None of the emigrants chose to leave voluntarily. They left either in pursuit of education abroad or to find work that could provide them with economic stability and safety amid the wars in Lebanon. When the electoral law was amended to include expatriates in the actual voting process, enthusiasm soared, and in the last election, a quarter of a million emigrants registered. Their votes played a decisive role in nearly 12 parliamentary seats through their participation in their home districts.
However, some parties are now striving to conduct expatriate voting based on Electoral District 16, which would allocate six seats exclusively for emigrants—without a clear mechanism or actual logistical arrangements. The goal, it seems, is to prevent expatriates from influencing internal decision-making.
In 2022, approximately 132,000 expatriates actually cast their votes abroad. Change-oriented forces came in first with 36,000 votes, while the Lebanese Forces came in second with 29,000 votes. These two parties were the main beneficiaries of the expatriate vote, which explains why their opponents now seek to restrict emigrants from voting for internal seats, preferring to confine their influence to the diaspora.
But there are several issues with this form of voting, the most pressing of which is the lack of clarity regarding how the election would be organized. Who determines which continent corresponds to which sect? For instance, if the African continent is allocated to the Shia seat, can a Shia candidate living in Europe still run? Would candidacies be restricted only to those living abroad, or could someone residing in Lebanon run for a diaspora seat? And how could such a candidate realistically campaign and promote themselves across an entire continent?
Opposition to this proposal rests on two main arguments. The first is the concern that Hezbollah and the Amal Movement might be unable to run their campaigns abroad due to international sanctions. However, notably, sanctions were also in place during the 2022 elections, and yet Hezbollah ranked third among emigrant votes, garnering around 10,000 votes. This did not prevent Speaker Nabih Berri, along with MPs Mohammad Raad, Hassan Fadlallah, Ali Fayyad, Amin Sherri, Hussein Al-Jashi, and Inaya Ezzeddine, from each receiving more than 1,000 preferential votes from the diaspora. So why is “restriction” being used as a justification now, when it wasn’t a barrier then?
The second argument, mainly from the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), is that the diaspora deserves representation by MPs who focus on their specific concerns. But in reality, expatriates don’t need someone to handle their personal affairs—they need MPs who will focus on fixing the country’s internal situation. Most emigrants who vote are based in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and France, followed by the United States, Australia, and Canada. The first group consists of economic migrants who send money back to Lebanon whenever possible. The second group left to study or emigrated during or after the war, disillusioned by the state to which politicians had brought Lebanon over the years.
The issue of how and whether the diaspora can vote will remain a hot topic until the end of May, and possibly beyond, if no agreement is reached before the regular parliamentary session concludes. This would require convening an extraordinary session to settle the matter before registration opens for expatriates in the diaspora. But even now, it’s clear that expatriates will not register in the same numbers if they are not allowed to vote for internal parliamentary seats. This means policymakers must start listening to what the diaspora wants—not just what the parliamentary blocs desire.
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