At the most immediate level, the U.S.-brokered push for Lebanon-Israel diplomacy faces the obstacle of Hezbollah’s weapons—or, more precisely, the arsenal of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on Lebanese territory. The drive for diplomacy must also overcome a shortsighted approach to peace that is emerging in Lebanon.
Some Lebanese sovereigntist political forces and state figures argue that any potential progress toward normalization with Israel should be conditioned on a broader regional track, specifically Saudi Arabia’s position. As such, they seek to make Lebanon’s sovereign decisions contingent on regional power balances.
This argument is not new in Lebanon. It reproduces the logic entrenched by late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad during Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon. Assad consistently sought to link Lebanon to Syria in negotiations with Israel, promoting the notion that Lebanon would be “the last Arab country” to sign a peace agreement.
This was part of Assad’s broader strategy to keep Lebanon within Syria’s sphere of influence and use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with regional and international actors. It also helped cement Lebanon as an arena for conflict against Israel, in contrast to the Golan Heights, where Assad avoided confrontation.
In this context, linking Lebanon’s diplomacy with Israel to Saudi Arabia’s position on normalization with Jerusalem makes little sense, especially since a Lebanon-Israel peace agreement would protect Lebanon without harming Saudi interests.
Instead, normalization with Israel should be advanced independently. Continuing to tie Beirut’s decision-making to the calculations of foreign states, regardless of which ones, prolongs the state of war and leaves Lebanon hostage to shifting regional balances. The objective is to close the southern front, a battleground for decades, and end Lebanon’s misuse as an arena for regional conflicts.
Since the Cairo Agreement of 1969—a turning point that transformed Lebanese territory into an open arena for the conflicts of others—Lebanon has paid a heavy security, economic, and human price unmatched by any other Arab country. Lebanon can no longer bear additional burdens or political posturing from any side, whether from domestic factions or Arab states.
Accordingly, decoupling Beirut’s diplomatic initiative for peace from Saudi Arabia’s position would prioritize Lebanon’s national interests. A comparison of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia’s respective situations underscores Beirut’s far greater imperative for peace.
In terms of sovereignty, Saudi Arabia exercises full control over its territory and is not used as a proxy battlefield, whereas Lebanon continues to serve as an arena for the IRGC. In Lebanon, pursuing peace aims to eliminate the pretext of “resistance” used to justify military activity along the southern border.
Saudi Arabia has one of the region’s strongest economies, bolstered by a cohesive state structure with full sovereign capacities. This affords it considerable room for maneuver and the luxury of time in approaching normalization with Israel. Delaying peace does not impose direct costs on its internal stability, economic development, or urban growth.
By contrast, Lebanon is mired in a severe economic crisis intersecting with the challenges of an ongoing conflict. The country, already suffering from an unprecedented financial collapse, has been drawn by Hezbollah into what is arguably the most dangerous war in its history. Thousands have been killed, while Lebanon has suffered massive destruction on a scale never before witnessed, as Israel continues to occupy parts of its territory. This reality compounds Lebanon’s human and material losses on a daily basis while further undermining domestic stability.
Between the Lebanese and Saudi realities, the question of time and its cost is decisive. What may be tolerable for Saudi Arabia is unsustainable for Lebanon. Based on these considerations, Lebanon’s national interests dictate accelerating the path toward peace with Israel as an existential necessity to halt the ongoing state of attrition.
Peace would pave the way for ending Lebanon’s state of war, securing Israel’s military withdrawal, and launching a comprehensive reconstruction process. It would allow displaced families to return to their homes and halt the open-ended bleeding of the Lebanese state and society.




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