Listen to the article
Before French special envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian returns to Lebanon for a second round of talks with Lebanese politicians over the stalled presidential election, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea summed up his stance in three “negations:” a categorical no to dialogue, no to amending the Taif Agreement, and no to a new version of the Doha Agreement. However, he expressed one positive response in favor of implementing the constitution for the election of a president through open parliamentary sessions.
Geagea noted that the constitution does not stipulate the necessity of dialogue or a pre-existing agreement for electing a president. He also emphasized that such agreements can be reached through discussions and negotiations during the sessions.
A former minister accuses officials of developing a habit of sidestepping Taif’s provisions under the guise of “agreement and consensus, citing Lebanon’s intricate balances.”
Some “have even introduced” the heresy of consensual democracy, while others distorted the very spirit of the National Pact, turning it into a sectarian nature. They disregarded the fact that the pact is meant to ensure equilibrium between Muslims and Christians, not between sects and confessions.”
Hence, many within the opposition reject Hezbollah’s informal practices, such as the use of veto power (the “blocking third”) in the government and the exclusive allocation of the Ministry of Finance to the Shiite community, citing the community’s right to validation power or a “third signature” in the Executive.
Hezbollah claims the arrangements were verbally approved under Taif. However, MPs who participated in the negotiations of the Taif accord have clarified that the allocation of shares between Muslims and Christians was based on the principle of equal representation (parity).
As such, most political forces oppose making Hezbollah’s practices constitutional. They mainly refuse to legitimize its military arsenal that would turn it into a national institution, similar to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
According to an observer, Hezbollah no longer insists on dialogue to secure the election of its presidential candidate and make its practices constitutional.
Due to heightened criticism, Hezbollah has effectively removed the topic of resistance from the negotiating table. A noteworthy statement made by the party’s MP Mohammad Raad, emphasized that “the party remains committed to Taif, with no intention of amending it. Instead, it seeks its complete implementation without advocating for a new political framework.”
Nonetheless, opposition leaders believe that Hezbollah relies on its own interpretation of Taif, which previews the legalization of its “norms and practices.”
The party’s media retreat from previous obstinate stances lacked concrete action and are perceived by the opposition as a tactical reaction to repeated calls for federalism and expanded decentralization.
Hezbollah is apprehensive of the idea of federalism and decentralization and their potential ramifications in a period of uncertainty and change of the regional political order.
It has succeeded in consolidating its control over the State and its institutions and in influencing the selection of the president and governments. It has effectively marginalized the Sunni community, by excluding Saad Hariri from the equation. Moreover, it has politically isolated Walid Joumblatt in favor of his son, Teymour. To advance its agenda, the party has also exacerbated divisions within the Christian community, although it denies such actions.
A former minister argued that Gebran Bassil’s disassociation from Hezbollah and his alignment with the opposition by endorsing Jihad Azour’s candidature dealt a strong blow to the party’s agenda. The party retaliated by boycotting Bassil’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and imposing conditions for the return of the “estranged son,” as reported by sources close to Dahieh, Hezbollah’s hotbed.
MP Raad’s recent comments were prompted by the accusations served against Hezbollah by the five nations that attended the Paris meeting on Lebanon, (France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and the United States). They found that the party has been obstructing the presidential election to legitimize its “privileges” and to use it as pressure card to serve Tehran in its negotiations with Washington.
The vacancies plaguing the country, especially the looming void in critical positions such as the Governance of the Central Bank and the Army Command, among others, no longer works in favor of Hezbollah. Rather, it has become a liability, as both local and international actors have held the party responsible for Lebanon’s political, financial, and economic collapse, and accuse it of turning its armed wing into a regional military instrument serving Iran’s agenda.
Hezbollah continues to brandish the option of dialogue in order to corner its opponents and impose its agenda which would jeopardize Lebanon’s model of peaceful coexistence. It is seen as resorting to excessive power in its attempt to impose its political project, ideology, and way of life on the country, disregarding Lebanon’s unique features and the individuality of the other Lebanese parties.
The external dynamics, particularly the engagement of the five countries participating in the Paris Meeting on Lebanon, have prompted a collective response aligned with Le Drian’s mission. The French envoy is expected to propose a comprehensive roadmap for rescuing the country, which will be shared with the Lebanese parties and the members of the Paris Meeting.
In parallel with Le Drian’s mission, representatives of the five countries might visit Lebanon, with the possibility of a bigger involvement by Washington in the rescue efforts. However, a former minister believes that substantial progress in the presidential issue is unlikely to happen before September.
A Western official reportedly said, “Go enjoy your summer, and we’ll talk in September.”
But the recent events unfolding at the Central Bank, ahead of the departure of the governor on July 31, have reinforced the need for a swift solution. The failure to reach an agreement on managing the looming vacancy prompted external actors to insist on appointing a new governor. They argue that the Central Bank cannot be managed for long by a Central Council under the direction of a vice governor.
