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3. The Maghreb: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Challenge of Power

As the Arab Spring unfolded, several political movements inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood sought to rise to power across the Maghreb. In Tunisia, it was Ennahda; in Morocco, the Justice and Development Party (PJD); and in Algeria, the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP).

The period proved favorable to the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology, which resonated with parts of Arab societies, most notably with Mohamed Morsi’s election in Egypt in 2012 and the fall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. In the Maghreb, Brotherhood-inspired thought emerged later than in the Middle East, generally after independence and appeared relatively new to these countries. These movements were not associated with former regimes, and they already benefited from a structured organization, unlike many other fragmented opposition groups. Moreover, unlike jihadist movements, the Muslim Brotherhood openly rejected violence.
"Ennahda, the PJD, and the MSP grew out of student movements in the 1960s and 1970s and drew inspiration from the ideas and methods of the Muslim Brotherhood," explained Vincent Geisser, director of the Institute for Research and Studies on the Arab and Muslim Worlds (IREMAM) and CNRS research fellow.

"There is no central Muslim Brotherhood organization that could control them. These movements exchanged ideas with one another while gradually adapting to national contexts, where domestic political concerns came to take priority."

In Tunisia, Rached Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou laid the foundations of what would become the Ennahda in the early 1970s, initially known as the Tunisian Islamic Movement (MIT). In 1981, their attempt to legalize their party was rejected by Ministry of the Interior. However, while the movement gained some public support, it faced severe repression. In 1987, around a thousand activists were arrested, and Ghannouchi was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. Although Ben Ali initially adopted a more conciliatory approach upon taking power, he resumed the crackdown in the 1990s, a repression that would continue until 2010. Released from prison, Ghannouchi went into exile in London, along with many of his supporters.

After years of exile and repression, the fall of Ben Ali in 2011 marked a turning point for Ennahda. The party won the October legislative elections with 89 seats, becoming the country’s leading political force. It then formed a coalition government, but the experience proved challenging for a movement that had always remained in opposition and lacked both governing experience and deep knowledge of the state’s machinery. Ennahda adopted a pragmatic approach, working with Tunisia’s left and making several doctrinal concessions, notably on the role of sharia in the Constitution.

Despite these efforts, the movement faced strong societal opposition, especially on issues like gender equality and secularism, and struggled to normalize its public image. The rise of jihadist terrorism and the assassinations of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013 shocked public opinion, with Ennahda accused of leniency or even complicity toward Salafist movements. Its economic mismanagement further fueled growing discontent. Economic mismanagement, compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic, corruption, and lack of transparency, further eroded its support.

In 2014, Ennahda lost its leading position, winning 27.79 percent of the vote against Nidaa Tounes, a party that brought together various secular political currents. Despite this setback, it regained prominence in 2019, though it did not secure a majority because of the divisions among its opponents. The party continued to participate in successive governments, navigating fragile alliances and constant compromises.

The election of Kaïs Saïed in 2019 reshaped the political landscape. With Ennahda’s indirect support in the second round, the president soon criticized the party’s governance of and ultimately dismissed the government it had backed in 2021. At the time, Rached Ghannouchi, then Speaker of Parliament, faced accusations of running a “parallel presidency” through frequent political visits abroad. In the following months, Saïed responded by suspending Parliament, concentrating power in his own hands, and amending the Constitution, effectively neutralizing all institutional opposition.

In 2023, a wave of arrests targeted senior Ennahda figures including Rached Ghannouchi. Weakened by repression, internal divisions, and public disillusionment, Ennahda has lost much of its activist base and can no longer constitute a genuine opposition to Kaïs Saïed, who has effectively sidelined all of his main rivals.

In Morocco, the ‘Makhzenization’ of the PJD

In the 2011 legislative elections, the PJD emerged as the leading party, becoming the country’s main parliamentary force for the first time. Its secretary-general, Abdelilah Benkirane, came from a background shaped by militant Islamism: in his youth, he was a member of the Chabiba Islamiya, a radical movement active in the 1960s and 1970s.

Inspired by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, Benkirane founded the National Renewal Party in the early 1990s to enter the electoral arena. When the party was rejected by the palace, Benkirane, and his supporters and with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior, joined the Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement (MPCD), founded by Abdelkrim Al-Khatib, a veteran of the nationalist movement close to the royal establishment. This integration, led to the creation of the PJD in 1998, granting it official access to Moroccan elections.

For the kingdom, the PJD represented a more manageable version of political Islam, as opposed to the Islamist movement Al Adl Wal Ihsane, which openly challenged the king’s constitutional role and his position as guardian of the faith.

Opposed to the Westernization of social norms, The PJD has consistently emphasized a “political interpretation inspired by Islam” and centered its electoral platform on fighting corruption and the rent-based economy. Drawing inspiration both from the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood and from Turkey’s AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the party stands out for its strong organization, deep local roots, and mastery of social media. On cultural values, its defense of tradition and social norms aligned closely with the Moroccan monarchy.

“Paradoxically, the PJD became one of the most monarchist parties in the 2000s,” observes Vincent Geisser. “This is not merely a transformation driven by interest but also reflects genuine conviction. Thanks to the monarchy, they can continue to exist, and traditional values are preserved.”

Building on several electoral successes in the 2000s, the PJD confirmed its breakthrough in 2011, winning 107 of 395 seats. Benkirane was appointed head of government by King Mohammed VI, forming a coalition due to the lack of an absolute majority. The PJD remained in government for a decade, consistently cooperating with the palace.

Over time, however, the party’s reputation for integrity eroded, undermined by economic challenges and political compromises. Its support for normalization with Israel, endorsed by the king as part of the Abraham Accords in 2020, alienated parts of its activist base. In the 2021 elections, the PJD suffered a dramatic collapse, retaining only 13 seats, a loss of 90% of its parliamentary representatives.

Weakened and divided internally, the party sought to reposition itself. In March 2023, it formally declared opposition to normalization with Israel, a reversal widely seen as an attempt to reclaim legitimacy with its traditional electorate, although its impact remained limited.

“The normalization with Israel that the PJD supported made Moroccans realize that these Islamists had themselves ‘normalized,’” says Geisser. “They lost their ‘pure’ status and their special standing among the people. Currently, they are perceived as politicians like any others.”

In Algeria, a Party Entrapped in Power

In Algeria, the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1990s left little room for the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1989 and officially recognized in 1990 under the name Hamas by Mahfoud Nahnah, the party struggled to gain a foothold in the country despite its ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Later renamed the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), it gained modest popularity, particularly in the central regions during the “black decade,” benefiting from the FIS’s decline.
“In Algeria, the Muslim Brotherhood followed a legalist approach to secure a place within the Algerian regime,” notes Vincent Geisser. “To exist legally and be tolerated, the MSP worked within the system of elected mandates and state clientelism.”

Having become the Algeria’s third-largest political force, the MSP strengthened its ties with the ruling establishment, joining the government in 1997 under President Liamine Zéroual and later the presidential alliance supporting Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999. Through this alliance, the party held ministerial portfolios before it withdrew from the government in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

The MSP time in power tarnished its credibility, compounded by corruption scandals, internal divisions, and stiff competition from other Islamist parties. Despite an attempted alliance in the 2013 legislative elections, the party was unable to regain a significant electoral foothold.

During the Hirak protests, the party’s leader, Abderrazak Makri, was booed by demonstrators due to corruption scandals and the MSP’s past participation in Bouteflika’s government. In the 2021 legislative elections, the party won 65 seats, becoming the second-largest force in the country behind the FLN. While a respectable result on paper, this result masked the absence of Hirak-backed candidates, the rise of 89 independent MPs, and the boycott by a significant portion of the population, with voter turnout at just 23 percent.

While the MSP managed to maintain a presence in Algeria’s National People’s Assembly, its ability to hold government positions has depended on alliances with the FLN and the National Rally for Democracy, the parties in power. Although it formally joined the opposition in 2012, its reputation remained tainted by its long-standing association with the Algerian regime.

Despite their participation in governments, these parties close to the Muslim Brotherhood have struggled to sustain a sufficiently broad popular base to stay in power. Weakened by corruption scandals, internal divisions, and governance failures, their political future in the Maghreb appears increasingly uncertain.

According to Vincent Geisser, “We are increasingly moving toward identity-based movements. Alongside them, parties close to the Muslim Brotherhood seem outdated. They are accused of overly compromising with the West and lacking assertivness. Some even see them as traitors and corrupt, and these movements no longer resonate with young people.”