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This is the fourth article in the series that recalls the putsches that shaped the Arab world as we know it. The following text will go over the coup orchestrated by Adib al-Shishakli; previous articles have covered the putsches of Bakr Sidqi (Iraq), Husni al-Zaim and Sami al-Hennaoui (Syria).
Although the Syrian putsches of 1949 can be explained by analyzing the trauma generated in our societies by the infamous 1948 Palestinian nakba (defeat), one can also better understand such events by studying the rivalry between Arab monarchies and the far-reaching Fertile Crescent project under the Hashemites.
The 1948 Palestinian nakba caused such a shockwave in the Arab collective subconscious that historians tend to believe it is the major cause – if not the only one – behind the successive coups affecting Syria as early as 1949. Indubitably, the Arabs’ defeat against the “Zionist gangs” did generate trauma among Syrians and other Arabs, after a short-lived – but hardly fought for– independence from the French. One must not forget, however, that during the same period, Middle Eastern monarchies fought silently, bringing about all the different putsches in Syria.
It is equally important to remember that the kingdoms of Egypt and Saudi Arabia would have frowned upon the creation of a Greater Syria under the rule of the Hashemites who controlled Iraq and Jordan. Neither King Farouk nor King Ibn Saoud wanted to revive the old botched project of Faysal the First.
Besides, if a union – confederal or not – were to have been established between Syria, Iraq and Jordan, a portion of the Syrian population would have been pleased, but that does not negate the possibility of an outcry in other parts of Syria. In Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Lattakia, there was a notable political trend that strongly opposed such a project, not the least because the two Hashemite kingdoms were de facto cronies of Britain. “We did not oust the French from our country to have them replaced by the British,” was what many Syrian nationalists would say at that time.
It is from this specific angle that one should look at the Syrian coups of 1949. While Husni al-Zaim (orchestrator of the March 30 putsch) was not all for an alliance with Iraq, one must believe that Sami al-Hennaoui (August 14 putsch) would have been eager to venture in that direction, hence the intervention of Adib al-Shishakli (December 19 putsch) to put a final end to these plans that would have amounted to the indirect submission of Syria.
A warrior’s journey
Adib Shishakli was born in Hama in 1909. He began his military career under French mandate, took part in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 as head of a regiment of volunteers, and joined Antoun Saadeh’s Syrian Social Nationalist Party at an undetermined date. As an army officer, he witnessed Husni Zaim’s many purges, and it was Sami Hennaoui’s efforts that helped Shishakli rejoin the Syrian Army.
On December 19, 1949, Colonel Shishakli arrested General Hennaoui and accused him of collaborating with a foreign country and conspiring against Syria’s interests. The army would not take over directly, and a civil government would be given power, in form at least. On September 4, 1950, the parliament, gathered as a constituent assembly, approved a new constitution. But the uncertain civil management could not solve the country’s serious economic problems. In fact, local political powers feared the influence of Shishakli who – although he was not head of state – controlled many aspects of political life through his brother-in-arms, Fawzi Selo, whom he had named Minister of Defense.
On November 28, 1951, Shishakli overtly took control by arresting members of the Council of Ministers and appointing Selo as Prime Minister. From that point on, he would make no effort to hide his dictatorial tendencies: he issued decrees that took the form of laws and placed the public administration and judiciary under his dominion.
Popular discontent
On April 6, 1952, Shishakli went as far as to dismantle all political parties and establish his own organization which he later called “Harakat al-tahrir al-arabi.”
In July 1953, he had a new constitution approved by public referendum, one that would establish a presidential regime. Unsurprisingly, he designated himself as head of state; his party’s deputies had a large majority in parliament, the others having boycotted the elections.
The outcry came towards the end of 1953, as students protested and the Druze Jabal al-Arab revolted. Courageous as it was, the political opposition was no longer endeavoring to hide its intention to topple the regime. Undeniably, the conflict was fueled by Iraq. On January 27, 1953, authorities proceeded to arrest all faction leaders and forcibly close all newspaper offices. The more radical the regime got, the more determined its enemies grew. On February 25, 1954, a large number of soldiers deserted the army, prompting Shishakli to renounce power and leave the country to avoid bloodshed.
He sought refuge in Brazil, where he was assassinated in 1964. He had attempted to return to Syria on more than one occasion, notably in 1955, an initiative supported by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
A hasty conclusion
Generally, people hold the three 1949 coup orchestrators Zaim, Hennaoui and Shishakli responsible for the undemocratic path that Syria would later follow. These schemers may just have planted a dangerous seed, a national tendency to have army officers interfere in political life. That being said, such a judgment could be perceived as somewhat categorical; a revised view would not do any harm.
It is crucial to remember that societies in Natural Syria were never ready to adopt liberal systems of governance that would allow for a peaceful transition of power. And the supposedly westernized elite of Damascus and Aleppo could not possibly administer the country under strong demographic and economic duress.
Since the Mamluks and the Ottomans, our collective psyche pictures only the man of the sword (rajol al-sayf) as governor, so long as he epitomizes the dignity of force (haybat al-qouwa) and holds the power to repress (qoudrat al-qama’). After all, King Hussein of Jordan and his son, King Abdallah II – both graduates of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst – safeguarded the destiny of their kingdom as military men exclusively. Their neighbor, Saddam Hussein, wore the uniform to attract the Iraqi masses, although he had never gone to military school. In Egypt, each of Mohamed Naguib, Anwar al-Sadat, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Hosni Mubarak were military men, too. In Lebanon, three army generals became heads of state since the Taif agreement…
Men from the army rise to power in the Middle East, because the general conjuncture allows it. It is not putschists who introduced the culture of coups into our societies. It is habit and specific inclinations that place strong men at the helm of the State. It is our own hopes and expectations that cradle our dictators. We might be regretful, but if we wish to criticize anyone, it ought to be ourselves!
Cf. This Is Beirut, 10 February/ 28 April/ 16 June 2023.
1- Two days before the December 19 putsch, Colonel Shishakli had confided in a journalist and assured him that the union with Iraq that the People’s Party (Hezb al-Chaab) intended to establish would not be accepted, and that he would give his life to defend the Syrian Republic, Cf. Bassam Barazi and Saad Fansa, Adib al-Shishakli (1909-1964), al-Haqiqa al-Mughayaba, Riad el-Rayyes Books, Beirut, 2022, pp. 127-128.
2- It has been said that his family was of Kurdish origin, but what is obvious is that his name has Turkish consonances.
3- Arab Liberation Movement.
