Moussavi’s Killing: Anticipating Iran’s Retaliatory Move

The death of Moussavi, just days before the commemoration of Soleimani’s death, comes about in a highly tense political and military context.

On Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to continue the offensive against Hamas in Gaza until the “elimination and deradicalization” of this pro-Iranian Palestinian group. He emphasized that, for Tel Aviv, this is the “only way to recover our hostages, eradicate Hamas and ensure that Gaza is no longer a threat to Israel.” These statements support the argument that the United States is no longer able to exert significant pressure on its ally to prevent the conflict, initiated on October 7 by a Hamas attack on Israel, from spreading or escalating into a broader war.

Iranians have threatened to retaliate for the killing of Moussavi, to ensure that Israel “pays for this crime,” as declared by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Would this retaliation be carried out through Iran’s paramilitary entities, including Hezbollah?

Israeli media reported on Tuesday that Tel Aviv was on heightened alert along its northern front, anticipating “an Iranian response that could include missile launches from Lebanon and Syria,” warned an Israeli official.

General Khalil Helou, as well as Shiite opponent and journalist Ali el-Amine, dismiss this possibility. In an interview with This is Beirut, Helou explains two potential scenarios. The first could involve retaliation via Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, which is deemed “unlikely,” as indicated by both Helou and el- Amine.

Both experts share a common perspective, asserting that such retaliation could lead to an Israeli invasion. While this might align with Tel Aviv’s objectives, neither the Iranians nor the Americans wish for this scenario. It’s relevant to note that an article published last Saturday in the Wall Street Journal, citing anonymous officials, reported that Israelis were preparing for a substantial operation against Lebanon on October 11, just four days after the Hamas offensive.

As Israeli warplanes hovered in the sky and were ready for action, the planned attack was “called off” due to the intervention of US President Joe Biden. He dissuaded Netanyahu from confronting Hezbollah, especially since “such a move could trigger a regional war,” according to the aforementioned article.

Retaliation to the Houthi Attacks

To delve into the facts and better understand why an Iranian retaliation from the southern border of Lebanon is unlikely, one must revisit the motives that led to the killing of Moussavi by Israel. As per General Helou, “the decision to target the Chief Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is viewed as a response to the attacks of the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who are closed to Iran, in the Red Sea.” These attacks have brought the port of Eilat, Israel’s only gateway to the Red Sea located at the country’s southernmost tip, bordering Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to a standstill. Therefore, Helou believes that Hezbollah is not “directly involved” in the retaliatory actions that the Iranians might consider taking against Israel.

The statement released by Hezbollah following General Moussavi’s death further supports this viewpoint. While Tehran openly threatened Israel with repercussions for the crime, Hezbollah chose a more restrained tone, stating that the assassination was “a blatant and shameless attack that has gone beyond acceptable limits.” No further details were provided.

Hence, in retaliation, Iran might choose to “target Israeli institutions or carry out the assassination of Israeli diplomats abroad,” as suggested by the retired general. Furthermore, Tel Aviv could potentially face “long-range missile strikes launched from Syria or Iraq towards Israel,” as emphasized by General Helou and Ali el-Amine.

This scenario unfolded when General Qassem Soleimani was killed in a US raid in Baghdad on January 3, 2020. In retaliation, an Iranian missile targeted the Ain al-Assad US airbase in the Anbar province of Iraq on January 8 of the same year.

Nonetheless, the situation in South Lebanon remains volatile. Escalation is a constant risk, especially since the end of major military operations, as previously hoped-for by observers for the end of January, is now off the table.