From Mali in 2020 to Gabon on Wednesday, August 30, sub-Saharan Africa has been rocked by a Coup d’état in multiple countries in recent years. At a time when Gabonese President Ali Bongo is being held by his soldiers and the shadow of Russia looms over all previous ventures, we take a look back at this trend and its geopolitical implications.
Sub-Saharan Africa, a region marked by a long history of political unrest, is currently witnessing an unprecedented rise in military takeovers. The recent coups in Niger and Gabon are the latest additions to a worrying trend that has been raging in the region since the early 2020s.
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Africa is the continent with the highest recurrence of coups over the decades. Between 1960 and 2000, it saw an average of four attempted coups per year, 82 of which were successful.
These figures can be explained by a multitude of factors, from the problems inherited from colonial powers, in terms of institutions and borders, to questions of identity and resources.
The subsequent action of external powers, such as France and the Soviet Union, also contributed to this instability.
Domino effect
The current decade has seen a resurgence of the putsch trend in sub-Saharan Africa. It began in Mali in 2020, with a putsch led by Colonel Assimi Goïta. The following year, after handing over the reins to a transitional government led by the former Minister of Defense, Bah N’Daw, Goïta repeated the feat.
The same year, Niger was the victim of an attempted coup by a dissident faction of the country’s armed forces.
By contrast, similar ventures in Guinea and Sudan were crowned with success. The former brought Colonel Mardi Doumbouya to power, while the latter installed General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane in Khartoum.
Then there was Chad, where the army installed Idriss Déby’s son, Mahamat Idriss Déby, as interim president, prompting opponents to call it a “dynastic coup”.
In 2022, two putsches shook Burkina Faso, the second bringing the current leader, the young colonel Ibrahim Traoré, to power.
The year 2023 completed the black series in sub-Saharan Africa. An attempted coup by the commander of the Rapid Reaction Forces, a paramilitary group led by General Mohammed Hamdane Daglo, degenerated into civil war in Sudan.
By contrast, the putsch led by the commander of the presidential guard, Abdourahmane Tiani, succeeded in settling down in Niger at the end of July. Today, all eyes are on the current putsch in Gabon, led by elements of the armed forces.
Targeting France
While these putsches are all officially justified by a deteriorating security situation, economic difficulties or accusations of corruption, they invariably end up targeting France, in particular the notorious Françafrique system.
The former colonial power is seen as a troublemaker. Apart from Sudan, all the coups in the region since 2020 have involved former subjects of its empire.
This wave of coups raises concerns about several dynamics linked to these political developments.
First and foremost, it raises the question of the survival of democratic regimes in the face of this authoritarian upsurge. It is in this context that the Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is engaged in a tug-of-war with the Niger junta, with the aim of restoring deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to office.
The organization’s leaders fear that the cases of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali could give ideas to their own military elites – as seems to be the case with Gabon’s armed forces.
Moscow’s influence behind the scenes
As for Western states, it is Russia’s action in the region that is under scrutiny. Through the paramilitary group Wagner, Russia is extending its influence in Africa.
Moscow’s aim here is twofold. On the one hand, it is gaining access to the vast resources found in the soil of these countries. Russia’s modus operandi generally boils down to obtaining concessions in exchange for security support for the regime.
On the other hand, Russia’s strategy is clearly directed against the influence of Western powers, mirroring its invasion of Ukraine. In this context, it is more a question of combating the democratic model advocated by the latter, by encouraging attempted putsches.
The Kremlin’s favorite tool here is the intensive use of inexpensive, highly effective means such as disinformation. In particular, this enables it to exacerbate the resentment of populations towards former colonial powers, especially France, seen as a systematic supporter of decried governments.
The leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, for example, have already begun a rapprochement with Russia, encouraged by a section of their population.
At the same time, they are pushing Westerners out the door, as demonstrated by the end of Operation Barkhane in Mali in 2022, followed by a redeployment to Niger. Today, it is the French and American forces present in Niamey that are in the crosshairs of the local authorities, leading to a de facto arm-twist with the French authorities.
The jihadist threat in ambush
But the stability of the countries in the Sahel strip is also at stake, particularly in view of the growing influence of extremist groups in the region. In just a few years, the region has become the epicenter of jihadist violence, surpassing the Middle East theater.
In the case of Mali, for example, the absence of Barkhane created a security risk that Islamist groups such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Groupe de soutien à l’Islam (GSIM), and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara were quick to fill.
They now occupy large swathes of Malian territory, including the city of Timbuktu. In Niger, the end of French operations in support of local armed forces was followed by an increase in jihadist attacks against the latter. The same is true of Burkina Faso, where the new junta is struggling to curb terrorist attacks.
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