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Although the Lebanese government has moved to enforce a monopoly on arms and the regional landscape is shifting following the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah remains defiant in its refusal to disarm. Its once-powerful justifications are eroding, revealing a movement increasingly stripped of legitimacy and internal coherence.
Two months after the Lebanese government reaffirmed its exclusive authority over weapons, Hezbollah remains unwavering in its refusal to disarm. Since its inception, the pro-Iranian militia has justified its arsenal as a means of “resistance” and “defending Lebanon,” portraying its weapons as both a shield against Israel and a tool of national deterrence.
But the ground reality increasingly contradicts this narrative. After two years of war between Israel and Hamas, the Sharm al-Sheikh ceasefire, which includes provisions for the Palestinian disarmament, has ushered in a new regional dynamic: compromise is beginning to replace confrontation.
In this shifting landscape, Hezbollah—a cornerstone of Tehran’s so-called “Axis of ”Resistance”—finds itself ensnared in its own contradictions. Its traditional rhetoric no longer masks the widening gap between its claims and the evolving geopolitical reality.
The Security Argument in Shreds
Hezbollah continues to assert that “the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) alone cannot defend the borders” and that Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon justifies its arsenal. Yet since the ceasefire of November 27, 2024, between Hezbollah and Israel, the militia has refrained from responding to daily Israeli violations, claiming it wishes to “give the state a chance to act.”
Lebanon remains trapped between two irreconcilable positions: Israel refuses to withdraw while Hezbollah retains its weapons, and Hezbollah refuses to disarm while parts of the South remain occupied.
The narrative of “liberating the South” has lost credibility. Critics argue that Hezbollah’s arsenal has failed to deter Israeli incursions and may even have provoked them. On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities in solidarity with Gaza, triggering an escalation that enabled Israel to seize five strategic positions along the border.
“Today, Hezbollah’s justification rests on its sectarian identity,” says Riad Kahwaji, a security and defense expert. “It is a sectarian group mobilizing Shia sentiment to preserve its base. It is not a Lebanese movement but a confessional organization serving Iran’s agenda.”
A Legitimacy in Search of Balance
In the wake of the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement, Hezbollah is striving to preserve its image. The group’s Secretary-General Naim Qassem hailed the truce as “proof of the resistance’s perseverance,” while Mahmoud Qomati, vice president of its Political Council, insisted that Hezbollah’s weapons remain “a guarantee of Lebanon’s sovereignty.”
But internal unity is no longer assured. “Hezbollah is no longer a monolithic bloc,” says Fares Souhaid, former MP and president of the Saydet al-Jabal Gathering. “Since the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, divergent voices have emerged, and the cohesion that once defined the movement has begun to fracture.”
Kahwaji offers a more skeptical view: “These divisions are largely tactical. Hezbollah cultivates the illusion of internal debate to sow confusion. In reality, it continues to expand its military capabilities under the guise of dialogue.”
The 2023-2024 war dealt a severe blow to the militia. Its strongholds were targeted, infrastructure dismantled, and operational capacity significantly degraded. Many observers now question Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel in any sustained conflict.
Recent threats directed at Lebanon’s political class, warning there would be “no life in Lebanon” if its weapons were confiscated, reflect less a show of strength than a sign of moral fatigue. The group’s refusal to comply with the government’s decision to enforce a state monopoly on arms underscores its posture as an adversary of the state, not its protector.
“Hezbollah is caught in a vise,” concludes Souhaid. “The president, the prime minister, and mounting U.S. pressure are converging to force its hand. But it is not irrational enough to risk turning Lebanon into ‘Gaza 2.’”
Crumbling Pretexts
Hezbollah continues to cite the threat of terrorism from Syria to justify its arsenal. Yet Damascus has made clear that it no longer poses a danger to its neighbors. “That pretext is outdated,” says Souhaid. “Even Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former Syrian rebel leader, has been received in New York and Moscow. Using that as a justification for a military arsenal in Lebanon is no longer tenable.”
The issue of the Shebaa Farms, a disputed territory between Lebanon, Syria and Israel, is another outdated argument. Neither Lebanon’s sovereignty over the area nor Hezbollah’s ability to liberate it has ever been established. That responsibility belongs to the state, not to a militia.
As the region moves toward compromise through Israeli-Palestinian agreements, international pressure and negotiations between Washington and Tehran, Lebanon can no longer afford to remain the exception.
The Lebanese government has endorsed a gradual disarmament plan, supervised by the army and supported by Washington. The initiative aims to restore the state’s monopoly on weapons by the end of 2025.
Souhaid highlights a contradiction. Hezbollah is part of a government whose mission is to reassert state authority over arms. It has signed onto that principle while refusing to implement it.
In his view, signs of partial retreat reflect a deeper vulnerability. Hezbollah no longer has the strength to resist. It is entirely dependent on Iran’s will, and if Tehran enters negotiations with Washington, Hezbollah could be sacrificed.
On the ground, the army’s role remains limited. “The weapons recovered were not voluntarily handed over,” explains Kahwaji. “They were seized during operations based on U.S. and Israeli intelligence.”
The army has managed to contain some militia movements and secure weapons from smaller Palestinian factions, but not from Hamas or Islamic Jihad. “No major coercive action has yet been taken,” notes Kahwaji.
When all of a militia’s justifications collapse, only one path remains: restoring the state’s monopoly on force. “The mere fact that a Hezbollah weapon is now in the hands of the LAF already marks an ideological rupture,” observes Souhaid. “Today’s Hezbollah no longer dictates regional policy. It is fighting to preserve its own existence.”
The Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the partial disarmament of Hamas have exposed the fragility of Hezbollah’s excuses. Lebanon’s security must rest on international legitimacy, not on the weapons of a militia.
But as concluded by Kahwaji, Hezbollah may endure. Yet as long as no Lebanese authority truly challenges it and its funding remains intact, it will persist only until the next war redraws the lines once again.
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