- 09:50
The return of war to Lebanon was neither sudden nor unexpected. On the contrary, it appeared almost inevitable, a consequence of Hezbollah’s rigidity and denial on one hand, and the Lebanese state’s hesitation and accommodation on the other. It followed the trajectory of the political and security developments since the ceasefire that ended the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel. The conditions for war were always present, and its outbreak had merely been delayed.
At the center of the crisis is Hezbollah’s continued refusal to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state. This has left Lebanon’s sovereignty incomplete and the country exposed to renewed conflict. Hezbollah’s obstinance underscores the party’s view of Lebanon as an arena for broader Iranian calculations, to be activated whenever regional balances shift or tensions escalate.
For their part, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have not risen to the occasion since taking office, failing to address decisively the issue of weapons outside state control. No clear roadmap or timeline has been presented for restoring the state’s full sovereignty. Their handling of the matter has been hesitant and politically cautious.
The renewed Israeli campaign against Hezbollah therefore reflects, in part, Lebanon’s failure to assert the state’s monopoly over arms. It also reveals the depth of Lebanon’s entanglement in regional dynamics. Once again, the country finds itself hostage to Iran’s strategic calculations.
With the launch of the military offensive against the Iranian regime, the region appeared to enter a decisive countdown. The escalation extended beyond Iran, with the potential to spill over into Tehran’s spheres of influence, foremost among them Lebanon. Attention quickly turned to southern Lebanon as observers anticipated Hezbollah’s response and whether it would open a new front.
The wait was brief. Hezbollah launched rockets toward northern Israel on March 2, a move described as an act of solidarity with Tehran and retaliation for the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet the attack inflicted no meaningful losses on Israel and did not alter the course of the military campaign against Iran.
It appeared less a strategic maneuver than a chaotic and impulsive act reflecting confusion and mounting pressure within Iran’s decision-making circles after the assassination of Khamenei and many other senior regime figures. At the same time, Hezbollah’s decision provided Israel with a long-anticipated opportunity. By attacking Israel, it gave Tel Aviv the justification to launch a military operation under the banner of self‑defense.
In this sense, Hezbollah’s attack went beyond a limited military action and became a pivotal moment highlighting the organic link between the party and Iran. In both timing and context, the move reinforced perceptions that the Lebanese state lacks authority over decisions of war and peace in the country.
This reality casts serious doubt on the official narrative promoted by Aoun and Salam. Both leaders have claimed the state was restoring sovereignty in the south for the first time since the 1969 Cairo Agreement. Hezbollah’s opening of a support front for Tehran demonstrated that non-state arms govern events and that claims of the state’s exclusive military authority are mere rhetoric.
The reopening of the front with Israel has implications far beyond the battlefield. It risks dragging not only southern Lebanon, but potentially the entire country, into an open-ended war with unpredictable consequences. These include the possibility of expanded Israeli control over Lebanese territory, possibly up to the Litani River, and widespread destruction. Lebanon will ultimately pay a heavy political price for Hezbollah’s reckless choices and the Lebanese authorities’ paralysis and abdication of responsibility.
Moments of crisis test the character of leaders. Either they shoulder their responsibility, placing the interests of their people and state above all else, or they reveal their inability to move beyond narrow calculations and forfeit the title of statesman. Major crises are not managed through statements, but with decisive action that sets a new course.
From this perspective, this war should not end with fragile arrangements or a temporary truce. It should conclude with a peace agreement with Israel that rescues Lebanon from serving as an battleground for proxy conflicts and restores its status as a fully sovereign state. Such an agreement would open the door to sustainable stability and provide genuine protection for Lebanese citizens. It would also lay the foundations for reconstruction, revive the economy, and address unresolved issues such as Israel’s withdrawal and the return of displaced residents.
If Aoun is serious about achieving these objectives, he will need to pursue a formal peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel. The Lebanese president stands at a defining moment in his political career. Does he possess the attributes of a statesman capable of making historic decisions? Or will he remain confined to the role of a power broker rather than a transformative leader?
History shows that major turning points often coincide with leaders who dare to shift paradigms from confrontation to peace, as Anwar Sadat did in 1979 when he altered the trajectory of Egypt and the region by making peace with Israel. The question today is whether Aoun will become Lebanon’s equivalent of Sadat, moving the country from perpetual conflict to stable statehood. Or will the moment, like others before it, pass without the emergence of a leader willing to change the course of a nation exhausted by war?
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