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Two headlines that prominently graced the front page of This is Beirut’s website on Thursday succinctly unraveled the underlying reasons for the profound rift triggered by Hezbollah’s warlike stance: “Kahaleh: Two Dead Among Rising Tensions” and “The Forgotten City: A Piano to Revive Tripoli’s Old Souks.”
These headlines vividly portray the two starkly opposing visions of Lebanon’s identity that have been in a violent clash for decades. The first pertains to the pro-Iranian party, which acts solely in the best interests of the Islamic Republic in Tehran, paying little heed to the intricate socio-communal dynamics and the country’s “political geography.” The second vision advocates for a liberal, pluralistic Lebanon, globally-connected, prosperous, and firmly committed to freedom. In essence, it’s a clash between the “culture of life” and the “culture of death” (or martyrdom), a slogan used by the March 14 coalition during one of its election campaigns. The Kahale incident serves as yet another illustration – one among many – of the mindset shaping the conduct of Hezbollah’s leaders. Under the guise of “resistance,” they aim to impose the establishment of a warmongering society upon the Lebanese people, perpetuating a constant state of conflict without any prospect of resolution or horizon, with the sole objective of consolidating the strategy of exporting the “Islamic revolution” initiated by the Pasdaran since the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.
Amidst the Khomeinist momentum, the Hezbollah leadership conveniently overlooks the fact that the Lebanese people have been held hostage by various regional players since the late 1960s. Hence, their aspirations for well-being and prosperous life after enduring 53 years of suffering and bloody hardships are undeniably legitimate. Equally valid is their call for a sovereign, efficient, and strong state, rather than entangling the nation in regional conflicts that bear no relevance.
Adding to the concern is the pro-Iranian party’s leadership’s blindness to a fundamental aspect of Lebanon’s public life: the country’s “political geography.” Recent and more distant chapters of Lebanon’s history emphasize the existence of emblematic regions, each of which embodies a distinct sensitivity, collective consciousness, or unique sense of belonging to a specific community. Kahaleh stands as one of these regions, epitomizing an “assabiya,” a spirit of resistance, akin to Ain Remmaneh, Achrafieh, Hadath, Zahlé, Ain Ebel, Becharreh, Zghorta, as well as Moukhtara, Baakline, Aley, Haret Hreik, and to a certain extent Tripoli (despite its diversity) to name a few.
One cannot help but wonder about Hezbollah’s reaction had the Lebanese Forces paraded with weapons through Haret Hreik on a moonless night or brazenly displayed a truck laden with arms and ammunition. On May 7, 2008, the pro-Iranian party committed a grave and unmeasurable strategic blunder by attempting to exert control over Moukhtara (!) and Choueifat. These areas not only serve as strongholds of the PSP, but are also genuine representations of the Druze community. Only an utter ignorance of Lebanon’s profound societal realities or a deliberate disregard for such truths would lead to unleashing a Shiite militia upon Moukhtara or Choueifat!
The aftermath of these reckless “expeditions” targeting the Druze strongholds has unequivocally underscored that Lebanon’s symbolic regions are off-limits to play around with or assault. The reaction of the inhabitants of Kahaleh, in the face of Hezbollah militants’ provocative storm of the town on Wednesday, was both predictable and justifiable. Similarly, the resolute and secessionist stances taken by many residents, dignitaries, and political figures who openly voiced their frustration were entirely warranted. After enduring decades of proxy wars, the Lebanese populace has earned the rightful claim to seek a measure of well-being, a normal and prosperous life, away from the overbearing domination of various regional players.
The “Party of God” consistently reiterates its desire for a President of the Republic who does not “stab it in the back.” In other words, a president in whom it can have complete trust. Undoubtedly, this is an attempt to offset the deep resentment it has stirred among the majority of Lebanese. Perhaps it is about time for this pro-Iranian faction to acknowledge that Lebanon is not its private domain and that it cannot persist in its reckless behavior, acting with impunity as if it holds dominion over the conquered territory. Be it Wilayat el-faqih or not…
