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When Amos Hochstein, Senior Advisor to US President Joe Biden on Energy and Security Affairs, visited Beirut lately, he presented an offer to Hezbollah for a ceasefire on the southern front with Israel. However, Hezbollah rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would undermine the party, its position and its role as a “resistance” force. It will also portray it as the initiator of gunfire against Israel, and the one expanding the battlefield, in contrast to its previous communications with officials and external parties.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri urged Hochstein to convey to Israel the necessity to cease fire, accusing it of being the aggressor. Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has indicated that his party’s role is supportive, not confrontational, meaning in retaliation against Israeli hostilities.
According to sources close to Hezbollah, as long as the Gaza war continues, tensions will persist on the southern front. By engaging in the north, the party will be impeding one-third of the Israeli army’s military capabilities, including ground and air, thus alleviating the pressure on Gaza.
As per opposition sources, Hezbollah will not declare a ceasefire, contending that the party, along with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, operate according to an Iranian agenda that prioritizes Iran’s interests over those of Lebanon. Otherwise, Hezbollah would have prohibited Palestinian factions from using South Lebanon to launch rockets at Israel.
What would Lebanon gain from such a scenario? Does igniting the southern front benefit Lebanon’s interests and contribute to resolving its crisis?
A figure from the ‘sovereign camp’, opposed to Hezbollah, argued that the party had previously endorsed and accepted Resolution 1701, committing to implement it and adhere to its content. This commitment was confirmed by the stance of its ministers in the government who raised no objections.
The leading figure wondered what would Lebanon’s stance be in the forthcoming Security Council session on November 22, which will deliberate the application of Resolution 1701. Following the failure of 1701, will there be another resolution under Chapter VII to implement and ensure peace on the southern border with Israel?
As per Western diplomatic sources, Washington aims to exert control over Lebanon’s role to prevent the spread of the conflict and preserve tranquility on the southern front. UNIFIL Commander General Aroldo Lázaro has been urging the antagonists to respect and implement Resolution 1701.
Local political parties have rejected Nasrallah’s pretention that the southern front is a supportive one arguing that such a depiction ends the effectiveness of the international resolution. From a military standpoint, it implies the use of the area to support an ally in an uncomfortable military situation with the enemy.
What is transpiring constitutes a clear violation of Resolution 1701. The resolution defines an area under the international umbrella where no armed presence is allowed with the exception of UNIFIL and the legitimate Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
The leader from the sovereign camp expressed concern over the re-emergence of Palestinian factions in South Lebanon, dreading a recurrence of the 1970 scenario when Palestinian guerrillas fled Jordan to Lebanon following fighting with the Jordanian army.
The government, backed by part of the Lebanese, embraced their presence, whereas the Tripartite Alliance (the “Helf” encompassing the Kataeb party, the Liberal National Party, and the National Bloc) opposed their entry and called for them to be sent back to Jordan.
The Palestinian armed presence became a contentious matter among the Lebanese, ultimately leading to allowing them to establish a zone for their operations against Israel in south Lebanon, commonly referred to as “Fatah Land,” where state apparatuses were denied access.
The international community and the Security Council worked together to end Fatah Land and tasked the Lebanese Army with controlling the situation in the south. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, or, in other words, the Palestinian weapon, was expelled from Lebanon to Tunisia. Those who remained sought refuge in camps under the protection of legitimate forces and arms were forbidden inside the camps.
Nonetheless, internal political maneuvering and divisions among the Lebanese, influenced by the opposing Arab axis, contributed to re-arming the Palestinians who were then exploited by internal and external parties, including Iran, as bargaining tools to enhance their positions in negotiations.
According to Western diplomatic sources, a revival of the “Fatah Land” model in south Lebanon is unacceptable.
They argue that if it wasn’t for Hezbollah, the Palestinian factions would not have reached the front, nor would have dared to cross the borders of the southern governorate.
