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Diplomatic avenues are – at least for the time being – blocked. The objectives of the war have evolved, especially since the announcement made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 17 regarding the expansion of the conflict to allow the 68,000 residents of northern Israel to safely return home. To achieve this, the Lebanese front had to be included in this multi-faceted war. While the means considered to “ensure the safe return of evacuated northern residents” were not clarified at the time, Israel’s military strategy seems to be taking shape. Will Lebanon suffer the same fate as the Gaza Strip?
In the current context, one thing is certain: we have entered a new phase of the war. This was explicitly stated by both Hezbollah and the Israelis. Following the remotely caused explosions of communication devices belonging to Hezbollah members, on September 17 and 18, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared, “We are entering a new phase of the war.” He also noted that “the center of gravity is shifting to the north.” The same sentiment was echoed by the pro-Iranian faction. On September 22, four days after the simultaneous explosions that killed dozens and injured thousands, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, commented on the situation during the funeral of Ibrahim Aqil, the head of Hezbollah’s al-Radwan force, killed on September 20 in an Israeli strike on the southern suburbs of Beirut. Announcing a new phase in the battle against Israel, the number two of the Shiite movement indicated that it was now an “open reckoning.” While both sides express similar sentiments, their goals and strategies differ.
Israel: Tactics, stated goals and hidden intentions
If the release of hostages in Gaza, the withdrawal of Hezbollah and its weapons beyond the Litani River (30 kilometers north of the border) and the return of Israeli citizens to Galilee, along with the “annihilation” of both Hamas and Hezbollah, are Israel’s stated goals, “Iran remains the ultimate objective,” says Jean-Sébastien Guillaume, an expert in economic and strategic intelligence and founder of Celtic Intelligence.
Referring to statements made on September 20 in Washington at the Israeli-American Council (IAC), Guillaume explains, “Israel must target Tehran, not Beirut.” He elaborates that “Hezbollah is just an appetizer to the Israelis. The main course is Iran, yet without direct armed conflict, through support for the population and a regime change over the next four years.” He points to a speech made that day by Reza Pahlavi, the crown prince and son of Iran’s last emperor. “We must end this regime,” he said about the Islamic Republic of Tehran, receiving enthusiastic applause from the country’s decision-makers gathered by the IAC. “The solution will come from the Iranian people, not through war or foreign intervention,” Pahlavi continued, adding, “We need to organize campaigns and strikes in Iran, the fastest way to paralyze this regime.” He emphasized, “The eye of the octopus is in Tehran, not in Beirut or elsewhere.”
Before moving to the final stage involving Iran, Israel must first address Lebanon, where it is executing several actions aimed at weakening Hezbollah. “Its strategy is to continue intense military strikes to achieve the total disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani, with the establishment of a credible monitoring mechanism other than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to weaken not only Hezbollah’s military, operational and logistical capabilities, but also its civil and political power.” This includes attacks on “Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, including rocket launch sites, training tunnels and strategic positions deep in Lebanon, such as southern Beirut, parts of the Chouf, the Beqaa and southern Lebanon,” says Guillaume. The goal, according to the expert, is to “destroy Hezbollah’s firing capabilities, particularly its missile and rocket arsenal,” which involves “intense attacks on both military and civilian infrastructure, the latter being used for specific military purposes.” Israel also reserves the possibility of a ground invasion if airstrikes alone do not guarantee the safety of the country’s north, which is a likely option in the near future, depending on how the situation evolves.
Moreover, the Israelis are targeting Hezbollah’s senior leadership, “especially members of the Jihad Council, as eliminating them is a necessity for Israel, which also aims to weaken the strategic and operational leadership of the pro-Iranian faction,” says Guillaume. It should be noted that three members of Hezbollah’s top military body, the Jihad Council, have already been targeted by Israel. Fouad Shokr, a high-ranking military commander of Hezbollah who also led the group’s forces in southern Lebanon, was killed in July in a strike on southern Beirut. Ibrahim Aqil, the head of the elite al-Radwan unit, was also eliminated on September 20 in the same area. Ali Karaki, the most recent target among the Jihad Council members, survived an attack on September 23 in southern Beirut. According to a Hezbollah statement later that evening, the head of Hezbollah’s southern front “is safe.”
On Tuesday, a senior official was targeted around 3 PM in southern Beirut. Although speculations about his identity are numerous, Israeli army radio denied that the target was Talal Hamiyeh, one of the leaders of the al-Radwan force. However, it confirmed that the target was a “high-ranking Hezbollah official responsible for missile control,” meaning it could be Abou Jawad Harakeh.
Currently, according to Guillaume, Israel’s primary targets include Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, the head of the Quds Force (the elite unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) Esmail Qaani, the head of Hezbollah’s Unit 910 (responsible for foreign operations), Talal Hamiyeh, Hezbollah security chief Khodr Youssef Nader, and Hezbollah’s Executive Council Chairman Hashem Safieddine.
What about Hezbollah?
While Israel seems to have put its strategy in place, Hezbollah also appears determined to continue the fight “as long as a ceasefire is not declared in Gaza,” as Nasrallah has reiterated since the war began on October 7, 2023. Holding to a self-imposed threshold, Hezbollah seems to be striving for a balance to avoid a total escalation in Lebanon. “Iran does not give orders; it supplies weapons, trains fighters, supports Hezbollah and works in concert with it, though it does not appear to be the decision-maker in the operational chain of command,” Guillaume notes.
However, with several of its fighters and senior officials eliminated, its communication system almost entirely infiltrated, and its weapons depots and military bases massively destroyed (50% of its capabilities have been targeted, according to a recent Israeli army estimate on Monday), one might wonder whether Hezbollah can maintain its support front for Gaza while achieving the goals it set for itself. As Nasrallah stated in his September 19 speech, “Punish Israel” and “prevent the residents of northern Israel from returning home before the fighting in Gaza ceases.”
