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Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech that has provoked considerable debate and analysis. After one week of anticipation, the address was not as expected. “The Israelis waiting for a week is part of the punishment.” This statement was ridiculed on social media, but it shows that there’s no clear time nor targets agreed upon to retaliate yet for Iran, and it seems that international pressure is in effect to specify the target without escalation. The Hezbollah leader asserted that the psychological warfare but also, especially, the economic losses of Israel are part of the response to the assassination of one of its top commanders, Fouad Shokr. It’s like trying to ruin someone’s picnic by stealing their sandwiches and hoping it rains and the ants invade their blanket.
Nasrallah hinted about not wanting to “eliminate” Israel anymore, and the goal now is not to let Israel win the war. “If the Resistance in Gaza is defeated, neither Islamic nor Christian holy sites will remain,” yet electing Yehya Sinwar as the new leader of Hamas might appear as a self-destructive move for the movement and a significant challenge to Israel and future negotiations.
Nasrallah then added, “If the Resistance in Gaza is defeated, Israel will move to a dangerous level, and the risks will be for all countries in the region.” Why mention defeat now? Does it mean that Iran will lose its policing status in the region? Or did Hamas realize that there’s no more Iranian support?
Nasrallah’s assertion that Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of Fouad Shokr is “inevitable” underscores the organization’s commitment to retaliation. While this stance aligns with Hezbollah’s historical approach to responding to perceived aggression, it raises questions about the potential for escalation. Nasrallah’s declaration of a “strong, impactful, and effective” response serves to reassure supporters and intimidate adversaries. However, it also risks exacerbating tensions and igniting a broader conflict. Nasrallah continues to give the impression that he does not want the clashes to escalate to an all-out war. “It is the Israelis who resorted to escalation,” he reminded, and it’s true, especially when Israel officially announced that it was responsible for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, as if it’s taunting Iran to respond.
The promise of retaliation, while rooted in Hezbollah’s strategic doctrine, might inadvertently escalate regional instability, particularly if Hezbollah’s actions provoke further Israeli retribution. The US and Russia sent their advisors to Israel and Iran, both consistently pressuring Iran and Israel to avoid a regional escalation. Till now, Iran has not responded as heavily advertised. Only CG videos portray a “doomsday” scenario, but in real life, it’s not clear what the right proportional response would be. It appears that Russia advised Iran to avoid provoking Israel, offering full support for Iran’s defense but refraining from endorsing a large-scale attack. This advice outlines new red lines that should not be crossed with Israel.
By stressing that Iran and Yemen are “committed to responding,” Nasrallah aims to present a united front against Israeli actions. But he also hinted that the reply of Iran’s proxies might be separate from Iran’s response. He even justified why Syria and Iran are exempt from this battle. “In this battle, Syria and Iran are required to provide moral and political support and facilities,” as if Lebanon can afford the rest!
Nasrallah’s criticism of the United States, labeling its efforts to mediate in Gaza as hypocritical, reflects a broader narrative that portrays the US as complicit in Israeli actions. His statement that “the US pretends to be dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s conduct” while supplying arms to Israel is a pointed critique of American foreign policy. This criticism serves to undermine US credibility in the region and aligns with Hezbollah’s longstanding narrative of Western bias against resistance movements. However, this view may oversimplify the complexities of international diplomacy and the challenges of balancing support for allies with efforts to mitigate conflict.
Nasrallah’s speech also delves into the broader implications of Israeli actions, particularly concerning the West Bank and Gaza. His warnings about potential Israeli plans to displace Palestinians and expand settlements reflect Hezbollah’s broader opposition to Israeli policies. While these statements aim to galvanize support for the Palestinian cause, they also risk reinforcing existing hostilities and complicating peace efforts.
Nasrallah’s assertion that a successful Israeli campaign could lead to a diminished Palestinian cause and the threat of Jordan becoming a substitute homeland for Palestinians is a significant claim. This perspective reflects Hezbollah’s view of the conflict as part of a larger existential struggle for Palestinian rights. While this narrative resonates with many in the Arab world, it may also exaggerate the potential consequences of current hostilities and distract from practical efforts to achieve a lasting resolution. The focus on dire predictions might overshadow more pragmatic approaches to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Finally, Nasrallah’s argument that Israel is no longer as strong as it once was and that it relies on US support for protection is a strategic statement designed to boost Hezbollah’s standing, and he may have a valid point there; Israel defeated the biggest armies in the Arab world twice by itself in 67 and 73, and now it desperately needs the US military support to defend itself against Iran and its proxy militias. By suggesting that Israeli power is in decline, Nasrallah aims to bolster the morale of Hezbollah’s supporters and highlight the resilience of the resistance. But what about Iran’s strength? However, this narrative might overlook the complexities of Israeli military and diplomatic capabilities. While Israeli vulnerabilities exist, the perception of Israeli weakness may not fully account for the strategic depth and resilience of the Israeli state.
While the speech reinforces Hezbollah’s commitment to retaliation and highlights the broader geopolitical stakes, it also raises important questions about the future of Iran in the region, as well as about the future of Iran’s militias in the region. If Israel is weak now, like Nasrallah stated, and its army is in a messy, chaotic state, if now is not the right time to defeat Israel, then when is it? After 40 years of building momentum and marketing the defeat of the state of Israel and liberating Jerusalem, the moment came and the opportunity is slipping away, and if Iran with its proxies can’t deliver their promise today, when will the promise be fulfilled?
If the goal is no longer the “demise of Israel,” and there is no consensus on a full-frontal assault or comprehensive retaliation, and with Gaza facing destruction and 40,000 innocent lives lost, what should be the next move? If Hamas has lost control of Gaza, its new leader is unable to negotiate effectively from hiding, and Iran is constrained by security breaches, economic difficulties, and surrounded by powerful armies and the unofficial Abraham Alliance, when will Iran and its proxies fulfill their promised objectives?
