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Syria’s controversial return to the Arab League has sparked angry feelings of condemnation among some, and welcoming support among others. However, both sides are almost convinced that Bashar al-Assad’s regime has won, although many refuse to openly disclose this “victory”. Syria is a mortified nation, pining away under five occupations, and half of its population has either relocated or emigrated. Hundreds of thousands of others are either dead, wounded, missing, or detained. For 12 years, Bashar al-Assad sustained Russian and Iranian support and held, with his allies, a part of Syria which was described during the war as “profitable Syria”. In addition, he gradually took part in an Arab normalization which began with the UAE in 2018 and 2019, followed by Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman. And in 2021, Jordan suggested the return of Syria to the Arab fold in return for concessions, which led to Damascus regaining its seat in the Arab League last week.
As a result, those wishing and soliciting the return of Assad to the Arab folds are convinced that the current situation can no longer persist. Indeed, the situation has become a source of contagious and harmful problems and crises for its surrounding countries and for the Syrian population itself. Some of the most salient matters include Syria’s shift into a hotbed of terrorism, drug production, and smuggling, in addition to millions of internally displaced pe ople and emigrants who have overburdened neighboring countries. As such, the persistent boycott of Assad’s regime will not solve any of these crucial issues. This game plan prompted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to press for his strategic decision: to appease to the fullest extent the breeding grounds of tension across the region and allow them to grow economically. In turn, this will have positive repercussions on the KSA, and on the region as a whole.
The same countries, rightfully wishing to see the return of Syria to the Arab League, believe that the region should not continue to pay the high price for the failure of three US administrations in tackling the Syrian war. From Barack Obama’s era to Donald Trump’s, and half of Joe Biden’s term, US policy towards Syria was a failure. The harsh imposed sanctions did not succeed in altering the state of affairs, which remained the same. Obama’s red lines have stumbled, Trump’s sound bombs have fallen on deaf ears, and Biden seems unmoved. Basically, by speaking the same language, albeit with different accents, the three US presidents have allowed the following: enabling Russia and Iran to establish their presence in Syria, allowing Turkey to control the northern part of the country, and finally, letting Israel roam free and chase Iran and its militias as it sees fit.
According to some public statements, the supporters of a normalization of relations with the Syrian regime haven’t been overly taxing regarding their demands and expectations. Instead, they solely chose to stick to the method of a gradual, “step by step” return, as was disclosed, without insisting on a transitional phase. Furthermore, they casually grazed the political process required by UN Resolution 2254.
In return for stable relations and helping to rebuild Syria, what is required from Bashar al-Assad’s regime may be limited to a package deal which starts with the safe return of the refugees through an essential and effective process: the latter should start with the release of a general amnesty law which extends to aspects related to compulsory military service and the elimination of the fear factor that could result from retaliation acts among other practices. In addition, new discussions need to potentially be reopened about a new draft constitution, as well as ending the manufacturing, fostering, and exporting of drugs to the region. Possibly, last week’s Jordanian military operation, which eliminated the biggest drug lords at its borders, fits into this background. In short, the structure of the regime, and everything that could threaten its existence and continuity, will not be addressed. It is also difficult to determine whether the regime promised to act regarding the withdrawal of foreign militias from Syria. And by militias, we refer here to the ones allied with Iran.
In addition, some sources leaked the request from the Syrian regime about an agreement on a settlement with Israel, which does not call for a normalization, nor a peace treaty with the country. This deal is only meant to prevent any chance of skidding into a war that could ignite at the Syrian-Israeli border.
Will Assad react? And will the ones betting on the success of this normalization win? Any effective response, whether in favor of or against Assad, is out of order. So far, experiences with this regime do not call for excessive optimism. Ever since the seventies, the history of the Assad family’s governance is based on refutation, stubbornness, and disagreement. As such, we can recall the “Resistance and confrontation front” which was formed by numerous Arab countries to isolate Egypt internationally as a punishment for signing the peace agreement with Israel. In addition to Syria’s support for the Palestinian Rejectionist Front, its opposition to the PLO’s fighting in Lebanon in 1976, and the expelling of Yasser Arafat from northern Lebanon in 1983, after he left Beirut with his troops following the 1982 Israeli invasion. The epitome of Syria’s decisions was its support for Iran against Iraq in the 1980-1988 war, standing apart from the Arab consensus. These positions were taken while Syria was in the bosom of the Arab League. Back then, it claimed to be the nucleus of Arabism and refused to take a unilateral approach to unify the views regarding the Palestinian issue, even regarding the Palestinian population. Syria perceived the nature of the Palestinian problem as being Arab and not solely Palestinian.
The Syrian-Arab issue must be examined through three standpoints: Saudi-Gulf, Iranian – which diverges from the first due to ideological differences – and Syrian.
The Saudi-Gulf perspective seeks to wipe away conflicts, quell hotbeds of tension in the region, push them towards stability and development, and weave a variety of balanced and independent political and economic relations. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states will continue to follow this path unless something new occurs, diverting their attention from Syria. An example of this is the ongoing fighting in Sudan, which poses a threat to the Red Sea region. Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi expressed the country’s perspective on the matter during his visit to Syria. Back then, he considered Iran and Syria to be “victorious” and reasserted a “unified position”, an attachment to the resistance, and the support for strategic relations between the two countries by signing a wide number of agreements. In short, Iran’s narrative did not waver.
Finally, the Syrian perspective perceives Assad’s pragmatism, his clenching to all available opportunities that serve his interests, and his constant wagering on two factors: time, as well as regional and international changes. His guesstimates were right on target at the beginning of the Syrian war, when he mentioned that all world leaders would eventually be out of power, but the Syrian regime will still stand.
The key collateral victim of Syria’s return to the Arab League is the United Nations. Undoubtedly, two things were mentioned: the Cairo Declaration as well as the Security Council Resolution 2254 as the only bases for a political settlement. But these were mentioned unintentionally. As for the Europeans and the Americans, despite the declared reaction which rejects normalization with the regime and adheres to the sanctions against it, they didn’t hinder the path of the Syrian regime’s return to the Arab League. In Europe, pressure will be exerted by various countries in order for the European Union to soften up and comply with the Arab League, although the majority of European Council members – France and Germany in particular – are hostile to any lifting of sanctions.
It remains to be seen whether normalization and reconciliation will rescue Syria from its agony. Syria’s return to the Arab fold should motivate the West in general, and the Americans in particular, to make a serious attempt at changing their wavering vision and performance regarding the Syrian issue, one that they have largely implemented throughout the years of war.
