media outlets affiliated with Hezbollah took notice. One prominent outlet expressed surprise at the FPM’s “exaggerated cheering” over Salameh’s arrest, pointing out that this enthusiasm does not obscure the fact that the FPM, including its leader MP Gebran Bassil and former President Michel Aoun, was involved in extending Salameh’s term.
The outlet remarked, “Despite all previous — and subsequent — denials by Aoun and Bassil, it is well known to everyone who was present or even outside the cabinet session that approved the extension. No party bypassed the Maronite president in extending the term of a key Maronite position. The FPM cannot conceal its previous support for Salameh during his tenure or its benefits from him while now launching a media campaign against him.” The media outlet concluded by stating, “This is similar to what the FPM is attempting to do now with MP Ibrahim Kanaan, distancing itself from him as though Kanaan acted independently from the FPM’s policies and its management of financial matters and benefits over the years.”
Under the second headline, which addresses the parliamentary status of the FPM, media responses affiliated with Hezbollah suggest that the FPM bloc is in the process of disintegration. This is evidenced by the departure of four MPs — Elias Bou Saab, Alain Aoun, Simon Abi Ramia, and Ibrahim Kanaan — following the earlier departure of two others, Mohammad Yahya and George Bouchikian.
The number of FPM MPs has dropped from 21 to 15, with five of these MPs having been elected with the support of Hezbollah. The response further notes, “What is more alarming is that the FPM has lost its representation in the districts that should reflect its popularity and political relevance in Mount Lebanon — Baabda, Metn, and Jbeil, which were elected by its base.” It concludes by stating, “The weakened image of the Free Patriotic Movement is significant because Christian representation has become divided among three Christian blocs, with the strongest being the Lebanese Forces, who, along with their non-partisan allies, hold 20 seats.”
In contrast, the FPM has fully immersed itself in efforts to avoid the consequences of its own actions. Observers of Bassil’s recent media appearances would note that he is on the offensive, defending himself as vigorously as he did during past conflicts. Bassil first emphasized his distinction from Hezbollah, stating that “the FPM supports defending Lebanon against Israel but does not agree with linking this defense to conflicts that are not in its interest.” He then addressed the issue of Salameh’s arrest, asserting that “the FPM is the only party that had the courage to confront this issue.”
Commenting on the departure of the four MPs from the FPM, Bassil said, “Whoever leaves the FPM leaves alone.” However, Bassil realized how deep the predicament the FPM has reached, emphasizing that “the FPM needs to return politically to the popular state it was in back in 2018, to communicate with the people and not leave them confused and misguided.” Yet, amid this burst of energy to save whatever can be salvaged from the sinking FPM ship, Bassil turned his accusation toward the Lebanese people, saying, “The audience for corruption in Lebanon is larger than the audience for reform!” He concluded with a cry reminiscent of Tarzan’s yell from the black-and-white cinema era, stating, “The internal and external forces have conspired to dismantle the FPM and draw a policy for it that is outside of its cause, principles, and policy!”
Returning to the earlier question about whether there is an explanation for this phenomenon in the historical trajectory of the relationship between the FPM and Hezbollah: Based on the points discussed, which are merely the tip of the iceberg, it is evident that the FPM is grappling with the fear of “the day after” the current events that have significantly impacted its position in Lebanon. Consequently, the FPM’s leadership is seeking a lifeline. This was hinted at by the FPM’s television channel last Saturday, which reported that Bassil held “a series of political meetings in Europe last week with several figures who were either already there or traveled there to meet him.” At the same time, the FPM’s recent attempts to engage with the Lebanese Forces, following Samir Geagea’s latest speech, have not yielded successful results.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah is contending with intense challenges, some of which were recently highlighted by Abdallah Bou Habib, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants in the caretaker government. He stated, “Israel conveyed a message to us through mediators indicating that it is not interested in a ceasefire in Lebanon, even after a ceasefire is reached in Gaza.” In response, Israel’s Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, announced, “Our forces are preparing for offensive measures inside Lebanon.”
Is it an exaggeration to say that Bassil’s “value” in Dahyeh has now plummeted in a market that views the FPM as a commodity nearing its expiration date?
