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For several months, Syria and Turkey have been making statements in favor of normalizing their diplomatic relations. In July, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that he could invite Syrian President Bashar al-Assad “at any time” to begin talks to restore relations.
At the end of August, in a speech before the People’s Assembly, Assad declared the necessity and benefits for both countries of restoring their relations, while emphasizing that “reestablishing a relationship first requires eliminating the causes that led to its breakdown.”
The two countries severed their diplomatic relations in 2011 after the start of the Syrian conflict. Thirteen years later, Syria remains stuck in a stalemate between government loyalist forces, Turkish forces and the rebel factions they support in the north, and Kurdish factions supported by the United States in the northeast.
This is Beirut interviewed Arthur Quesnay, a political science Ph.D. (University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne) and co-author of Syria, Anatomy of a Civil War (2016).
There recently have been several statements in favor of normalization between the two countries. Do you think this normalization could happen in the coming months, or is it still an uncertainty?
Syria is seeking openings on the international stage, especially with Turkey. However, Bashar al-Assad is not ready to compromise on important issues, such as the Syrian refugees in Turkey, stopping drug trafficking, which poses many problems for Turkey, and certainly not on normalizing the groups opposing the regime, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Thus, without concessions from the Syrian regime, normalizing relations between the two countries is unlikely to succeed.
Nevertheless, both countries have interests in reaching a deconfliction agreement. In Turkey, Erdogan is in a difficult position on the domestic political scene, where the Syrian refugee issue remains significant and affects the AKP’s electoral results. This was evident in the municipal elections with the loss of the Istanbul mayoralty. In this context, Erdogan seeks to make an impression with his foreign policy and seems to address the Syrian refugee problem, which would be presented as a political victory.
For Assad, it is about lifting Syria from its pariah status and reestablishing relations with other countries on the international stage, as he did with his return to the Arab League and rapprochements with Gulf countries.
However, at this stage, any normalization between Turkey and Syria seems impossible, and negotiations between the two actors are likely to be short-lived.
Could Turkey consider withdrawing from Syria? Under what conditions?
Without an agreement on the Syrian refugee issue and securing their common borders, Turkey cannot consider withdrawing from Syria. It intervened in Syria to secure the Idlib pocket, where more than 3 million displaced people reside. Turkey fears that withdrawing its troops from northeastern Syria would trigger a new wave of refugees onto its soil.
Ankara favors a status quo that does not harm it and is not that costly. With nearly 15,000 Turkish soldiers stationed in northeastern Syria, Erdogan prefers a wait-and-see position in the absence of a regional solution to the conflict.
Is there any convergence of views or interests between the two countries on the Kurdish issue in Syria?
Several times, under Russian mediation, Turkey and Syria have held talks through their intelligence services to address the Kurdish issue. The ultimate goal was to increase Turkish army attacks against the Kurds to weaken Rojava and allow the return of the Syrian army to the region. This solution suits both countries, enabling Syria to regain part of its territory and Turkey to distance the Kurdish threat.
However, these talks have proven unsuccessful, mainly due to the weakness of the Syrian regime. The Syrian state is on the brink of collapse, with an army that has only a few thousand men left. Turkey fears that the Syrian army would lack control over this new territory, which would benefit Kurdish forces and pro-Iranian militias. A potential return of the Syrian army would thus increase instability on the Turkish-Syrian border without addressing the PKK issue, which Ankara wants to avoid.
Regarding the Idlib region, could Turkey reduce or abandon its support, or could Syria make compromises with opposition groups?
The situation is not so desperate for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, thanks to Turkish support, which they cannot afford to abandon for the internal political reasons we mentioned. Indeed, maintaining the group in Idlib more or less contains Syrian immigration to Turkey.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham controls its territory tightly and sees itself in a war of attrition against the Syrian regime as the main force of the Syrian opposition.
For Bashar al-Assad, despite his desire to become an actor on the regional scene again, there is no question of compromising on the return of refugees and drug trafficking, which is vital for Syria’s economic survival, as it is currently a true narco-state.
Furthermore, Iran has become a central actor in the regime’s survival, having restructured its security system. Syria is a pillar of Iran’s regional deployment, and Tehran does not want normalization between Damascus and Ankara.
The rapprochement between Syria and Turkey will probably resemble the scenario of the regime’s return to the Arab League a year ago. Despite Bashar al-Assad’s appearance alongside Mohammed bin Salman, the normalization process is at a standstill. Syria refuses any form of concessions, and no concrete progress has been made.
What is the future for Syrian refugees in Turkey?
Turkey has tried to address the issue by implementing a policy of forced returns. At the heart of the project is the creation of towns in territories controlled by the opposition to accommodate refugees. However, this initiative has proven to be a failure, and with several million Syrian refugees in Turkey, it is very difficult to ensure a return policy, even under coercion.
At the same time, Syrians continue to flee to Turkey, despite smugglers’ increased fees. Therefore, there are no real solutions apart from the long-term integration of these populations in Turkey.
For Syria, the problem is twofold. The regime refuses any concessions because this is part of its scorched earth policy to empty the country of a part of its population in order to repress more easily and ensure better control of its territory.
Moreover, many militias have seized the lands and possessions of Syrians who fled the country and oppose their return. In this extremely repressive context, refugees sent back to Syria would be condemned to wander around the country, which is not politically viable.
What do Russia and Iran think about a possible normalization? And what is the future for American bases in Syria?
Russia would like its Syrian ally to normalize its regional relations; this would represent a victory for Moscow, which provides military support to the Syrian dictatorship. It has therefore attempted several times to bring the two countries closer together. However, these attempts have failed because Turkey realized that Russia has nothing to offer and no leverage over the Syrian regime. Moscow is unable to resolve the main issues preventing this rapprochement. To some extent, Syria represents a quagmire for Moscow, which tries to maintain a precarious status quo and avoid a resumption of conflict.
For its part, Iran is the real actor in Syria and views with suspicion a too-close normalization of the regime, which could lead to increased autonomy from the “axis of resistance” built by Tehran. Thus, Iran and Russia are actually the main actors in Syria’s isolation.
Finally, the international coalition led by the Americans maintains its presence in northern Syria to continue fighting the Islamic State with the Syrian Democratic Forces. There is indeed a risk of the Islamic State’s return if Western forces were to withdraw from Syria. With the escalation between Iran and the United States in the context of the Gaza war, the situation is tenser; coalition bases are regularly targeted by attacks carried out by pro-Iranian militias. The problem is that, in an increasingly tense regional environment, there is no Western policy in Syria. The situation remains precarious and subject to the whims of regional powers, and it is in this context that relations between Turkey and Syria are evolving.
