Listen to the article
If the division among the Lebanese has been the predominant feature in national political life for decades, there are major strategic issues that demand immediate attention. These matters cannot be dealt with according to outdated traditional norms that have proven ineffective and have been overshadowed by significant events and changes, particularly in the aftermath of the Gaza war. Indeed, this conflict has become a major turning point on multiple fronts.
One of the debated issues revolves around Lebanese foreign policy, a longstanding point of divergence among its people. This matter involves discussions about Lebanon’s identity, its role, and its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the Arab landscape grapples with deep-seated turmoil and pronounced divisions, exacerbated by the stagnation of institutional frameworks meant to buttress collective Arab endeavors, Lebanon’s potential disengagement from the Arab sphere does not imply a total separation. Despite its current challenges, Lebanon continues to benefit from the political and economic cover afforded by the Arab context, even if it is currently faltering.
The notion of Arab identity has never encountered such indifference and neglect. Everything tied to this concept currently seems dim, irrelevant, and too weak to bring about the necessary changes amidst the all-around growing and intensifying challenges. But the fundamental question revolves around whether the poor performance of an idea is enough on its own to eliminate the idea entirely.
It is crucial for Lebanon not to fall prey to isolationist propositions that advocate for its self-seclusion and distancing from its natural surroundings. Additionally, Lebanon should not be led down paths that could compromise its political decisions in favor of the narrow interests of specific groups, disregarding its broader national well-being.
Lebanon’s foreign relations are not at their best. The successive visits from foreign envoys hardly go beyond recurring attempts to implore the political class to fulfill its primary duty — particularly the election of a new president. The objective is to revive the constitutional process, enabling institutions to reclaim their inactive roles in serving the nation and its citizens.
Lebanon’s relations with Arab nations are also not at their best. They have transitioned from close ties to a state of deterioration, marked by intermittent breakdowns and currently characterized by an evident chill. This comes amidst a noticeable shift in Arab priorities regarding regional affairs on the one hand and the internal structural dynamics within those Arab societies on the other.
Today, more than ever, Lebanon is in dire need of shaping a new foreign policy grounded in its intrinsic ties to the Arab milieu. This imperative remains steadfast, regardless of the diverse perspectives that may define the complex Arab landscape. This is true despite the reality of shifting Arab interests and priorities from what they traditionally used to be, which is both understandable and justified given the continuous developments.
Lebanon must actively engage with the ongoing regional developments and cannot remain neutral in pivotal conflicts. However, this doesn’t imply that Lebanon should be transformed into a battleground for settling scores or that it should bear the political and non-political costs beyond what it can withstand.
Lebanon must undergo a transformative process to capitalize on its unique advantages, which are progressively eroding amid the changing dynamics of both Arab and non-Arab neighboring societies. The latter boast capabilities that far exceed Lebanon’s, making competition quite challenging. Nevertheless, Lebanon remains adaptable and continues to preserve its identity as a “nation with a message.”
