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President Emile Lahoud’s term was set to end in November 2007, as the election of a new president was hindered by Hezbollah and Michel Aoun. Meanwhile, Fouad Siniora’s caretaker government, which lacked Shiite representation, had just approved two decrees that were rejected by the Amal/Hezbollah duo and their Christian allies from the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).
On May 7, 2008, the Hezbollah militiamen and their allies seized control of the capital and the Mountain – from where they were pushed back – as they managed to force the government to reverse its May 5 decision. The escalating situation prompted Qatar and the Arab League to step in on May 15 and negotiate a ceasefire. This set the pace for a new Lebanese national dialogue session that took place in Doha, from May 16 to May 21, with the specter of the pro-Iranian militia’s weapons casting a shadow in the background. The caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was reluctant to attend due to the disruption in the balance of power. Former MP Ahmad Fatfat told This is Beirut that one hour before his flight to Doha, Siniora was still indecisive.
At the Doha conference, the participants agreed on the following: electing Michel Sleiman, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to assume the Presidency; organizing the legislative elections; forming a coalition government, and finally going forward with the national dialogue under the aegis of the new President.
The Doha Agreement, endorsed by the international community, successfully ended an 18-month-long political crisis and put an end to a series of political assassinations that targeted leaders from the March 14 camp. Sit-ins, organized by the March 8 coalition in downtown Beirut for months also came to an end. However, the Doha Accord will institute the principle known in Lebanon as the one-third minority veto, which will, in turn, pave the way for a new interpretation of the Taif Agreement. The one-third blocking vote is tantamount to a “federation” of communities within the government granting each community group the right to veto, leading to dysfunction in successive cabinets after Doha’s meeting. In parallel, under this agreement, the parties involved committed “not to resign or obstruct the government’s activity.”
Following his election in 2008, Sleiman laid down the main item of his dialogue agenda, namely “The Defense Strategy.” The carefully formulated term was “approved” by Hezbollah, but it nonetheless led to a misunderstanding: while the Shiite formation argued that the term did not encompass its weapons, the March 14 coalition believed that the “Defense Strategy” inherently encompassed the need to address the issue of the pro-Iranian party’s arsenal.
The dialogue was put on hold in 2009 to gear up for the parliamentary elections and was relaunched in 2010, spanning over five sessions during which the two camps vied for control of the discussion agenda. The March 14 camp aimed to solely focus on the defense strategy while leaving economic matters to the cabinet. However, the March 8 camp wanted to delve into topics such as the Shebaa Farms and the presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the refugee camps, seemingly with the aim of diverting attention from the main issues.
The Policy of Dissociation
The dialogue resumed in 2010 under the chairmanship of Sleiman instead of Nabih Berry, who “took off his mediator hat” (that he had worn in 2006) and became the representative of his political camp.
Insert List of participants
Unlike the round table of the 2006 dialogue, this time around, the delegates were gathered around a rectangular table, and the session was chaired by the President of the Republic.
The dialogue was led by Sleiman, as stipulated by the Doha Agreement. However, because of his previous position as Army Commander in Chief (a nomination “driven” by Syria), his leadership failed to trigger the same level of respect from all the participants.
Both blocs (Hezbollah and FPM) boycotted the said sessions consecutively at different stages of the dialogue. Hezbollah protested attempts to discuss its weapons, while the March 14 camp rightfully accused the pro-Iranian formation of being the sole decision-maker regarding the issues of war and peace and that its decisions overstepped the State’s institutions (at the time, the war in Syria was beginning to escalate).
Around the same time, in January 2011, the “Black Shirts Coup” occurred as a result of the resignation of one-third of the ministers, in addition to one minister on President Sleiman’s ministerial team. These events happened while Prime Minister Saad Hariri was at the White House Oval Office.
This was Hezbollah’s second turnaround against the agreement it signed in Doha, in which it committed not to resign from the government.
These events culminated with the adoption of the “Baabda Declaration” on June 11, 2012, which called for Lebanon to dissociate itself from the issues in Syria. The Declaration included 17 items, chief among which stipulated that “Lebanon should eschew block politics and regional and international conflicts. It should seek to avoid the negative repercussions of regional tensions and crises in order to preserve its own paramount interest, national unity and civil peace.”
Another clause emphasized the commitment to “respect international resolutions, including Resolution 1701, and prevent the use of Lebanese territory as a “base, corridor or starting point to smuggle weapons and combattants.”
Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah rejected the agreement, describing it as “stillborn.” The Baabda Agreement, which was never implemented, became Hezbollah’s third turnaround against a document it had agreed to and signed. As a result, the pro-Iranian party pursued its policy of interference in the Syrian war.
Two more dialogue sessions will ensue: one in 2014 under the auspices of Sleiman, and another in 2015 under Berry’s. The latter focused on the election of a head of state and the implementation of certain clauses of the Taif Agreement, including the establishment of a Senate and political secularization. During these 2015 sessions, Hezbollah attempted to define the characteristics of the President of the Republic in a way that boosted its candidate, Michel Aoun. In this particular session, there was no backtracking on the part of the Shiite party, as no decision was taken, according to a personality who was present during these discussions.
Dialogue and ‘Fait Accompli’
Despite the obvious need for dialogue amid the current critical situation and the fact that it embodies a framework for bridging divides, the topics addressed throughout this stated period remained unresolved.
In a bid to keep up appearances in upholding the principles outlined in the Taif Agreement, Hezbollah’s consistent involvement in successive dialogue conferences, along with its latest wish to push for dialogue, can be seen as an attempt to save face. However, in practice, the de facto modifications of the essence of this agreement are unfolding, and a “fait accompli” is being enforced on the balance of power.
The successive turnarounds that occurred in the dialogue sessions (from 2006 to 2015) prove that Hezbollah’s sole objective is to be the ultimate decision-maker.
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