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3. Revolution, Power, and Repression: The Political Downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

From the 2012 electoral victory to the upheavals that followed, the trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood in contemporary Egypt reflects a decade of tensions, divisions, and radical transformation.

On January 25, 2011, millions of Egyptians took to the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other major cities, demanding an end to Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. This popular uprising, fueled by economic hardship, political repression, and endemic corruption, led to the president’s resignation on February 11. In the aftermath, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) then assumed power, promising a democratic transition.

In the political vacuum that followed, the Muslim Brotherhood, long embedded in Egyptian society, emerged as an organized and influential force. This resurgence traces back to the changes Egypt underwent in the 1970s under former president Anwar Sadat.

The Rise of the Brotherhood

According to Sarah Ben Néfissa, CNRS researcher and specialist in contemporary Egypt, President Sadat encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood to “operate in the social, educational, and medical spheres through their charitable associations.” In the midst of sweeping neoliberal reforms, this arrangement allowed the president to “get rid of his Nasserist and leftist opposition, who criticized his rapprochement with the United States and the peace agreements with Israel,” she adds.

The leniency shown by Sadat and his successors toward the Brotherhood allowed the movement to carve out a political foothold. In the 2005 legislative elections, it secured 88 of the 454 seats in the People’s Assembly (the lower house of Parliament), with candidates officially running as independents, as the organization had been formally banned from political activity since 1954.

“After the 2011 revolution and the dissolution of Mubarak’s party, they [the Muslim Brotherhood] were the only ones with established social bases. At one point, the leadership of the lawyers’, engineers’, architects’, medical, and pharmacy unions also came under their influence,” specifies the researcher.

The Brotherhood’s affiliated political party, Freedom and Justice, won the 2011–2012 legislative elections, securing 235 seats in the Assembly. Its leader, Mohamed Morsi, then won the presidential election on June 30, 2012, becoming Egypt’s first democratically elected head of state.

The Morsi Era

His rise to power quickly sparked concern and opposition. Accused of authoritarian tendencies, of prioritizing the Brotherhood’s interests over those of the state, and of failing to tackle the economic crisis, Morsi deeply divided Egyptian society.

In November 2012, a controversial constitutional decree expanding his powers fueled widespread public discontent. By the summer of 2013, tensions had peaked, with massive protests drawing millions of opponents demanding his removal.

According to Sarah Ben Néfissa, the Brotherhood made a series of strategic missteps. “The Muslim Brotherhood accumulated errors due to a poor understanding of the balance of power between themselves and other political factions,” she explains. By initially allying with the army and later opposing the judicial, media, and cultural elites, they found themselves increasingly isolated. “Mohamed Morsi faced a full-scale media lynching, and the cultural elite felt their very existence threatened by the Brotherhood’s ascent to power.”

Toppled by the Army

On July 3, 2013, the army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, ousted Morsi. The Brotherhood denounced it as a military coup against democratic legitimacy.
In the weeks that followed, security forces launched a brutal crackdown on Morsi’s supporters: on August 14, 2013, they violently dispersed pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares, killing more than 800 people, according to Human Rights Watch. It was one of the deadliest political massacres in modern Egyptian history.

According to the researcher, this turn of events can also be attributed to the organization’s very nature. “The leadership’s insularity, tied to the sectarian character of the Brotherhood, partly explains their inability to govern,” she emphasizes.

Although this internal discipline had long been a source of mobilization, it also hindered their prospects, since “this type of organization mainly attracts members with limited education and cultural background… It is therefore unsurprising that the Muslim Brotherhood failed the test of power.”

Repression

Since then, the Brotherhood has been banned, labeled a terrorist organization, and severely weakened through mass arrests, trials, and death sentences. Mohamed Morsi died in detention in 2019, after six years of near-total isolation.

According to Sarah Ben Néfissa, the post-2013 crackdown profoundly disrupted the Brotherhood’s structure and was exceptionally intense. “The repression targeted nearly all of its national, regional, and local leaders, triggering multiple divisions and fractures within the leadership,” the researcher points out.

Today, the Brotherhood’s leadership is fragmented, with branches in exile — most notably in Turkey, Qatar, and the United Kingdom — struggling to establish a coherent political direction. According to Ms. Ben Néfissa, three main “fronts” now vie for leadership: “The Mohamed Kamel Front, which led the Brotherhood between 2014 and 2016 and whose leader was killed by security forces, stood out for resorting to violence against security forces and economic interests, breaking with the tradition of peaceful coexistence.”

As for the two other fronts, based in London and Istanbul, they have taken a more cautious approach. The researcher attributes this stance to their awareness of the risks of being labeled a terrorist organization internationally, which could lead to the dismantling of the Brotherhood’s branches worldwide.

Political Marginalization

Under al-Sissi, who became president in 2014, Egypt entered a new authoritarian era. The regime tightened security control, curtailed public freedoms, and sealed off the political space. All forms of dissent, whether Islamist or secular, are systematically suppressed.

Ideologically, the Brotherhood shows little sign of renewal. “Nearly a century after their founding, their main doctrinal references remain Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Non-Islamist intellectuals who align with the Brotherhood serve to legitimize the movement, but they are not included in its official doctrine.” 

While the Brotherhood remains a reference point for segments of Egyptian society, it now faces deep structural weakness and near-total marginalization. The regime’s enduring shift toward a form of military neo-Caesarisms has drastically narrowed the political space for any organized opposition.

Thirteen years after the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer a central player in Egyptian politics. Its future appears contingent on potential regional or internal developments, but its marginalization in Egypt seems likely to persist.