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On the occasion of Saudi Arabia’s National Day, an event held in Beirut garnered the presence of political figures with close ties to the kingdom’s political sphere. This event, which took place on Saturday, September 23, spurred a flurry of statements emphasizing Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role in safeguarding Lebanese unity and standing steadfastly beside the Lebanese people worldwide. In effect, this is an undeniable reality.
As is customary during events linked, one way or another to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, there is a recurring emphasis on upholding the Taif Agreement, or at the very least, ensuring its thorough implementation before seeking other alternatives. This is emblematic of the continuous efforts spanning at least 50 years to find a resolution for Lebanon’s enduring formula amidst its ongoing crises. However, the real issue with the Taif Agreement, especially among the advocates of ongoing Arabization, is not its lack of implementation, but rather its inherent impracticality.
The Taif Agreement explicitly asserts above all else, Lebanon’s Arab identity, its membership to the Arab League, and its commitment to its charters, all while emphasizing the principle of non-alignment. However, the Taif Agreement’s texts tend to lean towards poetic rhetoric, while the reality (at least during the post-2005 era), has shown no adherence to the decisions of the Arab League. This was notably evident during Gebran Bassil’s tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the outset of the Syrian crisis, and persisted even after the crisis, when Lebanon diverged from the positions of Arab countries. What’s more, Hezbollah’s active involvement in the conflict undermined the principle of non-alignment, as it further emphasized this divergence.
This dimension is intricately linked to the issue of arms and the differing interpretations thereof. It culminated in allowing Hezbollah to retain its weapons while disarming other militias, citing the continued Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon as justification.
The sixth point of the Taif Agreement touches upon the topic of a free-market economy, individual entrepreneurship and private ownership, which have been the cornerstone of the Lebanese economy. However, since the 2019 revolution, Lebanon’s economic foundations, deeply rooted in these principles, have come under relentless attack. The pretext for this attack has been the pursuit of an elusive vision of social justice, an aspiration that even the most robust socialist states fell short of fully realizing during their heyday. Furthermore, this approach has dismantled the idea and implementation of balanced development.
When it comes to the provisions related to the amended powers of the Parliament, the Presidency, and the Prime Minister’s role, the heart of the matter and the underlying contention regarding the impracticality of enforcing the Taif Agreement come to the fore.
In the seventh clause of the second point within the Taif Agreement, consensus was reached to establish a Senate comprising all religious denominations, with its authority restricted to pivotal matters. This was to be achieved following the election of the first non-sectarian, national Parliament. This point contradicted the fundamental essence of the preceding point, which had divided parliamentary seats on a religion basis, albeit in a relative manner among different confessions. This inconsistency was a clear oversight by the legislator, driven by the imperative of a Syrian-American agreement and Saudi sponsorship, highlighting the urgency to end the war. More importantly, the Taif Agreement did not delve into the mechanics of conducting elections on a non-sectarian basis.
In this context, this Agreement raises questions as to whether it adheres to the traditional governorate-level electoral districts as dictated by the Agreement, opts for a nationwide single district, upheld notably by the Shiite duo (Amal-Hezbollah) and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, or explores alternative division options. Moreover, assuming that the Senate is formed, questions arise regarding its leadership. The Taif Agreement, at certain junctures, omitted details concerning the Senate, failing to specify the sectarian identity of its leader, the exact number of its members, their distribution and the nature of the critical issues they would address. Would such issues be confined to peace and war alone? What would the government’s role be in this scenario? Would the pivotal issues encompass major constitutional amendments? What role would the Parliament play and what would the voters’ opinions be in such a case? The likelihood of including recent social issues, like the ‘Barbie’ movie or the criminalization of homosexuality, as pivotal matters is increasing. Any issue framed in terms of national security or threats to national unity becomes highly significant to the Lebanese population.
The Taif Agreement, which mainly aimed for the establishment of a non-sectarian elected council, failed to anticipate the intense sectarian battle for the Senate presidency within Lebanon’s existing sectarian quotas, ranging from the highest echelons down to local positions like forest wardens.
Will the Senate be led by a Druze, a logical choice considering that the Druze constitute the fourth-largest religious community in Lebanon and seek representation as a response to perceived injustices in State positions? Or will the Senate’s leadership go to an Orthodox, as Orthodox Christians have thus far only held deputy positions, and are the second-largest confession in Lebanon after the Maronite? Furthermore, their failure to secure this seat would lead Muslims to occupy three vital positions: The Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister, and the President of the Senate, while the Presidency of the Republic remains in the hands of the Christians. This would disrupt the sectarian balance and run counter to the concept of communal coexistence that the Taif Agreement was originally designed to foster. The problem does not stem from the Taif Agreement itself, as its sole sectarian objective was to end the war and alleviate different concerns.
The crux of the matter resides in the Taif Agreement’s deliberations, which concealed the identity of the legislator who was unwilling to devise practical enforcement mechanisms regarding many aspects of this Accord. The culmination of the aforementioned agreement’s aspirations is similar to those often expressed in United Nations statements during conflicts.
The Taif Agreement might be Lebanon’s last opportunity to preserve Greater Lebanon’s current borders, as any alternative framework would involve reshaping maps in light of ground realities and demographic changes. However, the challenge with implementing the Taif Accord lies in how it grapples with its core issue: sectarianism.
