- 18
- June
- 2024
For Israel and Lebanon, the Most Dangerous Period Looms
modified on 19 June 2024 à 14:29 Read : 4 minute(s) A A A
There is conventional wisdom held in some quarters that the risk of a full-blown war between Hezbollah and Israel will begin to recede if and when the conflict between Israel and Hamas reaches a ceasefire or end state. If only it were so simple.
It is true that Hezbollah leaders assert they will continue the fight they joined on October 8, 2023, so long as the war in Gaza continues. That hints at a corollary: they may want to stop once Hamas stops. Even with the recent escalation between Hezbollah and Israel, it is also true that neither side seems interested for now in an uncontrolled war. Israel hardly wants war on two fronts, beyond what it is already dealing with. Iran's interests are less transparently communicated to the world, but a full-scale campaign against Israel by Hezbollah would jeopardize weaponry in south Lebanon that is of great value to Tehran -- valuable as a reserve deterrent against kinetic attacks on its own nuclear facilities.
As for the stage after the Gaza conflict, the uncertainty is less about Iran and more about Israel. Even after the war with Hamas ends, the situation in Gaza will be a major security, political, and diplomatic challenge for Israel. Nonetheless, Israelis will not tolerate for much longer the status quo in the north. For most Israelis, October 7 discredited previous national security strategies that entailed de facto coexistence on their borders with groups committed to their extermination.
Israeli rhetoric focuses on how to turn the tables, restore deterrence, and guarantee Israelis they will "never again" live in the shadow of violence. Prime Minister Netanyahu warned on June 12 of the potential for "very strong action" and said, "One way or the other, we will restore security in the north." He may be trying to avoid being outflanked by his right-wing cabinet colleagues, such as Finance Minister Smotrich who demands a ground invasion. The debate in Israel on what to do to restore security on their northern border is serious, albeit with a flavor of deja vu. Memories of the 2006 war must inject some reality about the consequences of a full-blown war with Hezbollah, as well as an appreciation that both sides have developed a level of firepower that would make war even more lethal and damaging than the one in 2006. But the absence of viable alternatives to address Israel's security predicament in Lebanon, and Hezbollah's gratuitous joining Hamas' war, keeps military options very much alive in Israel.
This is where America has a necessary role in avoiding an expanded war, if possible. The starting point for successful diplomacy lies not in new formulas, but with a return to the unfulfilled commitments made at the end of the 2006 war, adopted in UN Security Council Resolution 1701. While it had the ingredients for restoring stability, it lacked enforcement mechanisms or a willingness by Hezbollah and its Iranian masters to submit to it. Moreover, the main sponsor of 1701 -- the United States -- seemed to lose interest once a ceasefire was achieved. Getting back on the path of implementing 1701 is key, with an initial withdrawal of Hezbollah to the Litani River. Of course, that won't happen in a vacuum.
The strategic foe is in Tehran, not Bir Hassan. Recent reports of direct, diplomatic engagement between American and Iranian officials may be pointers in the right direction, depending on what is being said. Only when Iranian leaders -- not just their expendable Arab proxies -- feel the pain will there be any hope of a genuine reassessment in Tehran that influences the behavior of Hezbollah. Sanctions enforcement, interdiction of weapons exports, and military pressure on Iranian assets stationed outside Iran are key. If such pressure does shift Iran's strategic calculus, UNSCR 1701 provides the framework for a gradual improvement of security for both Israelis and Lebanese living alongside that border. If no pressure is applied to Iran, no amount of creative diplomacy or new formulas by American, French, or Arab diplomats will make a difference. Success will require time, persistence, and a focus on the source of the problem.
We should learn from the past. One lesson is to know that short-term fixes are just that -- short-term. Papered-over differences have a way of resurfacing with a vengeance. A return to the pre-October 7 status quo in south Lebanon simply guarantees another future war and condemns innocent Lebanese and Israeli citizens to lives in the daily shadow of conflict. And in any case, the current Israeli mood will not support a return to such a policy of complacency. A second lesson is that America has an indispensable diplomatic role to play, but it requires pressure and persistence. It can demonstrate that achieving security and stability through diplomacy is a viable alternative to expanded war -- but only in the context of restored deterrence against Iran and its proxies. So long as Israel, America, and others focus in Lebanon only on the proxy and not the sponsor of conflict -- that is, only on Hezbollah and not Iran -- these cycles of violence will never end.
It is true that Hezbollah leaders assert they will continue the fight they joined on October 8, 2023, so long as the war in Gaza continues. That hints at a corollary: they may want to stop once Hamas stops. Even with the recent escalation between Hezbollah and Israel, it is also true that neither side seems interested for now in an uncontrolled war. Israel hardly wants war on two fronts, beyond what it is already dealing with. Iran's interests are less transparently communicated to the world, but a full-scale campaign against Israel by Hezbollah would jeopardize weaponry in south Lebanon that is of great value to Tehran -- valuable as a reserve deterrent against kinetic attacks on its own nuclear facilities.
As for the stage after the Gaza conflict, the uncertainty is less about Iran and more about Israel. Even after the war with Hamas ends, the situation in Gaza will be a major security, political, and diplomatic challenge for Israel. Nonetheless, Israelis will not tolerate for much longer the status quo in the north. For most Israelis, October 7 discredited previous national security strategies that entailed de facto coexistence on their borders with groups committed to their extermination.
Israeli rhetoric focuses on how to turn the tables, restore deterrence, and guarantee Israelis they will "never again" live in the shadow of violence. Prime Minister Netanyahu warned on June 12 of the potential for "very strong action" and said, "One way or the other, we will restore security in the north." He may be trying to avoid being outflanked by his right-wing cabinet colleagues, such as Finance Minister Smotrich who demands a ground invasion. The debate in Israel on what to do to restore security on their northern border is serious, albeit with a flavor of deja vu. Memories of the 2006 war must inject some reality about the consequences of a full-blown war with Hezbollah, as well as an appreciation that both sides have developed a level of firepower that would make war even more lethal and damaging than the one in 2006. But the absence of viable alternatives to address Israel's security predicament in Lebanon, and Hezbollah's gratuitous joining Hamas' war, keeps military options very much alive in Israel.
This is where America has a necessary role in avoiding an expanded war, if possible. The starting point for successful diplomacy lies not in new formulas, but with a return to the unfulfilled commitments made at the end of the 2006 war, adopted in UN Security Council Resolution 1701. While it had the ingredients for restoring stability, it lacked enforcement mechanisms or a willingness by Hezbollah and its Iranian masters to submit to it. Moreover, the main sponsor of 1701 -- the United States -- seemed to lose interest once a ceasefire was achieved. Getting back on the path of implementing 1701 is key, with an initial withdrawal of Hezbollah to the Litani River. Of course, that won't happen in a vacuum.
The strategic foe is in Tehran, not Bir Hassan. Recent reports of direct, diplomatic engagement between American and Iranian officials may be pointers in the right direction, depending on what is being said. Only when Iranian leaders -- not just their expendable Arab proxies -- feel the pain will there be any hope of a genuine reassessment in Tehran that influences the behavior of Hezbollah. Sanctions enforcement, interdiction of weapons exports, and military pressure on Iranian assets stationed outside Iran are key. If such pressure does shift Iran's strategic calculus, UNSCR 1701 provides the framework for a gradual improvement of security for both Israelis and Lebanese living alongside that border. If no pressure is applied to Iran, no amount of creative diplomacy or new formulas by American, French, or Arab diplomats will make a difference. Success will require time, persistence, and a focus on the source of the problem.
We should learn from the past. One lesson is to know that short-term fixes are just that -- short-term. Papered-over differences have a way of resurfacing with a vengeance. A return to the pre-October 7 status quo in south Lebanon simply guarantees another future war and condemns innocent Lebanese and Israeli citizens to lives in the daily shadow of conflict. And in any case, the current Israeli mood will not support a return to such a policy of complacency. A second lesson is that America has an indispensable diplomatic role to play, but it requires pressure and persistence. It can demonstrate that achieving security and stability through diplomacy is a viable alternative to expanded war -- but only in the context of restored deterrence against Iran and its proxies. So long as Israel, America, and others focus in Lebanon only on the proxy and not the sponsor of conflict -- that is, only on Hezbollah and not Iran -- these cycles of violence will never end.
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