The issue of expatriate voting - if it makes it onto Parliament’s agenda - has taken on a sectarian dimension, placing the Shia community in an increasingly contradictory position, both in relation to the broader Lebanese diaspora and to the very idea of Lebanese emigration itself.
This tension is especially perplexing given that Shias constitute more than a third of Lebanese expatriates, with large, well-established communities in Africa, Europe, and North America—most notably in Michigan and Detroit, where Shia Lebanese have become politically and economically influential.
The Shia duo's problem with the diaspora has become a distinctly political one. This problem has increased over the years, but contrary to widespread belief, it does not stem from the diaspora as a whole—it is specifically rooted in the Shia diaspora. There are countless stories of successful Shia expatriates, and they have long contributed to business ventures, development projects, and investments abroad and in Lebanon alike. Southern Lebanon, for instance, could not have been rebuilt without the contributions of Shias living abroad.
Yet, due to years of sanctions, political pressure, and accusations of terrorism, the Shia community abroad has been placed in an awkward and unusual position. Simply being a Shia expatriate has become a burden, a weight that follows Shias wherever they are in the world.
More importantly, when Shia citizens step outside the narrow confines of their local environment in Lebanon and settle abroad—experiencing new realities, engaging with foreign societies, and exploring global opportunities—they tend to become more aware of the opportunities lost to Lebanon’s ongoing state of conflict.
This is not to suggest that Shia emigration alone leads to enlightenment; this awakening happens across the board – whether it's a Sunni from Akkar or a Maronite from Keserwan. Leaving behind the stifling Lebanese reality for life abroad opens up new horizons.
For Shias in particular, this exposure has led to a realization: that life in Lebanon was often reduced to a binary narrative - on one side, perpetual resistance to Israel; on the other, a constant pursuit of sectarian gains within the political system.
The problem the Shia duo now faces with the diaspora is that expatriates see Lebanon differently - outside the narrow framework imposed by Hezbollah and Amal in the Lebanese political game, with its manufactured customs and ideas such as consensual democracy, the blocking third, and other sectarian gimmicks that only became entrenched after the July War and the Doha Agreement.
With the latest war having dismantled many long-standing political narratives and constructs, the Lebanese diaspora—particularly the Shia segment—has grown increasingly independent of the Shia political duo’s grip. This stands in stark contrast to the narrative the two parties continue to promote in Parliament: that Shias abroad risk marginalization unless they align politically with them.
In reality, Hezbollah and Amal now face an existential challenge when it comes to the diaspora. The prospect of granting all Shia expatriates the right to vote for Shia MPs within Lebanon threatens their longstanding control over the 27 Shia seats in Parliament. The two parties reluctantly accept the creation of a 16th electoral district for expatriates, knowing that focusing on a single candidate list is more manageable.
But deep down, they understand that their real battle with the diaspora lies in the latter’s growing political independence - not merely in the mechanics of electoral participation.
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