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The coexistence of the central State with small sectarian states is becoming riskier and more complex by the day and is contributing to the spread of dangerous theories that simply do not fit the Lebanese formula.
Among these theories is the proposed federalism that consists in dividing governorates and provinces into sectarian cantons whose coexistence is an impossibility, giving way to further divisions and tensions.
Some believe that a new formula and a revised social contract are inevitable and that these would enable the Lebanese people to reorganize their national, constitutional, and political life with a new set of rules and a new balance of power. Evidently, such changes will alter the distribution of power within the State itself.
In practice, this means that the Taef agreement will have to be put in the drawer before even resuming the implementation of its terms, including the reform-related ones that were so deliberately disregarded. Such reforms include the abolishment of sectarian politics, decentralization, the establishment of a senate, the elimination of sectarianism within the parliament, and other sizeable initiatives that could change the entire country.
Although choosing the right political system and power distribution rules is crucial, the real problem could be the political powers –not so different from the current ones– that will stem from the new regime. Such a situation will have serious repercussions on the country’s future, its unity, and its weight in the regional conflict.
Most people believe that no political alternatives to the current formula can generate a better command and a new political elite. The underlying reason is not necessarily tied to the laws that would bring about a new parliament and a new government. It is rather linked to the fact that some local powers are so enshrined in a number of areas –and the political system. Needless to say, armed factions contribute directly to this considerable imbalance when it comes to the internal distribution of power.
The thought to avoid using weapons internally was ditched following the events of May 7th, 2008, and the Doha declaration that followed. The issue was made worse when the Baabda declaration–made public during former President Michel Sleiman’s mandate–was put aside. Simultaneously, all calls for the establishment of a new national defense strategy to protect Lebanon against potential Israeli raids were disregarded. Heeding these same calls would have helped the country stay at a safe distance from unnecessary conflicts that the Jewish State could capitalize on to feed its long-standing hatred toward Lebanon.
Therefore, no new formula could be implemented through local efforts only, and the failure to elect a president–after months of negotiations since late October–is further proof.
How then can one envision foreign intervention, given a lack of interest on the US side, the absence of a real initiative from the Saudi side, France’s “ever-shifting” position, and the hegemony of Iran? What is this hybrid formula that will catapult Lebanon straight into the unknown? As for federalism-related theories, few can contest their irrelevance and inability to solve real problems.
Can federalism solve the weapons issue? Can it provide decisions on war and peace? Is it able to keep the army unified? Does it guarantee balanced growth? No. All it does is safeguard sectarianism in all areas and fuel the fire of confessionalism in the country with no tangible solutions!
