- 10:35
Israel’s Alma Center is wrong about Lebanon’s Shia population. In a recent article, the institute claimed that Hezbollah’s Shia constituency is a “captive audience” chained by dependency, fear, and ideology. In reality, Hezbollah’s committed ideologues are a minority, while dependency and fear can be reversed.
Those dependent on Hezbollah can be peeled away with foreign investment and resources, while fear of the militia can be broken by bolstering Lebanon’s legitimate state security institutions. Weakening Hezbollah’s grip is not rocket science.
Hezbollah enjoys, at most, the support of one-third of Lebanon’s 1.75 million Shia, with evidence suggesting its hold is slipping. In the 2022 parliamentary elections, when Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement dominated Lebanon’s institutions and economy, 17 percent of Shia voters still cast ballots against the “Shia duo.” This trend has only accelerated since then.
In the May 2025 municipal elections, in the traditional Hezbollah stronghold of Baalbek, the two parties won all 21 seats, but secured only two-thirds of the vote. A rival, purely Shia opposition ticket captured one-third of the vote, or 6,000 ballots, despite the militia’s overwhelming money, organization, and intimidation machine.
Two months later, a Gallup poll delivered a similar verdict, with 27 percent of Lebanese Shia expressing support for the complete disarmament of Hezbollah. The fact that a third of the Shia population openly rejects the militia is already a remarkable breach in the so-called captive audience.
The weakest pillar in Alma’s theory is ideology. Hezbollah’s entire project rests on Wilayat al-Faqih—Arabic for “Guardianship of the Jurist”—a doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran that contradicts over 1,400 years of Twelver Shi’a theology.
Traditional Shia believe that the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, entered occultation in the 9th century and will return only at the end of time to establish justice. In his absence, religious authority is deliberately decentralized. Any qualified cleric who earns peer recognition can become a Marjaʿ al-Taqlid—Arabic for “Emulation Authority.” Believers choose one such scholar, follow his rulings on spiritual and personal matters, and pay him religious dues that fund seminaries and welfare networks.
This system was designed to prevent a monopoly on power and to keep religious leadership separate from governments. Shia were historically expected to assimilate into the states in which they lived and to owe political loyalty to the government of the day, essentially to “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s.”
The Wilayat al-Faqih formulation of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini shattered this tradition. Borrowing heavily from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, he elevated a single cleric, himself, above all others. Khomeini anointed himself supreme jurist, ruling over both religion and state in Iran. The Shia religious establishment in Iraq’s holy city of Najaf rejected this innovation outright and still does.
Lebanon’s Shia traditionally looked to Najaf for religious guidance. For decades, the majority emulated Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei before shifting to his successor, Ali al-Sistani. Hezbollah’s rise, fueled by Iranian money, tempted many to switch allegiance to Khomeini and later Ali Khamenei.
Today, anecdotal estimates suggest the Lebanese Shia community is split roughly three ways. Roughly 40 percent follow Khamenei and remain locked into Hezbollah’s patronage web. A plurality, however, is not ideologically bound to Tehran or its Lebanese proxy.
Another 40 percent emulate Ayatollah Sistani. Even amid the latest war in Lebanon, Sistani’s network has subsidized healthcare for displaced Shia families when clinics in the south became inaccessible.
The final 20 percent of Shia look to the independent school of the late Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, once considered Hezbollah’s spiritual founder until he broke with Iran. The Islamic Republic refused to recognize his status as a Marja’ al-Taqlid because he clashed with Tehran’s doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
These three blocs are not always apparent to outsiders. For example, the two main medical centers in Beirut’s southern suburbs are Al-Rassoul al-Aazam Hospital, operated by Hezbollah’s Martyrs Foundation, and Bahman Hospital, operated by Fadlallah’s Mabarrat Charity.
Bahman was funded by a wealthy Kuwaiti Shia businessman, attesting to the wide reach of Fadlallah’s independent religious leadership. Most Lebanese assume both hospitals and their parent organizations are Hezbollah’s, when in fact only one is.
Lebanon’s Shia are not hopelessly captive. Hezbollah constructed its empire through unmatched Iranian cash, ruthless patronage, bullying, and occasional murder. It did not fill an imagined vacuum by a negligent Lebanese state, as is often argued, but deployed a known Shia clerical tradition and exploited Lebanese sectarian politics.
What Hezbollah built with financial power and fear can be dismantled by those same forces, once the balance of terror and resources shifts. Israel’s recent decimation of Hezbollah’s senior leadership and fighting force has already lowered the fear threshold. If Iran’s economy continues its collapse, the cash pipeline will shrink further.
And if Lebanese institutions are properly resourced and empowered, the community’s independent voices, those within Sistani or Fadlallah’s networks, will weaken Hezbollah’s grip.
Just as Iranian dominance over the Shia in Iraq has been weakening, Lebanon can follow. Hezbollah’s dominance over Lebanon’s Shia is neither eternal nor inevitable. It is fragile and already fraying.
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