- 11:20
There is no doubt that Israel has inflicted a severe blow on Hezbollah, weakening not only its battlefield capabilities but also significantly eroding its regional role. However, its complete dismantling as a military force ultimately depends on U.S. pressure on Iran.
Hezbollah no longer resembles the organization it was prior to launching its campaign against Israel on October 8, 2023, in “support” of Gaza. At that time, Hezbollah was widely regarded as the cornerstone of Iran’s regional project and one of Tehran’s most effective instruments for projecting influence.
The Iranian proxy intervened directly in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the regime of now-deposed Bashar al-Assad, while also supporting Tehran’s security machinations in Iraq and Yemen. Hezbollah’s security and intelligence networks extended into several Gulf states, with reach and repercussions across Europe, South America, and Africa.
Since then, Israel has assassinated Hezbollah’s top officials, including its leader Hassan Nasrallah, a central architect in the expansion of Iran’s regional influence. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu once described Nasrallah as the second most important figure in the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” after Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was later killed by the U.S. and Israel on February 28, 2026.
Despite sustaining significant losses in its wars with Israel, Hezbollah continues to exert extensive influence within Lebanon. This is reflected in its de facto control over key areas on the ground, as well as its ability to shape decisions of war and peace in Lebanon through its military and security apparatuses.
The result is that Hezbollah wields substantial leverage within Lebanese political life. It stands as one of the main obstacles to progress in diplomatic efforts between Lebanon and Israel, limiting the prospects of a peace agreement between the two countries.
Once the crown jewel of Iran’s regional project, Hezbollah received significant political, financial, and military support from Tehran. This reflected Hezbollah’s role as Iran’s most important strategic asset, both in the conflict with Israel and in shaping the regional balance of power in the Middle East.
Today, however, the picture is markedly different. As Hezbollah’s regional influence erodes, Iran’s continued investment in the group appears increasingly costly relative to the political and strategic returns it once generated.
From this perspective, the Iranian regime may place less strategic value on Hezbollah as an asset. The militia’s value as a bargaining chip is diminishing, as neither Washington nor Tel Aviv appears willing to make significant concessions.
Israel has arguably already accomplished much of its objective of weakening Hezbollah by reducing the strategic value the group offers the Iranian regime. Moreover, Israel continues to launch daily waves of strikes against Hezbollah’s military and security infrastructure, deepening attrition and further eroding its capabilities.
Yet despite its significance, Israeli military action alone is unlikely to be sufficient to compel Hezbollah to relinquish its weapons or dismantle its military apparatus. A decision of this magnitude is not made in Beirut’s southern suburbs, but in Tehran.
Accordingly, the “last mile” in ending Hezbollah’s military role now rests largely with the U.S., after Tel Aviv has completed much of the operational groundwork. This entails Washington compelling Tehran to dismantle Hezbollah’s military structure.
Consequently, the prospects for peace between Lebanon and Israel are now influenced less by developments between Beirut and Jerusalem than by the trajectory of Washington’s policy toward Tehran.
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