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Once again, Lebanon was rocked by a wave of explosions that struck multiple regions on Wednesday afternoon. This time, the blasts were caused by Hezbollah walkie-talkies, specifically the Icom IC-F2100DT VHF model, reportedly manufactured by Icom Inc. (Aikomu Kabushiki-gaisha), a Japanese company specializing in radio communication equipment, founded in 1954 by Tokuzo Inoue under the name “Inoue.” Several deaths and injuries were reported, adding to the thousands already affected since Tuesday, when pagers belonging to members of the pro-Iranian group exploded.
In the investigation of the booby-trapped pagers that detonated across Lebanon on Tuesday, attention has focused on the Hungarian company BAC Consulting KFT due to its links with Voltaker KFT and its contract with the Taiwanese firm Gold Apollo Ltd.
Accused of involvement in the booby-trapped pager attacks targeting Hezbollah, Taiwanese company Gold Apollo Ltd denied any role in manufacturing the devices despite them carrying its branding. In a statement released on Wednesday, the company claimed the devices were “designed and sold” by the Hungarian firm BAC Consulting KFT, whose website has been under maintenance since Wednesday morning.
BAC Consulting KFT: The Big Mystery
Established in May 2022, BAC Consulting KFT reported a revenue of 210 million forints (HUF) and a net profit of 13 million HUF for 2023. Its head office is 33/A Szőnyi út, District 14, Zugló, Budapest. However, Juli Butcher’s investigation for the Hungarian media outlet 444 reveals discrepancies about this location. “Our visit to BAC Consulting KFT’s supposed head office in Budapest uncovered that it is not the actual office. The building listed as the company’s address serves as a service provider hosting multiple businesses,” reports journalist Butcher, supported by photographic evidence. “This information is not uncommon; it is a domiciliation address,” explains Jean Sébastien Guillaume, founder of Celtic Intelligence. However, Guillaume highlights that “two companies registered at this address have ties to Russia, raising concerns about potential broader connections.”
According to Guillaume, “the association between BAC Consulting KFT and the two Russian companies, Alteko Action Trade KFT and Claywood Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató KFT, might indicate a complex network of businesses registered at the same location.”
Although no direct link to Israeli services has been identified, the expert in economic and strategic intelligence asserts that “the intertwining of Russian, Hungarian, and international interests surrounding BAC Consulting could be crucial in the context of the explosive pager production.”
Further investigation into the company’s website archives, facilitated by Guillaume, reveals that BAC Consulting KFT is a public relations consultancy, not a telecommunications or battery manufacturing plant.
How could a manufacturing and distribution contract be awarded to a company without expertise in this field? Guillaume speculates that the contract may have been transferred from BAC Consulting KFT to Voltaker KFT, a company with over thirty years of experience located just a hundred meters from BAC in Hungary and recognized for its battery production for clients worldwide.
Another Key Hypothesis: Bársony-Arcidiacono Cristiana Rosaria
The identity of this woman in her forties has sparked interest following a review of her background. Who is she?
Bársony-Arcidiacono Cristiana Rosaria holds a Ph.D. in Physics from University College London (UCL). She furthered her studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science and completed post-graduate training in London. Fluent in seven languages, her career includes roles as a researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), an expert with the European Commission, and positions at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Her impressive CV highlights a diverse and accomplished professional history. Today, Bársony-Arcidiacono claims to have been the General Director of BAC Consulting since 2019. However, as previously mentioned, the company was only established in Hungary in 2022. This inconsistency raises questions about the accuracy of her claims.
While the origin of the pagers remains uncertain, experts are also grappling with a critical question: How did the pagers explode?
Pager Explosions: A Multifaceted Attack
According to Guillaume, based on interviews with specialists and technicians, three key hypotheses are proposed:
- Exploitation of a Design Flaw: Firmware is software created by manufacturers to control electronic devices. All devices, from watches to connected speakers, rely on specific firmware. Electronic devices require a power source, such as lithium batteries in pagers. These batteries are known for their sensitivity to overheating, which can cause them to swell and explode. A radio wave attack could disrupt the firmware and cause a short circuit if the overheating protection is compromised or defective. This could lead to a rise in battery temperature, gas release, and potentially an explosion if 1 gram of PETN (to be detailed later) was added. The consequences could be severe, causing significant injuries due to the chemicals in the battery.
- Sabotage During Manufacturing and Exploitation of Supply Chain Weaknesses: This scenario involves collusion with the manufacturer. Agents could insert an explosive charge into the pagers directly on the production line, modify the firmware, and then complete the assembly with PETN.
- Similar to the Second Scenario but Without Manufacturer Involvement: This method involves infiltrating the delivery or distribution process. A delivery person or distributor might carefully open or tamper with new pagers, alter the firmware, insert the PETN explosive charge, and reseal the device and packaging to match the original.
Expert Guillaume suggests that “once the pagers are delivered to their target — in this case, Hezbollah members — the plan might be to wait for a predetermined period and then simultaneously trigger all the charges using a radio signal sent to the targeted pagers.”
Operation Kickoff
The operation involved sending a message via the pager frequency to devices dispersed among the targets. According to Guillaume, this message, which triggered the explosions, “was reportedly sent on September 17 at exactly 3:30 PM.”
The explosives were detonated simultaneously, causing blasts at multiple locations in Lebanon and Syria.
Guillaume further notes that “the frequency used to activate the explosives was reportedly 157.950 MHz, according to the technicians.” He adds that “these were specialized, reinforced pagers (IP67 standard), designed to be shock-resistant and waterproof, with long-lasting batteries capable of lasting up to 85 days. These pagers contained explosives, particularly PETN, which were reportedly integrated into the battery.”
Understanding PETN
PETN, or Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (C₅H₈N₄O₁₂), is a highly potent explosive that appears as white or colorless crystals. With a density of about 1.77 g/cm³, PETN is insoluble in water but dissolves in organic solvents such as acetone, ether, and methanol. It has a detonation velocity of approximately 8,400 m/s, categorizing it as a high-energy explosive. Extremely sensitive to heat, shock, and friction, PETN is one of the most powerful explosives available and is notably dangerous to handle.
When detonated, PETN releases a significant amount of energy, making it highly effective for concentrated explosive charges. Its applications include:
Military Uses: PETN is utilized in detonators, demolition charges, land mines, blasting cords, and various improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Industrial Uses: It is employed in controlled demolitions and in precise explosive applications, such as dismantling structures.
Compact and difficult to detect, PETN has been used in various terrorist attacks, including IEDs in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Its suitability for miniaturized devices makes it a preferred choice for covert operations. PETN is challenging to detect with standard scanners, especially when concealed within devices, which could explain how it might have gone “unnoticed” when integrated into pager batteries during delivery.
To confirm PETN’s role in the attack on Hezbollah, although its chemical signature is hard to trace post-detonation — due to its near-total disintegration and significant energy release — chemical analysis methods and damage assessments can provide evidence of its usage. Additionally, the specific sound of the explosion can be a crucial clue in such investigations.
Companies with Russian Links Registered at the Same Address
Guillaume also reveals disturbing details about the two aforementioned Russian companies: Alteko Action Trade KFT and Claywood Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató KFT. Alteko Action Trade KFT is owned by Pavel Bogdanovskii, with Marianna Kovalenko as his Hungarian representative in Hungary. Founded in 2007, Alteko specializes in the wholesale of metals and minerals. Alteko’s founder is a company, Acton Trading Corp. On the other hand, Claywood Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató KFT, owned by Promsnab (a Russian company registered in Moscow), specializes in the wholesale of petroleum products. Also founded in 2007, its founder is another Panamanian company, Armorica Trading Corp.
The links between these two companies are quite significant. Acton Trading Corp, the founder of Alteko, held shares in Claywood between October 2013 and May 2016. Gergely Prandler, a Hungarian citizen, owned both companies at one point, reinforcing the complexity of the interweaving of interests on an international scale.
