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The war between Israel and Hamas has entered its third week, and the situation on the ground remains largely unchanged. The absence of “maneuver warfare” diminishes concerns about the conflict spreading to other fronts.
Tel Aviv is still holding off on its threat to launch a ground offensive against the Gaza Strip while relentlessly bombing the Palestinian enclave, where the number of casualties has exceeded 5,000.
Further to the north, the Israeli army is consistently retaliating to rocket attacks launched from Lebanon by Hezbollah and Palestinian factions tied to Iran. Despite the escalation that took place over the weekend on the southern border, the rising toll among Hezbollah fighters, and the state of war declared in northern Israel along the border, both parties continue to adhere to what is commonly referred to as the “rules of engagement.” Neither Hezbollah nor Israel appear to have decided, for the time being, to engage in a broad, large-scale confrontation.
However, this status quo is not reassuring per se, as the rules of the game could change at any moment based on the strategic objectives of the parties involved or in the event of an uncontrolled escalation on the ground.
Israel has much to gain, but also much to lose if it ever launches a ground offensive against Gaza to “eradicate” Hamas.
So far, this Palestinian group, alongside Iran, have achieved their objectives. The ongoing normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been halted. Furthermore, Iran has successfully repositioned itself as a prominent player on the political stage, in anticipation of potential negotiations regarding the future of the region. In fact, the Iranian regime has dealt a severe blow to the state of Israel, unequivocally highlighting its capacity to wield a substantial striking force that could potentially reshape the regional dynamics, if it decides to do so.
Lebanese Apprehensions
Within this framework, concerns about the conflict’s broadening scope are palpable in Lebanon, where the population is closely and anxiously monitoring the escalating situation along the southern border. This anxiety is fueled by ongoing rumors of a potential crisis spreading throughout Lebanon.
Based on existing military and political evidence, this anxiety might not be justified. The stakes of a large-scale war remain highly complex, both for Israel and for Hezbollah.
In Hezbollah’s case precisely, the popular factor cannot be underestimated. The Lebanese group has incurred significant losses on this front since the uprising of October 2019 and the deep-seated crisis gripping the country, even within its own community.
Prominent journalist Ali el-Amin, a leading figure in the Shiite opposition to Hezbollah, emphasizes, among other factors, that Hezbollah is reluctant to provoke a war with Israel.
“Hezbollah is well aware that it can inflict significant harm upon Israel if it were to initiate a war against it. However, it is equally conscious of the harm that Israel could cause to the civilian population in which it operates. Will it put its own community in harm’s way? I don’t think so,” Amin says, dismissing concerns about the armed conflict between Hamas and Israel spreading to Lebanon.
“I believe that Hezbollah’s level of engagement will likely remain the same, especially since it appears to be accepted by Israel,” he further states.
At this stage, the war strategy of both parties is primarily limited to a public exchange of threats involving massive destruction. On the ground, they are engaging in artillery fighting with a focus on minimizing harm to civilian populations.
The Risks for Israel
Amin’s analysis is based on military, political and diplomatic data that have come to light since the surprise attack by Hamas on October 7.
In this context, even the Israeli threat of a ground offensive against Hamas in Gaza, which could potentially draw Hezbollah into this conflict on a large scale, remains hypothetical. The associated risks for Israel, both militarily and politically, are substantial.
On a political level, Israel is facing sustained international pressure to avoid a ground operation that could potentially inflame the entire region. Divisions within the Israeli Cabinet regarding the advisability of a ground intervention have led to a “confidence crisis” between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli military, as reported by Yediot Aharonot. This is an additional factor that would support the status quo along the southern border, at least for the time being.
Evolvement of International Reactions
Furthermore, American opposition to Israel’s plan for an extended conflict has become apparent, despite Washington’s unwavering support for the country. These concerns were raised in the questions presented by US President Joe Biden to Netanyahu during their meeting in Tel Aviv on October 18. “This explains the fact that the Israelis are far from confident about the success of their offensive. Moreover, if it does achieve its objectives, it will come at the cost of a bloodbath, a prospect that the international community is unlikely to condone,” Amin notes.
He states that since October 7, there has been “a notable shift in international reactions that does not align with Tel Aviv’s intended direction.”
According to Amin, this is yet another factor that aligns with Iran’s wishes. While Iran has been issuing numerous threats against Israel, it has made it clear from the outset that it is not in favor of regional escalation, especially since it has achieved its political objectives in the regional context.
As long as this situation lingers on, Hezbollah will claim victory, if only because Hamas continues to assert its presence on the ground,” notes Amin. This victory sadly evokes memories of the 2006 “divine” victory, as proudly proclaimed by Hassan Nasrallah after the devastating July 2006 war that left Lebanon in ruins.
However, within the inner circles of the pro-Iranian group, the traditional narrative prevails. It can be summarized into the following two sentences: Hezbollah is fully prepared for conflict, and the situation, whether in Gaza or along the southern border, is open to all possibilities.
