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Even those who are skeptical of the Chehabism principles cannot deny the visionary leadership and foresight of the late President Fouad Chehab. Numerous aspects substantiate the rationale behind this theory, with a major concern arising in 1958, when Chehab apprehensively foresaw the potential transformation of the military leadership into a pit stop before Baabda.
Those opposed to Chehab criticized his approach during the 1958 events as aimed at pleasing Gamal Abdel Nasser and securing his presidential endorsement at the time. However, according to the memoirs and writings of his acquaintances and those familiar with his way of thinking, his primary concern was the eventual conversion of the army leadership into a platform that would pave the way for future presidents.
This was evident in various subsequent phases, from General Emile Boustany during the Cairo Agreement and General Michel Aoun during the Taif Agreement to intentional and, at times, malevolent violations of the Constitution during the elections of Emile Lahoud and Michel Sleiman.
Chehab’s pragmatic concerns were rooted in the genuine apprehension that military leaders might compromise their steadfastness, attempting to please various political parties both internally and externally, in pursuit of the coveted presidential seat.
To avoid generalizations, it is worth noting that many army leaders are recognized for their integrity and high ethical standards. However, the circumstances of presidential elections in recent years have left little doubt that the army commander is inevitably the first candidate discussed.
Before the vacancy that ensued after Lahoud’s term, there were discussions regarding the election of Sleiman, citing the successful experience of the army in Nahr al-Bared. However, the settlement was delayed due to internal upheaval, highlighted by opposition protests against the Siniora government and the intense polarization that erupted on May 7… Eventually, Sleiman made it to the Baabda presidential palace.
Similar scenarios unfolded during the transition from General Jean Kahwaji, at the end of Sleiman’s term, when enthusiastic supporters began preparing celebratory songs for the presumed new president. However, due to well-known circumstances, the arrival of Michel Aoun to Baabda took 27 years. The situation was further complicated by a clause that stipulated that first-class civil servants could not be elected for a period of two years following the end of their service.
Today, the name of the army commander undeniably plays a pivotal role in political calculations. Furthermore, it is considered a move to stabilize the situation, anticipate a regional settlement in the context of the war in Gaza and meet the conditions for electing a new President.
It is now clear that the issue echoes the apprehensions initially voiced by Chehab. It is no secret that the Army Commander in Chief’s ethical standards are widely acknowledged, with near-unanimous support for extending his tenure under these circumstances. The exception pertains to the Free Patriotic Movement, motivated by personal agendas and presidential ambitions.
However, the issue lies in maintaining a cohesive and focused army leadership throughout each period that the country is going through, as the appointment of an army commander is increasingly viewed as a de facto endorsement for the presidential seat.
For those aspiring to build a stable State, the difficulty lies in the combination of presidential foresight with the ability to effectively manage military affairs. The reluctance of the army to engage in internal calculations turns any ground-level conflict into chaos.
The conditions that surrounded the calls for the dismissal of Riad Salameh, the former Governor of the Central Bank, at the onset of the crisis, apply today to the extension of the army commander’s term. The response of Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati underscored the belief that an officer in battle should not be replaced. In this context, the question arises as to whether it is acceptable to replace a general in the midst of a war.
