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Lebanon lacks a distinct foreign policy, as the country remains deeply affected by the external events unfolding in its immediate surroundings. It all boils down to the regional developments and their repercussions on Lebanon’s domestic policy.
Every presidential term has been accompanied by a regional crisis, essentially turning the presidency into a role akin to that of an emergency response vehicle primarily focused on putting out fires.
Bechara El Khoury was unexpectedly confronted by the upheavals in the region, which marked the end of the era of statesmen in favor of military figures assuming power within the presidential palace. Camille Chamoun was taken by surprise by the Free Officers’ revolution and the Soviet influence in the region. He turned to the Americans under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, but American policy let him down, despite the arrival of the US fleet to the shores of Lebanon. Charles Helou was caught off guard by the 1967 Naksa and was compelled to participate in the Cairo Agreement. Sleiman Frangieh was taken aback by the 1973 war, which bolstered the armed influence of the Palestinian guerillas (Fedayeen) in the heart of Lebanon. Elias Sarkis was startled by the Camp David Accords, which shifted Syrian policy from being supportive of Christians to perceiving them as their prime adversaries. Amine Gemayel was astonished by almost every development. Elias Hrawi was puzzled by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the subsequent derailment of peace in the region. Emile Lahoud was dazed by the events of September 11 and the invasion of Iraq. Michel Sleiman was surprised by the Arab Spring and the deteriorating situation in Syria. Michel Aoun was taken aback by the Gulf-Iranian face-off and the changing leadership landscape in Saudi Arabia.
In sum, each of the above mentioned presidents had their share of surprises. Today, if Lebanon had a president, this president would likely find themselves tasked with crisis management within less than a year of their election, given that the latter proceeds within the constitutional timeframe. Under the current circumstances, the potential presidential candidates are probably grateful that they did not take over the presidency, which would likely have led to the premature termination of their term. The current crisis in Gaza is the second instance in contemporary Lebanese history to occur during a Lebanese presidential vacuum.
The first crisis that transpired during a presidential vacancy occurred in 1990 and played a significant role in expediting the resolution in Lebanon. Back then, Iraq was launching its military campaign against Kuwait. The Desert Storm operation led to Iraq’s withdrawal and rewarding Syria — for its substantial military and intelligence contributions to the operation — by consolidating its military and intelligence presence within Lebanon. After receiving international approval, Syrian tanks moved in and reached the heart of Baabda’s Presidential Palace, ultimately concluding the war through the October 13 operation. This significant event unfolded less than two months after the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.
The second crisis currently unfolding within the context of a presidential vacuum is the Al-Aqsa Flood operation. Many in Lebanon are hoping that this crisis might ultimately pave the way for a presidential breakthrough, as was the case in the 1990s. Some believe that Hamas’s military capabilities and the fear instilled in Israel can allow both Hamas and its supporters, including Hezbollah, to impose their conditions, thereby increasing Hezbollah’s chances of appointing a president. Meanwhile, others assert that the elimination of Hamas as a result of these conflicts would “cripple the influence” of Hezbollah and Iran along the western Asian coastline, thereby affording greater leverage in Lebanon to other regional stakeholders.
In reality, there are no tangible consequences regarding this narrative. Both Iran and Israel are heavily engaged in on-the-ground calculations and their concerns do not extend beyond Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun and the settlements on the opposite side along Gaza’s northern border.
When we seek to compare the two events, there may not be many apparent similarities on the surface. However, within the framework of domestic political circumstances, logical thinking is right on target. Between 1990 and today, there are many points of convergence in the state of affairs: An attempt to exert influence over Lebanon’s domestic matters by neighboring countries, a presidential vacuum, system inefficiencies, efforts to impose a new formula and a crippling economic crisis in need of foreign backing.
In this context, the question arises as to whether the Lebanese presidency would become the reward for whoever directly or indirectly assists in eliminating Hamas.
