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In the context of the ongoing war in southern Lebanon and the ensuing diplomatic activity, one essential element seems to be missing. It is, in the absence of a President of the Republic, the ability to negotiate on Lebanon’s behalf about border demarcation and the application of UNSCR 1701.
For this article, we will address negotiation prerogatives in two parts. The first will tackle the scenario of a country with a president in office, shedding light on a previous instance, namely the May 17, 1983 agreement. The second part will shed light on the current situation where Lebanon’s institutions are in a vegetative state and one formation holds all the power.
In the scenario where Lebanon does have a sitting President, a fully functioning government, and where Parliament is a legislative assembly rather than an electoral one (as it is supposed to be at the moment, in the absence of a President), treaty negotiations follow a very precise course.
A perfect world
From a constitutional perspective, it is the President of the Republic, in agreement with the Prime Minister, who negotiates and ratifies treaties, “as expressly stated in article 52 of the Constitution,” says Ziyad Baroud, lawyer and former Minister of Interior, to This is Beirut.
The article states, “The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify international treaties in agreement with the Prime Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified except after approval by the Council of Ministers. They shall be made known to Parliament whenever national interest and state security so permits,” as is the case with border demarcation. In the case of commercial treaties or those involving State finances, the procedure is different.
According to Baroud, there are two stages in treaty negotiations. First, come the preliminaries to lay the groundwork. In some cases, the President may entrust the preliminary negotiations to the General Director of State Security or to a Minister who, depending on his or her expertise, prepares a draft negotiation plan. “The President may ask the designated representative to initiate negotiations beforehand,” explains Baroud.
General Khalil Helou agrees with the above, telling This is Beirut that when it comes to demarcating borders, technical aspects precede negotiations. “The technical part inevitably involves the army’s geographic services. In the case of delimitation with Israel, this geographic service has already determined disputed areas and positions,” he points out. After that, it is up to the other party to relay its answer from a technical standpoint. Negotiations do not start until that file is ready.
From then on, the President can ask the entities he has appointed to undertake the preparatory tasks as well as negotiations. “When the maritime borders were demarcated, the President entrusted the task of negotiation to Elias Bou Saab – Parliament Vice-President at the time – and negotiated in agreement with the Prime Minister. Negotiation is therefore a clearly defined procedure, but there is nothing to prevent this task from being entrusted to third parties. It’s an exploratory phase,” stresses Baroud. General Helou points out that Lebanon negotiates through intermediaries rather than directly with Israel, as was the case with the maritime borders where Amos Hochstein, US special envoy, was in charge of this dossier.
As far as the army is concerned, negotiations do not fall within its prerogatives from the start. Only if it is officially entrusted with this mission does it have a role to play in this sense, continues Khalil Helou. “The maritime border negotiation team was comprised of civilians as well as soldiers. The army provided maps and the civilians negotiated as they were experts in maritime law and knew exactly what the leeway was.”
History
Lebanon experienced a similar situation some 40 years ago known as the May 17th agreement. In 1983, in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the latter, led by President Amine Gemayel and Prime Minister Chafic Wazzan, signed an agreement with Israel putting an end to the state of war between the two countries. This agreement was repealed under pressure from the Syrian regime.
Five months earlier, negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, mediated by the United States, had begun at the Lebanon Beach Hotel in Khaldeh. The Lebanese delegation, led by Antoine Fattal, a lawyer, career diplomat, and former Director General of Foreign Affairs, participated in 35 negotiating sessions that took place between Khaldeh, Kiryat Shmona and Netanya to reach this agreement, behind which the United States had thrown its full weight.
The text stipulated the end of the state of war between the two countries and the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Lebanon (on condition that Syria would follow suit). It also provided for the creation of a security zone between both countries. However, because of the regional context at the time, and under pressure from Syria, the Council of Ministers decided to cancel the May 17 agreement.
In the context of this article, the highlighted point is that, at the time, the negotiators were not politicians but rather experts in their fields. It should also be noted that negotiations that led to this treaty took place before the Taif agreements, which amended the President’s privileges.
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