U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made an important announcement when he said that Washington is developing a plan to pursue Hezbollah’s disarmament by building up trusted units within the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
“We’re working towards establishing… a system that actually works where vetted units within the Lebanese Armed Forces have the training, the equipment, and the capability to go after elements of Hezbollah and dismantle them so Israel doesn’t have to do it,” Rubio said in an April 27 interview with Fox News.
The concept of rebuilding the LAF by developing strong units within the institution has worked in the past to bolster armies. Historically, armies like Napoleon's French Grande Armée had powerful, elite units tasked with being an anchor of a larger force. Napoleon’s Imperial Guard is one example, as are Prussia’s elite grenadiers under Frederick the Great.
What might work in Lebanon? Training a small number of vetted special units, or creating several such battalions, could address Beirut’s chronic inability to deploy the LAF against Hezbollah. U.S. soldiers cannot lead the disarmament of Hezbollah, but training and equipping LAF units to do so remains a viable option.
The U.S. learned from its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that it cannot send soldiers to lead the way and do all the work. In Afghanistan, this resulted in the Afghan army essentially melting away while American soldiers tried to keep the peace in a decreasing number of areas. In Iraq, the insurgency sapped U.S. strength and led to casualties.
Washington found success in what it called “by, with, and through,” an approach used during the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Under this model, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) supported local forces, including by training and equipping the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which then did the heavy lifting against ISIS.
Similarly, in Iraq, the U.S. and its anti-ISIS coalition partners trained and equipped both the Iraqi army and the Kurdish Peshmerga. This effort helped Iraq develop capable, specialized units, including the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (ISOF). One of the key units was the Golden Division, which played a central role in the 2016–2017 Battle of Mosul.
Iraq, like Lebanon, is divided along sectarian lines, with both countries serving as arenas for Iranian-backed proxy forces. While U.S.-trained units were never used against the Tehran-aligned militias operating in Iraq, such a model might work for Lebanon. Washington and Beirut could also draw lessons from the SDF. Built around the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and incorporating Arabs, Christians, and other Syrian groups, it proved largely effective against ISIS.
The lesson the U.S. should draw from the region is that training Lebanese troops requires a whole-of-government approach, involving the State Department, the Department of War, and other relevant agencies. CENTCOM has demonstrated how quickly it can act when called upon, including recently in Iran as well as helping establish a coordination center for the Gaza peace plan in October 2025.
The LAF needs some muscle, meaning forces willing to be deployed against Hezbollah and other threats. In the past, the Lebanese military often shrank from the challenge. In other cases, Lebanon’s politicians have preferred to crack down on low-hanging fruit instead of tackling the larger problem.
Building up special units within the LAF will take time. Young volunteers will need to be vetted to ensure they have no links to Hezbollah before being trained. The U.S. has the capacity and expertise for this mission. With sufficient political will in Washington and Beirut, Lebanon could emerge stronger and more stable.




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