Listen to the article
A fragile truce has kept the Middle East on edge for the past three days. The ceasefire is expected to come to an end as was decided, on Monday, November 27, late in the evening or by Tuesday, November 28, in the morning, pending a possible last-minute extension. However, it would be insightful to lay out an overview of the potential scenarios that might unfold in the post-ceasefire phase.
A piece of evidence comes to mind: it is highly unlikely that the episode of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end here and there. Such an outcome would represent a significant and historical defeat for Israel, as the initially proclaimed objective, namely the elimination of Hamas’ military apparatus is far from being achieved. In the aftermath of the deadly attack on October 7, both Israel and the United States, along with certain European Union countries, asserted that reverting to the pre-conflict situation in Gaza is not merely an option.
Beyond this political standpoint – given that political principles are often quiet malleable –, it would be difficult to picture that the Israelis (who are still dealing with the profound trauma of October 7), would condone the resurgence of a “jihadist” armed presence and a focal point of security tension in the Gaza Strip. Such a scenario would once again amount to a perpetual threat, akin to the Sword of Damocles, hovering over their daily lives.
Going back, at this point, to a “normalization” state and to a de facto militia presence – especially if bolstered by a comprehensive reconstruction effort –, is hard to envision (although not entirely impossible). Therefore, as the ceasefire comes to an end, we are grappling with the following option: either a renewed large-scale military campaign aimed at decisively dismantling the military wing of the Palestinian fundamentalist organization, or the implementation of a scenario similar to that of 1982 in Lebanon. This scenario includes the evacuation of Hamas leaders and fighters to an Arab country, setting the stage for a revival of the broader political settlement process. The ultimate goal is the Two-State solution and a return to normalization with Israel (which was underway before October 7), based on the Abraham Accords and the Oslo dynamics.
Is this second scenario achievable? This question is especially pertinent given that the two key players — the Israeli far-right and Hamas — are the very ones that sabotaged the Oslo Agreement in 1994 and 1995, disrupting the peace dynamic between Israel and the PLO. Moreover, they still wield considerable disruptive power today.
The threat is extremely alarming, given consistent reports pointing to the early stages of a resurgence of Hamas in the West Bank. This situation has the potential to evolve into a new Gaza-like scenario, and shaped once again by the mullahs’ Iranian Republic. If this was to occur, the outcomes would be more serious than Gaza’s, given the important presence of far-right Israeli settlers who openly express their expansionist ambitions at the expense of the Palestinian population.
The revival of the comprehensive political settlement process – which is long overdue and ought to be the logical conclusion of the Gaza conflict – hinges on two main prerequisites: the political marginalization of the Israeli far-right, should it persist in sabotaging any peace initiatives as it did after Oslo, and the elimination of the military structure of Hamas (and the “Islamic Jihad”) by restoring the central role of a new Palestinian Authority. This approach would defuse the time bomb in the West Bank. In the absence of these measures, the region will remain ensnared in cycles of massacres and wars, devoid of direction or resolution.
As the Gaza conflict unfolds, the Lebanese are high-strung, and anxiously analyzing the possible repercussions of this new and reckless military operation in Lebanon.
