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The volatile situation in the Ain el-Helweh refugee camp reflects broader regional dynamics and the power struggle among regional actors for influence over the Palestinian issue. The intermittent ceasefires in the camp are indicative of this complex state of affairs. There is growing inclination to resolve the “issue” of Ain el-Helweh and relocate its residents to other areas to mitigate the burden of Palestinian presence. This is especially pertinent as the camp has evolved into a refuge for dormant terrorist cells, Islamist militants and extremists who leverage it to advance regional agendas within the obstructionist (Moumanaa) axis.
The infiltration of Islamists from Syria into the camp “to support their brethren against Fatah” reflects this trajectory. According to Fatah sources, the Palestinian party’s objective is to put an end to this Islamist presence and purge the camp of this dynamic, since there will be no coexistence with Islamists. This is mostly relevant in light of efforts to resume Palestinian-Israeli negotiations to resolve the conflict through a two-state solution.
A former official reports that during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, Israeli forces did not physically enter the camp of Ain el-Helweh. Instead, they enforced a stringent blockade around it. This measure was taken following Lebanese reports that the camp harbored instances of radical extremism. Subsequently, it became a refuge for individuals evading justice and terrorists of various nationalities.
The security situation worsened when Islamist groups refused to hand over the eight assailants responsible for the assassination of Abu Ashraf al-Armushi, head of the Palestinian national security forces. A decision about urgently surrendering these suspects to Lebanese authorities was made during a meeting held at the Palestinian Embassy between Fatah officials and representatives of Islamist groups. The latter rejected calls for a ceasefire, the evacuation of armed individuals from UNRWA schools and the dismantling of barriers and fortifications.
Consequently, the already fragile ceasefires collapsed, giving rise to skirmishes, all of which occurred at a notably suspicious time—on the eve of the resumption of French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian’s mission, and amid the Paris Five (USA, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar) efforts to elect a new president.
It has then become clear that the conflict in Ain el-Helweh involves non-Palestinians vying for control of the camp, with Islamists reportedly having prepared fortifications beforehand, ahead of a military victory, to seize control of the camp.
Local observers have expressed their concerns about a repeat of the Nahr el-Bared scenario, this time in Ain el-Helweh. Except today, the Lebanese Army is inclined to limit its role to the following: tightening the noose, intensifying diplomatic efforts to enforce the ceasefire and facilitating the execution of the “embassy agreement,” all while steering clear of direct involvement in the skirmishes. This stance comes despite persistent attempts to draw the army into the equation.
Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati spoke to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and highlighted the severity of the situation, stating, “What is happening in no way serves the Palestinian cause. It constitutes a serious infringement on the Lebanese State as a whole, especially in the city of Saida.”
In the aftermath of the clashes, a Western official indicated that “the regional settlement has not yet fully matured, and the US-Iranian negotiations that are intended to serve as the foundation for the regional resolution have not progressed due to disagreements on several issues, including the Lebanese crisis.” Furthermore, the Western official expressed his concerns about the conflict spilling over to other camps and regions.
In this context, a former local official does not rule out the possibility that the fighting in Ain el-Helweh could expedite the election of a president. He further added that the issue of Palestinian weapons, along with other pending matters, may be discussed to restrict arms to the hands of Lebanese authorities.
