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3. Lebanese Neutrality: The Strategic Interest Shared by Beirut and Jerusalem

Lebanon's neutrality in regional conflicts is the single most important strategic choice it can make today, serving its core national interests and those of Israel in equal measure. If the Lebanese understand this, their country will be well on its way not only to recovery but to an economic boom.

More than a year after the November 2024 Cessation of Hostilities between Beirut and Jerusalem, Lebanon stands at a pivotal moment. Hezbollah's military capabilities have been severely degraded, Iran's regional axis has weakened, and a new executive under President Joseph Aoun is asserting state authority. Yet everything feels precarious and reversible.

Aoun should hit the road and campaign across Lebanon for peace, explaining to the Lebanese the endless benefits of Lebanon’s non-alignment in regional conflicts, a policy that gave Lebanon its golden days in the 1950s and 1960s. When Arab regimes fought the devastating Six-Day War of 1967, Lebanon — only a stone’s throw away from the unfolding events in the Syrian Golan — was instead reaping the economic benefits of sitting out the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Neutrality—detaching Lebanon from proxy wars, Iranian entrenchment, and the "resistance" ideology—offers the only credible path to sovereignty, reconstruction, and long-term prosperity. It would end Lebanon’s history of abuse as a battlefield for others, beginning with the disastrous 1969 Cairo Agreement, under which Lebanon conceded its sovereignty to Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) militias. Decades later, the country has yet to fully regain it.

Neutrality would also allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to enforce the state’s monopoly on weapons. Freed from external agendas, Lebanon could rebuild its infrastructure, revive banking and tourism, attract diaspora investment, and position itself as a stable, innovative hub. In doing so, it would become the envy of a fractured region, much like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, countries that prioritized pragmatism over ideology and entered into the Abraham Accords with Israel.

Israel’s interests in this matter converge with Lebanon’s in near-perfect harmony. A neutral Lebanon would eliminate the existential threat on its northern frontier. Jerusalem would no longer need to contend with Hezbollah’s arsenal, Iranian weapon factories, or the risk of a surprise multi-front war.

Since communities in the Israeli Galilee are located minutes from the border, any security incident immediately endangers civilian life and national security. While Lebanon’s partial implementation of the cessation of hostilities has lowered these immediate risks, sustained neutrality would cement these gains.

Israel's decision to retain limited strategic positions on five Lebanese hilltops reflects its demand for verifiable assurance against Hezbollah’s rearmament and should not be misconstrued as territorial expansionism. In late 2025, direct civilian-led talks between Lebanon and Israel expanded channels beyond strictly military matters, demonstrating Jerusalem’s openness for deeper engagement once Lebanon proves its commitment to staying out of regional conflicts.

Both countries’ mutual interests stand in stark contrast to the unreliability of other actors. The U.S. chairs the ceasefire monitoring mechanism hosting the talks and has sent envoys, yet its support is inconsistent, shaped by domestic politics, election cycles, and broader negotiations.

The U.S. has abandoned its partners before. Syria’s Kurds serve as the most recent example.  Lebanon could easily become a bargaining chip in talks over Iran, energy corridors, or other priorities.

Like Washington, Arab capitals with interests in Lebanon tie their support to their own agendas. Saudi Arabia long viewed Iran as an existential threat and pursued policies to weaken the regime, a stance that helped counter Hezbollah and bolster Lebanon’s sovereignty.

But with Tehran now weakened, Riyadh prefers a hobbled Iran under sustained sanctions to a revitalized one that could surge oil exports and further depress already low prices. Today, therefore, Saudi interests diverge substantially from Lebanon’s.

This makes allying with Israel Lebanon’s best option. Bound by geography, Israel has an inescapable, self-reinforcing stake in Lebanese neutrality, as instability next door directly threatens its own citizens. No distant power can match thislevel of enduring commitment.

Aoun has gone to places in talks with Israel no Lebanese president has gone to since 1983. But for more durable results, Lebanon’s president should travel to Jerusalem and address the Knesset, declaring neutrality as a shared national interest: "a quiet, secure border that allows Lebanon to rebuild its future and Israel to live without fear from the north."

Such a move, reminiscent of Anwar Sadat's historic November 20, 1977 speech to the Knesset, would signal irreversible intent, unlock reconstruction aid, invite technical cooperation in water management, agriculture, and technology, and open pathways to joint economic initiatives.

Skeptics will point to history, including the wars in 1982 and 2006, lingering grievances, and to official Lebanese positions linking broader relations to the Arab Peace Initiative from 2002 and Palestinian statehood. Yet historical wounds do not have to dictate the future. The alternative to Lebanon’s normalization with Israel is a grim scenario of renewed proxy wars against Israel, fought on Lebanese territory, and economic stagnation.

Lebanese neutrality would deliver what both Beirut and Jerusalem need most. With it, Lebanon would regain agency and revival, while Israel would secure lasting calm without the burdens of occupation. The convergence of interests between Israel and Lebanon is no longer deniable, and the moment to act is now.