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Hezbollah has established itself among the Lebanese population by embodying “the army, the people, and the Resistance.” This expression was coined by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the pro-Iranian movement, in the aftermath of the 2006 war between the Israeli army and the Shiite militia. The armed branch of Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s during the Lebanese Civil War, with the objective of liberating Lebanese territories from Israeli occupation. This Iran-tied movement gradually infiltrated the Lebanese state and became the main obstacle to a peaceful political life in a country that has been unable to elect a President of the Republic for over a year.
In 2000, the withdrawal of the Israeli army gave the Shiite movement national resonance. Six years later, after capturing two Israeli soldiers, Hezbollah militants reinforced the image of “Resistance” among the Lebanese and obtained a ceasefire supported by the international community, which served as a new victory bulletin.
Leveraging a military capacity funded by Iran and Syria alongside the undeniable patriotic sentiment of the Lebanese, Hezbollah has adopted a belligerent posture fueled by blatant antisemitism. Outside the state, Hassan Nasrallah’s allies were the only political parties, during the 1989 Taif Agreement, to retain an armed militia. Since then, Hezbollah’s weapons have sparked heated and divisive debates within Lebanese politics. Inside the state, in an insidious fashion, Hezbollah has succeeded in gaining strong control within security services.
The Army’s Condemnation to Coexistence
Courteous, consensual, and legitimist, the head of the Lebanese Army, General Joseph Aoun, has managed the feat of discreetly garnering support from the Americans while coexisting, through much diplomacy, with Hezbollah. This military figure, respected by all political forces, leads an army composed of about half Christian officers. However, in recent years, President Aoun, an ally of Hezbollah, has pushed for militants from his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to increase their presence among sympathizers within the military institution.
General Joseph Aoun also commands 35% Sunni and 28% Christian non-commissioned officers. Only a quarter of the intermediate military hierarchy is Shiite, but not necessarily under Hezbollah’s influence. “In recent years,” observed an officer, “the army’s emphasis on recruiting women has certainly been a clever way to prevent the entry of fundamentalist Muslim military personnel.”
In Lebanon, everything is about balance. Some army officials are known for their proximity to Hezbollah, such as General Malek Chamas, a member of the military council and director general of administration. His previous roles, including deputy commander of the South Litani sector, deputy director of Intelligence, and Lebanese government coordinator with UNIFIL, illustrate how community quotas are respected within the military institution.
Internal Security Forces (ISF)
The ISF comprises around 30,000 officers and a sophisticated intelligence service, and is considered a Sunni stronghold. Indeed, its leaders belong to the Sunni community. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, eager to build his own political police, provided the ISF with considerable intervention means, including the most advanced surveillance systems in Lebanon. The personnel were trained by the FBI, France, and Italy, with US funding.
The intelligence service, named “Information Service,” was long in direct opposition with the Shiite movement, at least when it was led by General Wissam Al-Hassan, a highly professional figure. ISF investigators implicated Hezbollah and its Syrian ally in the 2005 fatal attack against Rafic Hariri.
Later, in the summer of 2012, General Al-Hassan was also responsible for the arrest of pro-Syrian MP Michel Samaha, sentenced to thirteen years in prison for planning, along with Syrian services, the transportation of explosives from Damascus to Beirut for targeted assassinations. However, two months later, the head of Intelligence was assassinated upon his return from Germany. “Everything indicates,” revealed a close associate of the slain general, “from the car bomb to the perfectly timed explosion, that the Syrians could only have acted with the help of Hezbollah’s operatives.”
Over the past decade, relations between the ISF and Hezbollah have evolved. Hassan Nasrallah and his allies now prefer infiltration over confrontation. Certainly, the current head of the ISF, Imad Osman, is close to the “Future Movement” of former Prime Minister and son of Rafic Hariri, Saad Hariri. The Intelligence service is led by Khaled Hamoud, a Sunni close to the Hariri clan. However, the fight against Israeli networks in Lebanon or against groups linked to the Islamic State often stems from close collaboration between the ISF and Hezbollah-dominated services. All for the sake of efficiency! “As surprising as it may seem,” it is explained in Tripoli, the capital of Lebanese Sunnism, “there are numerous meetings and exchanges of information between former adversaries. This is Lebanon!”
Military Justice Under Influence
Military justice is a minefield where rendering justice is simply impossible. General Hussein Abdallah, a Shiite who never pledged allegiance to Hezbollah, long presided over the military tribunal with a strong commitment to neutrality. Until the day in 2020 where Amer Fakhouri, the former head of the Khiam prison in South Lebanon during Israeli occupation from 1985 to 2000, was arrested. He was suspected of murder and torture. However, the Americans demanded his immediate release; the Lebanese government, in which Hezbollah is involved, complied. Military justice thus released the suspect.
Hezbollah, complicit in this arrangement, absolved itself by fueling a campaign against General Hussein Abdallah, claiming he is “working for Israel,” which forced him to resign.
Military Intelligence
Military Intelligence has been led since 2020 by General Tony Kahwagi, a Maronite whose grandmother was murdered by pro-Syrian Palestinians. Despite this, the new appointee works in good understanding with Hezbollah. How could it be otherwise? “Lebanese President Michel Aoun, who appointed him, is an ally of Shiite forces,” explained a senior officer, “General Kahwagi executes orders like any good soldier.” He added, “He is further supervised by two deputies, one of whom is Shiite and closely linked to Hezbollah.”
Numerous underground networks prompted the departure in 1999 of Military Tribunal Prosecutor Peter Germanos, accused without evidence of corruption while he clashed with Hezbollah’s underhanded tactics. “When officers linked to Hezbollah were caught in any form of trafficking,” explained a lawyer friend, “they were immediately released. Peter Germanos could no longer tolerate this.”
General Security, Hezbollah’s Stronghold
Hezbollah officials understood early on the benefits of controlling airports, ports, and borders. Yet, it is the “General Security” service that manages Lebanon’s major infrastructures. For a long time, it was headed by a Maronite Christian before falling under Hezbollah’s control. In 1998, President Emile Lahoud appointed General Jamil Al-Sayyed, close to both the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, who remained in office. “In the name of fighting terrorism,” explained a Lebanese lawmaker, “General Security can meddle in almost anything.” With 3,000 personnel members, this independent service can wiretap politicians, mobilize special forces, launch judicial inquiries, or infiltrate associations and NGOs.
For the past twelve years, General Abbas Ibrahim, a conduit for Hezbollah, has been the all-powerful head of General Security.
– “What do you think,” AFP asked General Abbas Ibrahim, “about being referred to as a ‘Hezbollah man’?”
– “It doesn’t bother me at all,” he replied.
Mediating between political barons in Lebanon, freeing hostages in Syria, and engaging with foreign services in Washington and Paris, this high-ranking officer maintains an excellent relationship with the head of France’s secret service (DGSE), Bernard Emié. “It is necessary to maintain bridges with the pro-Iranian movement,” said an army officer, “France plays the role of intermediary with the Shiite movement, in line with the rest of the world, overlooking the French hostages taken in the 1980s,” described a “Security” expert from one of the main Lebanese political parties.
Control of Beirut airport is shared by Hezbollah and some officials appointed by its political allies, the Shiite Amal movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). For instance, Badri Daher, the customs director close to FPM, is currently incarcerated as part of the investigation into the August 4, 2020, double explosion at the Beirut Port, implicating Hezbollah for not showing enough vigilance over the stored nitrate in warehouses.
Nevertheless, General Security has shown undeniable talent in combating the Islamic State, whose influence has miraculously been limited in Lebanon despite Syria’s proximity. The Lebanese Shiite head of the anti-terrorist fight has never shown any leniency in combating Sunni members who joined ISIS.
Lebanese State Caught in a Pincer Movement
The agreed-upon expression presenting Hezbollah as “a state within the state” is only partially accurate. The Shiite organization has launched a real takeover bid on a government now caught in a pincer movement—externally by armed militants and internally by security complicity.
In the current climate, it is difficult to envision a positive way out of the crisis. Some want to bet on Hezbollah’s Lebanese reorientation, distancing itself from Iranian influence. Unfortunately, the most likely scenario is witnessing the Shiite movement continue its takeover bid on a Lebanese state that is undermined by an unprecedented crisis.
