- 12:30
The majority of Lebanese oppose peace with Israel, and elected officials who pursue normalization with the Jewish state risk political suicide. Nevertheless, popular rejection of peace does not justify censoring its proponents. The very purpose of open public debate is to allow minority positions to argue their case, sway doubters, alter perspectives, and potentially supplant the majority view.
Lebanon’s underdeveloped political discourse betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how sound policymaking works. Too many assume that public figures and commentators should simply parrot the prevailing opinion. If they don’t, they are branded out of touch, traitors, or a nefarious “Washington lobby” conspiring behind closed doors.
Detractors of normalization claim it has no real backing in Lebanon, and even when they acknowledge some support, they insist peace with Israel is categorically misguided. Two recent surveys shed light on Lebanese public opinion.
A poll commissioned by Qatar’s Arab Center in Washington, DC, showed only nine percent of respondents favored recognizing Israel, a stark indicator of entrenched antagonism. By contrast, a survey from the Council for a Secure America (CSA) indicated 40 percent believed peace with Israel was probable over time, compared with 27 percent who saw it as improbable.
Even more revealingly, the CSA asked Lebanese respondents about their support for peace with Israel after a long-term resolution of the Palestinian issue. Remarkably, 53 percent either declined to respond or said they neither supported nor opposed the idea. Dedicated opponents of peace stood at 31 percent, while backers made up 27 percent, far from an absolute rejection.
Opinion polls are fallible tools, susceptible to misfires; a case in point is the surveys before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which erroneously forecast Donald Trump’s defeat. Polling in Lebanon can be distorted by small sample sizes, the country’s sectarian residential segregation, biased question phrasing, or limited answer options.
In Lebanon, ordinary citizens often gauge the national mood through their immediate social circles. Most dwell in echo chambers of relatives and acquaintances, fostering the illusion that their views are universally shared.
Yet observers familiar with Lebanon’s diverse sectarian landscape discern a consistent pattern: Lebanese nationalists, heavily represented among non-Muslims, prioritize “Lebanon First” policies and endorse peace with Israel regardless of Palestinian developments.
Opposition is strongest among Shia communities, followed closely by Sunnis, whose views are prone to change if their patrons—Turkey, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia—change course. Meanwhile, Druze attitudes remain ambiguous.
Effective public policy, including on the issue of normalization, requires robust, unfettered debate between advocates and opponents. In Lebanon, however, the state apparatus and Hezbollah grossly distort the playing field.
Outdated boycott laws criminalize ordinary Lebanese interactions with Israeli individuals or entities, forcing peace proponents—typically those with the deepest ties to Israel—to remain abroad or silent, or risk imprisonment. Those who somehow evade state sanctions must still contend with Hezbollah’s formidable intelligence network, which employs intimidation, threats, and at times lethal violence against activists.
In a society where declaring support for peace with Israel carries greater risks than coming out as homosexual, the fact that even nine percent endorsed recognition in a Qatar-backed poll borders on the miraculous. Equally striking, the CSA findings showed that 53 percent were unwilling to reject peace, even though it would have been easy and safe for them to do so.
Lebanon unquestionably has large numbers of committed anti-Semites and radical Islamists who would repudiate peace with Israel regardless of the Palestinian issue. Yet, astonishingly, in an environment starved of meaningful free expression, hardcore rejectionists of Israel number only around 27 percent.
Meaningful discussion of Lebanese-Israeli peace requires the state to repeal statutes criminalizing contact with Israelis, with the exception of cases of espionage. Hezbollah, for its part, must completely disarm, dissolve its military hierarchy, and transform into a normal, violence-free political party.
Only when Lebanon achieves genuine political normality, free from coercion and the threat of violence, will authentic attitudes toward Israel fully emerge. Until then, the fortunate minority living safely abroad, beyond the reach of reprisal, has a responsibility to defend free expression in Lebanon and to make the case for peace with Israel.
There is no right or wrong, no good or evil, in the debate over normalization with Israel; it is a question of public policy. Supporters of peace argue that normalization can turbocharge Lebanon’s economy and free the country from Gulf handouts and regional alignments. Opponents of normalization prioritize “regional harmony” and “national dignity.” This debate on peace belongs in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, and the government that emerges must be held accountable for its choice.
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