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Six years have passed since the October 2019 uprising, an upheaval whose effects continue to heavily weigh on Lebanon. In just a few days, the country appeared to unite against a political class widely seen as corrupt and incapable of averting the looming economic collapse. This surge of public anger culminated in the resignation of Saad Hariri’s government on October 29, 2019, a move that sparked intense debate.
But what truly happened in October 2019? How does this uprising align with the hallmarks of so-called “color revolutions?” And what do available data reveal about the financing of Lebanese civil society organizations? This is Beirut takes stock.
Revisiting the Events
Even before the first barricades went up, Lebanon’s economy was on the brink of collapse. Public debt exceeded 150% of GDP, budget and trade deficits were widening, a shortage of dollars crippled imports and confidence in the banking sector was eroding.
The announcement of a tax on WhatsApp calls on October 17, 2019, acted as the spark that ignited a powder keg. Within hours, spontaneous protests erupted from Tripoli to Tyre. Observers were struck not only by the scale of the mobilization but also by its composition. For the first time since the civil war, sectarian divides appeared to give way, at least superficially, to a shared demand for dignity and social justice.
Even after Hariri’s resignation, protesters refused to disperse. For weeks, they occupied public squares, held debates and experimented with forms of “direct democracy.” Only a series of subsequent shocks, including economic repression, the collapse of the Lebanese pound and the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, gradually weakened the movement. By spring 2020, the protests had largely dissipated, with no political group succeeding in channeling the popular momentum into an institutional project.
Long celebrated by civil society, the 2019 protests have also been described by many experts as a foreign-influenced “color revolution,” modeled on mobilizations that reshaped Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine in the 2000s. Central to this theory is billionaire George Soros and his network of foundations, accused of financing, directly or indirectly, the Lebanese protests through local organizations, notably Kulluna Irada (KI).
Before analyzing Lebanon’s 2019 experience in detail, it is essential to understand the concept of a color revolution and how it operates.
Color Revolutions: How They Work
The term emerged at the turn of the 21st century to describe nonviolent civic movements that successfully brought about regime change from Serbia to Ukraine. A notable example is the Serbian movement Otpor, meaning “Resistance,” which trained young Georgian activists in nonviolent mobilization and political communication. Founded in Belgrade in the late 1990s, Otpor played a pivotal role in the fall of President Slobodan Milosevic.
Color revolutions combine mass popular mobilization with carefully planned political strategies. They rely on unifying slogans capable of transcending social, ethnic or religious divisions, and quickly rallying citizens around shared demands for justice or political reform. Nonviolent planning is central. Volunteer networks, local committees and training in peaceful resistance sustain pressure on authorities while avoiding direct armed confrontation.
Media and social networks are equally crucial. They spread messages, rapidly mobilize participants and document abuses of power, transforming communication into a tool for political leverage and public legitimacy. These movements also build broad and cross sector coalitions, bringing together students, NGOs, journalists and cultural or economic actors to strengthen social and political credibility.
External support, whether subtle or direct, often reinforces these movements. Symbols, colors and logos help unify participants and make the movement highly visible.
In Lebanon, many experts argue that the October 2019 uprising reflected these dynamics. Rooted in local conditions, the protests quickly transcended traditional sectarian and regional divides. They coalesced around clear and unifying demands, denouncing corruption and demanding dignity and social justice, mobilizing a significant portion of the population within days. The ability to craft a simple yet compelling collective narrative is a hallmark of color revolutions, where the idea of a common goal transcends partisan or identity-based interests, notes an expert speaking anonymously.
The strategic use of media and social networks proved equally decisive. Platforms coordinated demonstrations, disseminated messages and documented abuses, transforming communication into a lever of political pressure and citizen unification. The rapid circulation of information and its ability to galvanize participants mirrors techniques used in nonviolent movements in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine.
The Lebanese uprising also relied on diverse civic coalitions. Students, NGOs, journalists and cultural actors converged in public spaces, reinforcing the movement’s legitimacy. This cross-cutting approach, uniting different segments of society around a single objective, is another hallmark of color revolutions, which depend less on traditional political parties and more on organized civil society.
Several observers note that Lebanese civil society benefited from external support networks providing funding, training or strategic guidance. Direct or indirect assistance enabled activists to apply proven nonviolent mobilization methods inspired by foreign experiences like Otpor. While these resources did not drive mass mobilization in Lebanon on their own, they allowed external actors to exert influence and leverage over the country.
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