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Although the similarity is striking and evidently clear, it is worthy of closer examination. Back in 2006, within the Lebanese political arena and in the wake of the Cedar Revolution, the March 14 Alliance had succeeded in creating a distinctly Lebanese-oriented dynamic — nowadays characterized as sovereigntist — under the leadership of a government presided by Fouad Siniora (the hardline faction of the Future Movement), in which the minority Hezbollah-Amal duo was marginalized.

At the time, the March 14 Movement embodied – primarily at the grassroots level – a fundamental factor from a historical perspective defined as a cross-communal spirit. At its core, this spirit was rooted in the aspiration to build a robust and unifying central State. The prominent slogan among sovereigntists was Lebanon First… An (extremely) perilous antithesis to the regional ambitions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, staunchly upheld on the local front by the spearhead of the Pasdaran at the borders of Israel.

Until the summer of 2006, and despite the series of political assassinations that followed the fateful date February 14, 2005, this Lebanese-oriented dynamic was firmly underway, and nothing seemed able to shake it or smother it. Everyone remembers the broad-based political gatherings that brought together the leaders of the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, the National Liberal Party, liberal Christian figures, alongside Sunni and Druze leaders, and influential poles of the enlightened left – notably the renowned Democratic Left, led by Georges Haoui, the former iconic leader of the Communist Party. Haoui had boldly initiated a significant introspection within the Lebanese left, aligning, for the most part, with the sovereigntist positions of Christian parties, particularly in conjunction with the Progressive Socialist Party.

For the first time in its contemporary history, Lebanon was the arena for a potent pluralistic dynamic, transcending communal psychological barriers, with a simple goal: to build a strong and unifying central State. For the proponents of the radical wing of the Iranian mullah regime, it was vital to promptly dismantle this dynamic before it could firmly establish itself on the ground and at the higher echelons of power. What better way to achieve this strategic objective than a “proper war” with Israel? Hezbollah’s incursion into Israeli territory on July 12, 2006, can be seen as a successful move to abruptly disrupt the momentum toward building a truly dignified Lebanese State, in favor of the Pasdaran’s agenda. This marked the initiation of a calculated, protracted strategy aimed at systematically deconstructing Lebanon’s institutions and critical sectors, with the ultimate aim of reversing the strong sovereigntist dynamic.

The current landscape in the Middle East bears a striking resemblance to the situation in Lebanon back in 2006, albeit on a much wider regional strategic scale. The momentum towards normalizing relations with Israel, initiated by the Abraham Accords, which subsequently led to peace agreements with several Arab countries, mostly the Gulf states, seemed poised to culminate in historic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

This evolving landscape represents a significant shift in regional dynamics, akin to a vast politico-economic endeavor (reminiscent of the vision championed by Shimon Peres). It stands in stark contrast to the regional hegemonic ambitions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. To abruptly disrupt this momentum, what could be more effective than a conflict with Israel, similar to the one that unfolded in Lebanon in July 2006?

Does this imply that the ongoing momentum is permanently derailed by the Hamas attack launched on October 7? It is still highly unclear… Vast economic and financial interests are at stake throughout the region, with far-reaching consequences extending beyond the Middle East. The impetus towards normalization with Israel may indeed experience a slowdown and temporary setbacks, but claiming that it will be completely halted would be a hasty conclusion.

The scenarios from Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2023, along with earlier events such as the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel, underscore the dangers tendered by certain regional actors. The latter, often driven by an obscurantist and regressive vision for the region, have the capacity to disrupt the status quo. Today, the Middle East, including Lebanon, stands at a genuine and historical crossroads — an opportunity to forge a future that can bring an end to decades of turmoil. Even those who adhere to a rigid ideological agenda should recognize this, for it ultimately concerns the well-being of all of the region’s inhabitants, starting with Gaza. Unfortunately, this does not seem to concern the ideologists in Tehran who are oblivious of such factors…

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