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Whatever different people may think about the Trump Administration's approach to Iran, 21 hours of talks led by the American vice president demonstrated a seriousness of diplomatic purpose.  However, it was never likely that the wide gap between the goals of Washington and those of Tehran would be bridged in a day.  Eight American presidents since the Iranian revolution in 1979 have tried seemingly every means of statecraft under the sun to change Iranian behavior, with each new approach sequentially abandoned every few years because of a new president, a new congress, or a change of heart. Meanwhile, until lately Iran had only two, autocratic leaders. They learned to wait out each turn of policy by Washington, knowing American administrations and their publics would likely lose interest and focus.  Why submit to Washington when you know patience will bring change and openings to resume intimidation, terrorism and violence directed at home and abroad? That is no doubt what Tehran is expecting now. With three years left in his term, President Trump has an opportunity to prove them wrong and complete the shift in the region's balance of power against Iran since 2023. Results will not be instantaneous. 

Broadly, there are three post-Islamabad scenarios. One would be renewed diplomacy during the so-called, two week "ceasefire." It is hard to see what another few rounds would accomplish to overcome the apparent stumbling block of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. The Trump team's initial statements suggest there is no appetite for more high-level negotiations.

A second scenario is resumed, full-fledged war, which Trump is hinting at but not quite declaring. If five weeks of effective and intense American and Israeli military operations against Iran did not change Tehran's negotiating position, it is hard to see how more of the same will yield a shift. Moreover, another round of escalating attacks is not likely to open the Strait of Hormuz but might entail targeting of civilian infrastructure which will intensify political divisions in America over the war. 

A third scenario requires a long game. The phrase most often used in the U.S. to describe it is "mowing the grass," whereby the U.S. and Israel periodically conduct military operations against Iranian nuclear and missile programs, as well as its military, and keep degrading the capabilities of Iran's Arab proxies. But that approach alone is unlikely to be satisfactory. A more successful one would be to subordinate necessary "grass mowing" to broader statecraft: the application of all means by America and its allies to keep political, economic, military, and intelligence pressure to bear on Iran. There could be international support for such an approach. The Arab Gulf states have never been more united with America than today because of the stark reality of the Iranian menace. A British-led coalition is poised to help make Hormuz safer for shipping -- but only when the US/Israeli offensive moves from its intensive phase. China -- both directly and through Pakistan -- has signaled its interest in the free passage of shipping through the Strait. Pressure will mount on Iran to end its preposterous claim to control the waterway.  

Iran is not the Soviet Union, but the story of the successful resolution of the Cold War has lessons. The United States and a global alliance exercised a multi-faceted strategy of persistent pressure on and resistance to Moscow. The stakes were much higher for America than is the case in our contest with Iran, so Americans were prepared to pay a higher price for success than is true (or required) with Iran today. Few dreamt of victory or imagined Soviet collapse. Yet it came, because of American persistence, Soviet overreach, and the political, moral, and economic bankruptcy of the Soviet enterprise.

Over the long run, there may be only one way to limit and perhaps alter Iranian malign behavior: a multi-faceted, multi-year, unyielding strategy of isolation of Iran in every way. That approach could include blockading its shipping and air links, boycotting its exports, truly ending its access to foreign banking and finance, and striking when threats emerge.  It may also accelerate internal pressure on the regime, although explicit references to regime change as an American objective only backfire.  Above all, we need -- and should demand -- constructive support from like-minded allies, which means respecting the fact that they are sovereign entities.  Gaining their help requires persuasion and flexibility, but is worth the effort. If we expect states to join in our tactics, they will seek a voice in conceptualizing the strategy. Iran's effort to use Hormuz as leverage over the world will rally key players around a counter-strategy -- to include the use of force to maintain freedom of navigation -- if the US is nimble, persistent, and prepared to use a range of tools.

Tehran is at its weakest point ever, despite its bluster. For America to declare "victory" and go is exactly the opportunity to revive their fortunes that Iran's leaders pray for. Only a long game is going to end Iran's menace.