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3. Two Years After October 7, Israel Still Awaits Its Official Truth

Two years on from Hamas’s deadly attack on southern Israel, the country is still waiting for an official account of the events. Although the Israeli army and security services have acknowledged a “total failure,” no State Commission—the most powerful investigative body under Israeli law—has yet been convened.

This absence has fueled public uncertainty and widened the gap between citizens demanding transparency and a government keen on preserving its operational flexibility.

 

Commission Still Postponed

Since spring 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly dismissed calls for an independent commission, arguing that the government’s priority must remain the ongoing war and the return of hostages.

Opposition leaders, victims’ families, and many legal experts, however, insist that such a body is essential to determine responsibility. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara has warned that the longer the delay, the harder it will be to conduct a thorough investigation.

In the absence of a formal commission, State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman has expanded his own audit of the failures of October 7, scrutinizing the security cabinet’s preparedness, border defenses, and civil protection measures. His move sparked sharp criticism from the army, which challenged his authority and denounced what it described as an “inappropriate acceleration” during wartime.

 

Acknowledgment of Military Failure

By March 2024, the Israeli army had already launched internal inquiries at the command level. A summary report released in February 2025 acknowledged a “complete failure” in fulfilling the army’s core mission of protecting civilians.
 

Findings were damning: overconfidence in the Gaza barrier, the assumption that Hamas had no interest in launching a large-scale assault, and an inability to distinguish between intelligence on intentions and intelligence on capabilities.

Yet warning signs were there. On the eve of the attack, field observers reported unusual activity and mass activation of SIM cards linked to Hamas. These alerts were dismissed as mere routine exercises.

Major General Aharon Haliva, former head of military intelligence, was on leave when the first alerts came in, and reports from junior officers were blocked within the chain of command. On the ground, the southern division was overwhelmed within the early hours, its command structure paralyzed by chaos, and reinforcements arrived too late to prevent the massacre.

In January 2025, former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi resigned, acknowledging “terrible failures.” His successor, General Eyal Zamir, promised a “radical transformation of intelligence” and vowed that the army would “never again be caught off guard.”

 

Political Responsibility

Beyond operational shortcomings, the issue of government accountability lies at the heart of the debate. Several Israeli media outlets, including Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post, noted that the executive was intent on framing the crisis as a series of technical errors rather than a consequence of political decisions.

Analysts at think tanks such as Tel Aviv’s INSS and Washington’s CSIS stressed that the strategic surprise of October 7 cannot be fully understood without examining the choices made by the security cabinet and the prime minister.

An independent civilian commission formed by bereaved families released an even harsher report, accusing Benjamin Netanyahu and his ministers of “weakening all decision-making centers” and widening the gap between political leadership and military command.

The commission denounced a series of counterproductive strategic decisions: ongoing financial transfers to Hamas in a misguided bid to “maintain calm through money,” focusing exclusively on Gaza without considering broader threats, and the prime minister’s apparent disengagement from security briefings. Witnesses describe him as an “indifferent and complacent” leader repeating the mistakes of 1973 and failing to learn from the past.

In this context, former Shin Bet director Ronen Bar publicly acknowledged his share of responsibility. “We did not prevent the October 7 massacre,” he said, admitting that his service had failed in its mission. He said he would carry that “heavy burden” for the rest of his life.

In September 2025, the government appointed a new Shin Bet director, David Zini, a career army officer expected to bring fresh perspective and critical oversight to Israel’s domestic intelligence operations.

 

Reforms Promised, Still Unfulfilled

In response to mounting criticism, both the army and the government announced a series of reforms. Expert panels, including one chaired by General Sami Turgeman, were tasked with assessing the implementation of lessons learned.

Yet the findings remain unpublished, officially because of the ongoing war in Gaza. The standoff reflects persistent tensions among the army, the State Comptroller, and the government.

In some cases, the military has even petitioned the Supreme Court to suspend civilian inquiries, arguing that such investigations cannot be conducted during active conflict.

 

Truth Still Incomplete

Israeli society remains deeply scarred by the events of October 7. Surveys by the Israel Democracy Institute show that a large majority supports the creation of a State Commission and believes that the prime minister must ultimately bear responsibility, whether now or after the war.

On the ground, civic mobilization continues: protests outside the Knesset, boycotts of official ceremonies, and open letters signed by hundreds of victims’ relatives.

Israeli NGOs and media outlets are multiplying their investigations, thus intensifying pressure for genuine transparency.

Two years on, some facts are now established: a strategic surprise, massive failures of southern defenses, ignored warnings, flawed security doctrine, and overwhelming military responsibility.

Yet major questions remain unresolved, including the traceability of political decisions, the interpretation of conflicting intelligence signs, and the prime minister’s exact degree of accountability.

Until a state commission is ultimately established, Israeli society will continue to wait for an official truth and a clear chain of responsibility.