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The reality is bitter, but undeniable: since Lebanon’s independence in 1943, all presidential elections (except for the one in 1970) have been directly influenced by regional and international power dynamics. Indeed, the mechanism for electing a president of the Republic opens the door to a plethora of meddling depending on the current circumstances. As such, the president is elected, or rather designated, by a number of MPs who form the Parliament. This number was 55 in the early years of independence, then increased to 99, and later to 128 after the Taëf Conference held in 1989.
Knowing that Lebanon is a mosaic-like country, and that the region cares very little, if not at all, about normal democratic practices, it becomes easy for an external power to influence MP votes and tilt the balance in the “right” direction. A quick overview of the external political contexts that have influenced presidential elections since 1943 illustrates this reality.
The first president of independent Lebanon was elected amidst tensions and power struggles between Great Britain and France. That was in 1943, during World War II. At that time, the French Mandate had committed to granting independence to Lebanon, but it was taking too long to materialize. This issue prompted several leaders in the country to insist on immediate independence. Many observers assert that the independence movement was stimulated, behind the scenes, by Great Britain, which sought to reduce France’s influence in the region. Besides, a significant part of France’s territory was under Nazi occupation, making it difficult to contest Lebanon’s national aspirations, let alone the will of Great Britain, France’s crucial ally against Germany. This context led to the election of Bechara el-Khoury as president of the Republic. However, El-Khoury later defended himself against accusations of being anti-French, emphasizing his francophone culture.
The same British influence was also witnessed in 1952 during the election of Camille Chamoun. The latter had cordial relations with Great Britain, which facilitated his ascent to the highest office. President Chamoun aligned himself with the Eisenhower Doctrine implemented by the United States to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East. At the end of his term (1958), Chamoun faced a popular uprising presumably initiated by Egyptian President Abdel Nasser, an ally of the Soviet Union. President Chamoun, then requested, and obtained (in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine), the landing of American Marines in Beirut to put an end to the insurrection. This resulted in an agreement between the United States and Egypt to elect the commander-in-chief of the army, General Fouad Chehab, as president of the Republic.
The Chehab presidency was characterized by significant socio-economic development efforts and the strengthening of state institutions (notably through the creation of state control bodies). However, it was also marked by the emergence of a powerful Second Bureau within the army. This entity often intervened forcefully in politics to suppress any opposition to President Chehab. The omnipotence of the Second Bureau led, in 1964, to the election of Charles Helou, candidate of the Chehabist camp.
During Charles Helou’s six-year term, the Second Bureau continued its action to strengthen the political factions aligned with the Chehabist camp (the “Nahj”) and to combat opposition factions, particularly President Chamoun’s National Liberal Party and “Amid” Raymond Eddé’s National Bloc. The abuses of the Second Bureau stirred strong popular resentment, especially among the three Christian parties, the Kataeb, the National Liberal Party, and the National Bloc. These will then constitute a tripartite alliance (the “Helf”) to jointly contest the general elections of 1968. The alliance in question would achieve a significant victory, weakening as such the Chehabist Nahj. Some analysts claim that President Helou, frustrated and overwhelmed by the actions of the Second Bureau, indirectly paved the way for the Helf’s victory by appointing Sleiman Frangieh, leader of Zghorta, as Minister of Interior to organize and oversee the legislative elections. Frangieh was connected, through an informal alliance known as the “centrist” group, to Saëb Salam, Kamel el-Asaad, and Joseph Skaff (leader and deputy of Zahlé), who had distanced themselves from the Chehabist camp.
The unique case of the 1970 presidential election
These two blocs, the Helf and the “center,” joined forces for the presidential election in September 1970 by nominating Sleiman Frangieh as their candidate. He ran against Elias Sarkis, the Chehabist camp candidate and Governor of the Central Bank at the time. The September 1970 presidential election was one of the few held without foreign interference. The Arab countries were weakened after a resounding defeat in the 1967 war. The armed Palestinian organizations, which had established a presence in Lebanon following the ill-fated Cairo Agreement of 1969, had not yet extended their influence over Lebanese politics. In Syria, Hafez al-Assad (the gravedigger of Lebanon) had not yet seized power through a coup (November 1970).
Thus, the 1970 presidential election pitted two camps against each other: the Helf allied with the “center” and the Chehabist Nahj. A true democratic electoral battle, based on purely local power dynamics, marked this election, which resulted in Sleiman Frangieh’s narrow victory by a single vote margin, obtaining 50 votes compared to the Nahj candidate’s 49. At that time, the Parliament consisted of 99 deputies.
President Sleiman Frangieh faced several major geopolitical developments that undermined his term. These included the strengthening of armed Palestinian organizations (united under the umbrella of the PLO), which infiltrated parts of the Lebanese political class, the military intervention of Syria in Lebanon (and political interference) following the outbreak of the 1975 war, and a deep conflict of interests between the PLO, supported by the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), and the Syrian regime seeking to impose its control over the PLO and Lebanon.
Election of 1976: the Syrian Influence
The 1976 presidential election took place in this context of open conflict between Hafez al-Assad and the PLO-National Movement axis. The Syrian regime supported the candidacy of Elias Sarkis, much to the dismay of the National Movement and the PLO, who feared Syria’s total domination. Elias Sarkis was elected practically amidst bombings, as the PLO and militias of the National Movement launched attacks on areas leading to Parliament in an attempt to scuttle the presidential election session. In vain…
President Sarkis’s term was marked by the continuation of the Lebanese war and clashes between the Lebanese Forces and Syrian troops positioned in Lebanon to concretely protect the Anschluss that Hafez el-Assad was attempting to impose on Lebanon. This explosive situation culminated in the extensive Israeli offensive launched in Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli army reached Beirut and positioned itself in a large part of Mount Lebanon, thus displacing the PLO from the Lebanese capital and its surroundings.
In this context, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Bachir Gemayel, was elected President in August 1982. However, he was assassinated by Syrian agents on September 14, 1982. His brother, Amine Gemayel, was elected president a few days after the assassination. President Gemayel signed an agreement with Israel, known as the May 17 Agreement, to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanese territory. However, he was militarily opposed by the Syrian regime and its local allied militias to forcibly compel him to revoke the Agreement.
At the end of Gemayel’s term in 1988, the lack of security in the country prevented the election of a new president. President Gemayel then formed, in accordance with the Constitution, a transitional government led by the army’s commander-in-chief, General Michel Aoun, tasked with organizing a presidential election. However, General Aoun refused to facilitate the election and instead engaged in two successive wars against the Syrian army and the Lebanese Forces.
In order to break the political impasse and military escalation initiated by Michel Aoun, Lebanese MPs gathered in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the Arab League and the international community, specifically the United States and France. This resulted in constitutional reforms (the Taif Agreement) and the election of Rene Moawad, deputy from Zghorta, as President in 1989. The new head of state, widely supported by Saudi Arabia and the countries present at the Taif conference (USA and France), was assassinated in November 1989, allowing the Syrian regime to have its protégé, Elias Hraoui, elected President. Hafez al-Assad thus succeeded in strengthening his grip on Lebanon and subsequently extended Elias Hraoui’s mandate for a period of three years (until 1998), and later in 1998, he successfully paved the way for the election of his other ally, General Emile Lahoud, whose mandate was also extended for three years until 2007.
The end of the Syrian era
The end of the Syrian era was brought about by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, and the Cedar Revolution that followed, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory in April 2005. Here, the Iranian era began through Hezbollah, the armed proxy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran). The pro-Iranian party then embarked on a lengthy process of gaining control over the country and dismantling the state and major socioeconomic sectors. On May 7, 2008, it launched an offensive against the Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut and part of the Druze area in the mountains, after occupying the capital’s downtown in 2006 and waging war against Israel in July 2006. At the end of Lahoud’s term, Hezbollah blocked the election of a new President.
In order to extricate the country from the deep crisis it had been drawn into, the main political leaders and figures met in Doha, Qatar, in May 2008, and reached the so-called Doha Agreement. This initiative aimed at laying the groundwork for a way out of the crisis under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and the Arab League, with the support of the United States and France. This resulted in the election of the army commander-in-chief, General Michel Sleiman, as President of the Republic in May 2008.
At the end of Sleiman’s term in 2014, Hezbollah once again blocked the presidential election for over two years in order to impose the election of General Michel Aoun, who assumed the presidency on October 31, 2016. General Aoun completed his mandate in October 2022, and since then, the pro-Iranian faction has been sabotaging electoral sessions by breaking quorum and engaging in political blackmail: either Sleiman Frangieh for presidency or the vacancy. However, they could not preview a convergence of stances between the sovereignty opposition (Lebanese Forces, Kataeb, and Walid Jumblatt’s PSP), the Free Patriotic Movement (led by General Aoun), the bloc of Michel Moawad-Achraf Rifi-Fouad Makhzoumi, and several independent deputies who have managed to agree on a single candidate, Jihad Azour.
Similarly to the 1970 election, the 2023 presidential election opposes two political camps: Hezbollah and its allies on the one hand, and a broad spectrum of parties, groups, and independent figures on the other hand, who united against the candidate of the pro-Iranian faction. The difference is that, unlike 1970, foreign interference is not absent from the battle. The Islamic Republic of Iran is omnipresent through Hezbollah, while Saudi Arabia, the United States, France, and the Vatican make their voices heard. However, the major difference with 1970 is that the real stakes in this power struggle fundamentally revolve around a political project, a societal project, and a vision of Lebanon’s role and place in the region. It is an existential issue that a handful of parliamentarians who claim to be “independent,” or representative of the 2019 uprising, do not seem to grasp in its true dimension.
