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In exactly two weeks, on August 1st, the Central Bank (BDL) will undergo a significant shift as it will transition into a caretaker administration. This development occurs against the backdrop of a government also compelled to operate in a caretaker capacity, along with a parliament relegated to the distinctly Lebanese practice of “necessity legislation.” Moreover, the interim appointments have already permeated the uppermost echelons of the Republic, notably extending to the pivotal position of Director of General Security. Should the current impasse persist, there is a looming risk that by the end of the year, this caretaking way of “governing” will encompass an even more sensitive position: The Army’s Commander-in-Chief.

At the core of this pervasive dysfunction, akin to a spreading cancer, lies the glaring absence of a President of the Republic. It is during times of acute crisis that we fully grasp the significance of the vital components that are sorely missing. Never before has the title of “head of state” embodied such profound constitutional and macro-political implications as it does today, despite the unabated discourse surrounding the marginalization of the presidential role. This could explain the relentless determination of what is now commonly referred to as the “obstructionist axis—or rather, the axis of evil—in their audacious endeavors to systematically erode the essence of the head of state’s role or play down the absence of a president altogether.

Attempts to undermine the top post began under the impetus of the Syrian regime, during the rule of President Hafez Assad, with the totally unjustified extensions, imposed without consulting anyone, regarding the terms of office of Elias Hraoui and Emile Lahoud. Hezbollah will then take over by making the practice commonplace. Again and without any obvious justification, it disregarded the constitutional deadline for electing the President of the Republic, the aim being to try again and again to empty the office of head of State of its substance and to shake the entire political system in place.

The repeated sabotaging of the presidential election, in parallel with a deliberate void strategically created within the upper echelons of State institutions, undeniably aligns with an elaborately orchestrated dismantling strategy adopted by the Shiite party. As such, the pro-Iranian faction, which serves as the devoted follower of Wilayat al-Faqih (Iran’s theology of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) and “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,” have been holding the nation hostage since around 2005, driven by two objectives. Hezbollah’s first aim is to assert its dominance on the local scene by using tactics intended to coerce the diverse socio-cultural components of the country into surrendering to its specific vision of the political system, and second, to determine Lebanon’s regional positioning. Simultaneously, the pro-Iranian faction wants to ensure that the Iranian mullahs retain control over Lebanon’s fate, strategically leveraging it as a bargaining chip in potential package deals with the Western world and/or Gulf nations.

In the midst of this obstructionist strategy, intrinsically linked to the whims of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution through Hezbollah, it becomes blatantly clear that the key to unlocking the Lebanese impasse lies in Iran rather than in the hands of the Shiite party. Therefore, Lebanon’s friendly nations, notably the Group of Five (France, the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt), who convened in Doha on Monday to brainstorm potential crisis exits, must present the Iranian regime with an “offer they can’t refuse,” borrowing an expression from the movie “The Godfather,” the comparison being purely coincidental.

In this context, the paramount goal should be to persuade, or rather compel, the Iranian authorities to intervene with their Lebanese henchman to put an end to its destructive strategy and foster harmonious and mutually beneficial relationships with local partners. This objective is undoubtedly highly ambitious—possibly unattainable to a few skeptics—but remains an essential undertaking if there is a genuine desire to pull Lebanon out of the abyss.