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3. Washington Can Pressure Hezbollah, But Only Lebanon Can Disarm The Militia

As Lebanese and Israeli officials return to Washington for another round of U.S.-brokered talks, attention is focused on the diplomatic process, including the Pentagon’s security channel, the State Department’s political track and hopes that careful sequencing can address Hezbollah’s arms and prevent wider war.

However, the more consequential developments shaping these diplomatic efforts are unfolding in Beirut, not Washington. U.S. officials increasingly describe the upcoming talks as a test of whether the Lebanese state can exercise meaningful authority and reclaim its monopoly on force from Hezbollah.

A U.S. official told This is Beirut that the Lebanon-Israel talks remain on track, while warning that any breakdown of the talks would benefit Hezbollah. The militia’s attacks against Israel have steadily increased since the April 17 ceasefire. In retaliation, Israel has escalated its airstrikes in Lebanon this past week while pressing new ground advances.

Hezbollah has a strong incentive to continue its military confrontation with Israel, the U.S. official added, reflecting Washington’s view that the group is using the fighting to preserve its domestic power.

“The problem is not Lebanon and Israel. The problem is Hezbollah,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on May 25. “A stable, secure, and independent Lebanon requires the full disarmament of Hezbollah.”

Washington’s patience is visibly thinning amid growing doubts that Lebanon’s political class will take concrete action. While the U.S. can broker agreements with Israel, pressure Hezbollah through sanctions and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), it cannot manufacture Lebanese political will.

Prioritizing Implementation

The challenge lies not only with Hezbollah, but also with the political system that has enabled it for years in Lebanon. Major strategic decisions in the country are shaped by sectarian bargaining, mutual vetoes, and fears of domestic conflict. This helps explain why successive Lebanese politicians have pledged to assert state authority while hesitating to challenge Hezbollah.

U.S. officials are now less interested in Lebanon’s declarations of principle than in whether the government is willing to take the political risks of implementing them. For the LAF to disarm Hezbollah, as demanded by Washington, Lebanon’s political leaders will need to be decisive.

“Disarming Hezbollah does not start with the LAF. The operational strategy should end with the LAF but should start with political command. They need to implement strategies to address Hezbollah,” retired Lebanese army general Khalil Helou told This is Beirut.

Helou said that the issue is not just one of military capacity, but a much deeper one of the decisiveness of Lebanon’s political leaders. “The LAF is a tool. The chain of command must start with a coherent government decision. The army cannot and should not be asked to improvise a national strategy in a vacuum,” he added.

Lebanese parliamentarian Fouad Makhzoumi told This is Beirut that “the priority now is to move from declarations to an enforceable state mechanism.”

“What has been missing is implementation,” he said. The parliamentarian called for a U.S.-backed mechanism in which each Lebanese step to assert state authority would be matched by Israeli military de-escalation and increased U.S. support for the LAF and state institutions.

Meanwhile, fellow parliamentarian Elias Stephan told This is Beirut that the Lebanese government should issue a formal decision reaffirming that only the state has the authority to make decisions on war and peace.

“Lebanon cannot continue to live under two authorities and two decisions on war and peace,” Stephan said, referring to Hezbollah’s military activities outside state control.

“Hezbollah’s weapons are no longer a defensive asset; they have become the central burden and obstacle to sovereignty, stability, and the normal functioning of the state,” he added.

Narrow Opening

Hezbollah is weaker than it was two years ago. Israel’s military campaigns and sustained U.S. pressure have significantly undermined Hezbollah’s narrative that it could defend its support base.

“Many Shia increasingly recognize that Hezbollah’s strategy has brought devastation rather than protection,” Hanin Ghaddar, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, told This is Beirut.

But weakened does not mean harmless. Hezbollah remains capable of intimidation, which is why the U.S. is wary of any arrangement that manages the conflict with Israel while ignoring Lebanon’s fragile domestic balance.

For Washington, the current diplomatic track is also focused on whether Lebanon’s institutions can reclaim state authority without triggering domestic chaos. The latest U.S. sanctions reflected Washington’s prioritization of Lebanese state cohesion.

On May 21, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions on nine individuals accused of enabling Hezbollah to undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty, including officers from the Lebanese Armed Forces and General Security.

A senior Treasury official said the measures were meant to show that Washington would not tolerate Lebanese officials helping sustain Hezbollah’s shadow state, and that Lebanon’s leaders now faced a clear choice between asserting sovereignty and accepting subordination.

This does not mean, however, that the U.S. can dictate the outcome. Washington can help create a path for Lebanon, but the country’s leaders must choose to follow it themselves.

The U.S.-mediated talks between Beirut and Jerusalem are significant because they bring into the open a question Lebanon’s ruling class has long avoided. Can the state issue, defend, and uphold a sovereign decision against the armed order Hezbollah has established within the country?

If so, the current negotiations could initiate a new, albeit fragile, political structure in Lebanon. If not, the talks will simply yield another period in which Hezbollah adapts more quickly than the Lebanese state.

The narrow opening in Washington is therefore best understood as a deadline for Beirut. The Lebanese political class risks reaching a moment when the U.S. concludes that Beirut prefers the language of sovereignty to the burden of exercising it.