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The arrival of a new American ambassador in Beirut can mark a new style in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy there. However, it is good to remember that policies are set in Washington, not at embassies. As the talented new American ambassador, Lisa Johnson, settles in, it is an opportune moment to consider how the team in Washington should guide her mission in Lebanon.
Lebanon Matters. Lebanon and the Lebanese people have contributed much to the world and are of intrinsic value, but for a superpower such as the United States, it is the accident of Lebanese geography and demographics that gives it true significance. It is wedged between Israel and Syria, with a population segmented in ways that reflect the crosscurrents and patchwork identities of the Middle East. Lebanon all too easily becomes a landscape for regional conflict — for the conflicts of others. Therefore, Lebanese instability cannot be confined to Lebanon. Nor can Lebanese stability be reached if the region is in turmoil. Any American strategy to stabilize the region should have a Lebanese component, and U.S. policy toward Lebanon should derive from the regional one.
Iran is a Major Player in the Current Conflict in the Middle East and is Winning. People in the region need no reminder that Iran is not only a major protagonist in the ongoing tragedy, but is poised to be the winner if the current trajectory continues. That awareness is less evident in Washington. Yet, Iran continues to set the pace and venue for daily conflict against America and its allies. U.S. pinprick responses divorced from an overall game plan to deal with Iran will have limited impact. Until America and its allies reestablish deterrence against Iran and pursue a comprehensive approach to counter Iranian regional influence, Iran will continue to hold sway in four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sanaa. It will also spoil any American strategies to address sources of instability, whether for the Palestinians or the Lebanese while using its Houthi proxies to disrupt global shipping. Hezbollah already has entered the Israel-Hamas war; if its involvement spirals into a full-fledged war, it will not be because it is in the interest of the Lebanese people, but because it is in the interest of the Iranian regime.
America Has Been a Force for Good in Lebanon. Support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, diplomacy to enable exploration and exploitation of any offshore energy resources, and longstanding investment in education have been among America’s contributions to help all Lebanese achieve security and prosperity. The United States should remain a steady partner in these and other activities, but there is growing skepticism in Washington — especially in Congress — that these investments are worthwhile. To sustain American partnership, Lebanese should be asked to do their part as well by working actively to regain their sovereignty.
Going Back to Basics. Somewhere along the line, America abandoned serious efforts to implement fully UN Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). Washington’s rhetorical support continued, but there was no real diplomatic campaign to pursue the hardest parts: the prevention of Hezbollah’s armed deployment south of the Litani River and the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah. A resumption of progress along that path will be long and arduous and should not be pursued through threats of military action. However, the absence of an effort to complete the unfinished business of 1701 is the surest way to bring the danger of intensified conflict between Lebanon and Israel closer.
State Sovereignty and Incrementalism. The configuration of power in Lebanon — meaning, Hezbollah’s political dominance derived from its arms — is such that progress will not occur without external pressure. A serious effort by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other like-minded states will be required to bolster opponents of Iran and isolate Tehran’s direct and indirect allies in Lebanon. Pressure should also be applied to enable the Lebanese state institutions to take control of Lebanon’s borders, ports, and airports. Sanctions targeting individuals who are obstacles in this pathway can be effective, but the approach should be a component of a larger game plan to counter Iran’s regional influence. Ultimately, Iran’s grip on Lebanon can only be dealt with by pressure on Tehran, not in Beirut.
Focus on Easing Lebanon’s Financial and Economic Crisis. Lebanese leaders have evaded responsibility by adopting the false premise that no reform is possible without a functioning presidency and cabinet. Meanwhile, not only have the Lebanese people reached new lows of degradation, but the country is slipping into a black market and dollarized, cash economy. This situation is ideal for Hezbollah and other bad actors to flourish. With new leadership, the Central Bank of Lebanon and the Special Investigation Commission can be effective in countering money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion. It is a legitimate American interest to make a maximum effort to help Lebanese authorities tackle these problems. Given the current emergency, other urgent measures to restore confidence in Lebanon’s financial sector and its currency can be taken even without a president. American influence should be applied in that direction as a priority task for all those interested in Lebanese stability.
Do Not Fall Victim to the Presidential Vacancy Fever. With sexennial regularity, Lebanon’s political paralysis produces a vacancy in the presidency. This problem is a symptom, not a cause, of Lebanon’s underlying dysfunction. Those Lebanese enjoying power are unlikely to address root causes, and without a Lebanese initiative, foreign actors have no legitimacy or means to bring about deep political reform. The vacancy itself compounds Lebanon’s problems by freezing the whole political process and eclipsing Maronite representation. However, Washington and Paris tend to get fixated on filling the vacancy without appreciating that doing so at any cost can be very expensive. The more the West signals its abhorrence with the vacuum, the more the pro-Iranian elements blocking the process can raise the price. Public diplomatic activism by American diplomats without result just aggravates the problem; America should continue to help the Lebanese resolve the impasse, but this is an instance where quiet diplomacy may be more effective than podium foreign policy.
