Just a few weeks ago, many believed that diplomatic efforts had stalled, given the inability of foreign governments to make a breakthrough in the complex issues surrounding the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. Today, however, it seems that a new momentum has been introduced. Does it offer hope? One can only speculate, especially since the information available to the Lebanese political scene after the brief visit by US envoy Amos Hochstein remains vague.
On Monday, the US special envoy visited Beirut as part of yet another diplomatic initiative aimed at reinforcing stability in Lebanon amid heightened tensions on the southern border with Israel. American demands—ranging from the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to separating Lebanon's situation from the war in Gaza—did not indicate an immediate crisis resolution, at least not in the short term.
Some political and media circles deemed Hochstein's meetings with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati as unproductive. However, others praised the results of these meetings, which also included a session with Army Commander Joseph Aoun. But why? And what message was Hochstein carrying?
It’s worth recalling that this visit is a continuation of American efforts to implement Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006 following the war between Israel and Hezbollah. This resolution calls for a ceasefire between the two sides and the deployment of the Lebanese army, supported by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in southern Lebanon.
It is also important to note that Hochstein’s visit came shortly after Israeli authorities submitted a document to the US, outlining conditions that seem unattainable for a diplomatic solution to end the war. According to the US website Axios, these demands include allowing Israeli Defense Forces to actively prevent Hezbollah's rearmament and giving the Israeli Air Force freedom to operate in Lebanese airspace. Lebanese authorities view these demands as violating Lebanon's sovereignty and conflicting with the provisions of Resolution 1701.
While these conditions were not entirely dismissed by the US, some sources suggest that Hochstein reiterated them during his visit, though in a slightly more “tolerable” format for Lebanon. In fact, Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar cited Arab diplomats claiming that the American envoy presented a roadmap during his meetings with Berri and Mikati.
This document reportedly focuses on expanding the mandate and mission of international forces operating in Lebanon. The expansion would include a significant increase in peacekeeping forces and Lebanese soldiers stationed north of the Litani River, extending at least a few kilometers from the border. Previously, Israel had demanded Hezbollah withdraw 30 km from the border, in line with Resolution 1701, but they have since scaled back, now calling for a withdrawal between 3 and 10 km. They claim that this would restore calm along the Lebanon-Israel border and allow the safe return of 68,000 northern Israeli residents who fled due to the clashes. However, given Hezbollah's long-range missiles that exceed this distance, it is unclear to what extent Israel would agree to this.
Hochstein’s roadmap also allegedly includes a clause granting international forces the right to inspect any suspected sites containing weapons and to conduct patrols and drone surveillance in areas covered by Resolution 1701, in coordination with the Lebanese army. Furthermore, the document would grant forces the right to control Lebanon’s ports and air traffic, with technical support from control towers along the Lebanon-Syria border. For some observers, these provisions undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty, masking Israeli conditions under an international guise.
As for the official statements following Hochstein's meetings with Berri and Mikati—both of whom expressed “satisfaction”—three main points emerged. First, Hochstein stressed the “rigorous implementation” of Resolution 1701, hinting that additional clauses might be added later. However, the issue of Resolution 1559, which is part of 1701 (mentioned in the preamble), was not raised. Adopted in 2004, Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, the disbandment of all militias (including Hezbollah) and the organization of free elections. What could these additional clauses entail? How can an “augmented” 1701 be considered when even the basic 1701 remains partially implemented? Among the obstacles to implementing 1701 is Israel’s veto, which imposes unfeasible conditions, as mentioned earlier. Additionally, Resolution 1701 operates under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which provides only semi-coercive authority, unlike Chapter 7, which grants binding enforcement.
Israel fears a return to the post-2006 scenario, where the partial implementation of the UN resolution did not prevent Hezbollah from strengthening militarily and logistically.
Second, Hochstein advocated for separating Lebanon's issues from Gaza's, a concept that Hezbollah finds nearly inconceivable. Since the war in Gaza erupted on October 7, Hezbollah has promoted the principle of united fronts, tying a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon to a ceasefire in Gaza.
Third, Hochstein informed his Lebanese counterparts that the US is working on a plan to end the conflict permanently. Is this merely a tactic to buy time until the US elections in November? “Hochstein reiterated what all parties already know: Resolution 1701 alone is no longer sufficient,” said Fadi Assaf, co-founder of Middle East Strategic Perspectives, a think tank specializing in international, defense and security issues in the Middle East. According to him, there are two main camps: “Those who acknowledge this reality but remain in denial, hoping time will work in their favor and restore the pre-October 8, 2023 status quo.” For example, “Hezbollah, Nabih Berri, and Iran believe that securing a ceasefire in exchange for vague promises to implement 1701, without 1559, is still feasible.”
The other camp comprises those who “refuse to take this risk and intend to capitalize on the military balance shift against Hezbollah to impose, 'manu militari,' a new security framework, with Israel, the U.S., and European countries as the main actors,” he suggests. He adds that “both camps are betting on time. While Israel and its American allies count on the political implications of military successes, Iran and its proxies, mainly Hezbollah, hope that time will eventually turn the situation in their favor.”
Analyzing the current situation, Assaf points out that Israel seeks to exploit its opponents' indecision by offering a “proposal they cannot accept,” which grants the Israeli army the right to intervene and violate Lebanese sovereignty at will. However, Hezbollah and Iran, buoyed by the anniversary of the October 1983 attacks on US Marines and French paratroopers in Beirut, believe they can turn the situation in their favor and refuse to concede to an augmented 1701.
Meanwhile, the US and European countries, particularly France which is hosting an international conference on Lebanon on October 24, “know that this is neither the time for negotiations, nor for deals, nor for a ceasefire,” says Assaf. “They are nonetheless trying to curb the escalating tensions on the Lebanon-Israel front, hoping to prevent the total collapse of the Lebanese state and keep the door open for future negotiations in a more favorable context,” he continues.
Relying on a strategy of de-escalation and regional cooperation to prevent Lebanon from descending into another open war, will the US plan once again fall through? How can one even hope for a simple implementation of 1701 when the first reinforcements (with an additional 1,500 soldiers expected to arrive at the border) for the Lebanese army won’t be ready for another four to six months? How can one expect success when Hezbollah continues to build tunnels, stockpile weapons from Iran and entrench its positions? And how can one imagine eliminating Hezbollah entirely as long as the Iranian regime remains in power? Finally, how can one expect a resolution when Hezbollah and its allies effectively control Lebanon’s political reins?
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