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3. Explaining the U.S. Troop Buildup as Trump Pushes Iran Talks

Amid escalating rhetoric from U.S. President Donald Trump, including threats of further strikes on Iran’s Kharg Island, Washington has signaled openness to negotiations with Tehran. 

 While Trump has not formally indicated plans to invade Kharg Island, through which 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports flow, he has made increasingly escalatory remarks, threatening massive destruction and framing the island as a legitimate military target. “I told them openly — I’ll knock the hell out of it,” he claimed.

Against this backdrop, the United States has reportedly deployed thousands of additional troops to the Middle East, including roughly 2,200 Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, expected to arrive Friday, and 2,500 more from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). An additional 3,000 soldiers from a combat brigade of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division are also expected to deploy to the region.

Michael Eisenstadt, director of The Washington Institute's Military and Security Studies Program, told This is Beirut that these figures represent the best currently available estimates. He noted that these forces are designated for rapid deployment, arriving by sea or air in the case of Marines, or by helicopter or parachute for airborne troops. 

He explained that not all Marine Expeditionary Units would deploy ashore. An MEU includes aviation, logistics, and command elements, many of which remain at sea or support from ships. The ground combat force is the Battalion Landing Team (BLT), which consists of approximately 1,000 Marines.

Purpose of the Buildup  

Attention is now turning to what this military buildup is meant to achieve. According to Eisenstadt, the deployment could be used to increase leverage over Iran to accept the U.S. terms for a cease-fire agreement and to create military options if Iran rejects U.S. terms.

“The brigade combat team from the 82nd combat brigade could work with the 11th and 31st Marine Expeditionary Units, or independently, to seize and hold terrain–such as Kharg Island–for leverage over Iran,” he stated. 

The move could deny Iran the ability to export oil and end the war on favorable terms for the U.S., according to Eisenstadt.

However, he emphasized that there are significant risks involved with this type of operation. “Iranian units on the mainland could bombard Kharg Island and inflict casualties on U.S. troops there,” he highlighted. 

Eisenstadt outlined an alternative to seizing Kharg Island that could reduce risks to U.S. forces, suggesting that U.S. forces instead carry out targeted raids on Iran’s mainland to destroy small boat facilities, as well as missile and drone storage and launch sites.

He claimed that any operation to seize Kharg Island is speculative at this stage, but remains plausible.

If the U.S. were to seize the island, Eisenstadt believes troops would occupy it for a limited period. “I suspect that the intention is not to stay there indefinitely. Much depends on whether it succeeds in halting Iran's oil exports with limited U.S. casualties,” he said.

Alternatives to Seizing Kharg Island

According to a recent report from the Washington Institute for Near East policy by Eisenstadt and Assaf Orion, convoy operations and offensive strikes on Iranian military assets could temporarily ease pressure on shipping, but carry high risks, may not fully secure navigation, and could escalate the conflict. 

The report outlines other kinetic options targeting Iran’s key oil export node of Kharg Island; while seizing it would expose U.S. forces to heavy attacks, an alternative is to mine Iran’s approaches to the island to disrupt tanker loading, with the option of later clearing the mines in exchange for Iran allowing free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Another option involves a selective blockade through the Strait that allows ships carrying essential goods, including food, to transit while diverting or preventing vessels carrying raw materials, equipment, and industrial products from entering Iran. Approximately 80 percent of Iran’s imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz; the U.S. could extract benefits from this leverage. 

The report suggests that a mix of strategies would be the most effective: laying mines in the approaches to Iranian ports, selectively blocking Iranian oil exports and imports of raw materials, and using non-destructive economic and operational pressure to force compliance, all of which could facilitate better negotiating conditions for the U.S. 

Negotiations and the Diplomatic Angle

The recent deployment comes as President Trump publicly signals a renewed push for talks with Tehran. On March 26, Trump urged Iran to “get serious” in negotiations with the United States “before it is too late.” 

Trump said that Iran was privately pushing for a deal while publicly downplaying its interest, even as Iranian state media reported Tehran had rejected the U.S. peace plan. According to multiple reports, the United States sent Iran a 15‑point plan to end the war including provisions such as a one‑month ceasefire and broader terms for peace talks via mediators.

Eisenstadt said that the recent troop deployment, alongside Trump’s publicly signaled willingness to negotiate with Iran, could create leverage for talks, but he remains skeptical of the strategy. 

In his report, he concluded that “there is no silver bullet to solving this dilemma, and all military options to reopen the strait (and keep it open) will entail substantial risk and require significant resources and time.”